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Abstract
From an evolutionary point of view, it can be assumed that visual processing and
rapid  detection  of  potentially  dangerous  stimuli  in  the  environment  (e.g.,  perilous
animals) is highly adaptive for all humans.  In the present dissertation, I address three
research  questions;  (1)  Is  information  processing of  threatening  stimuli  enhanced in
individuals with specific phobias? (2) Are there any differences between the different
types of phobia (e.g., spider phobia vs. snake phobia)? (3) Is the frequently reported
attentional  bias  of  individuals  with  specific  phobias  -  which  may  contribute  to  an
enhancement in information processing – also detectable in a prior entry paradigm? In
Experiments  1  to  3  of  the  present  thesis  non-anxious  control,  spider-fearful,  snake-
fearful, and blood-injection-injury-fearful participants took part in the study. We applied
in each experiment  a response priming paradigm which has a strong theoretical  (cf.
rapid-chase theory; Schmidt, Niehaus, & Nagel, 2006; Schmidt, Haberkamp, Veltkamp
et  al.,  2011)  as  well  as  empirical  background  (cf.  Schmidt,  2002).  We  show  that
information processing in fearful individuals is indeed enhanced for phobic images (i.e.,
spiders  for  spider-fearful  participants;  injuries  for  blood-injury-injection(BII)-fearful
individuals).  However,  we found marked  differences  between the  different  types  of
phobia. In Experiment 1 and 2 (Chapter 2 and 3), spiders had a strong and specific
influence in the group of spider-fearful individuals: Phobic primes entailed the largest
priming  effects,  and  phobic  targets  accelerated  responses,  both  effects  indicating
speeded  response  activation  by  phobic  images.  In  snake-fearful  participants
(Experiment 1, Chapter 2), this processing enhancement for phobic material was less
pronounced and extended to both snake and spider images. In Experiment 3 (Chapter 4),
we demonstrated that early information processing for pictures of small injuries is also
enhanced in BII-fearful participants, even though BII fear is unique in that BII-fearful
individuals  show opposite  physiological  reactions  when confronted  with  the  phobic
stimulus compared to individuals with animal phobias. These results show that already
fast visuomotor responses are further enhanced in spider- and BII-fearful participants.
Results  give  evidence  that  responses  are  based  on  the  first  feedforward  sweep  of
neuronal  activation  proceeding  through  the  visuomotor  system.  I  propose  that  the
additional  enhancement  in  spider-  and  BII-fearful  individuals  depend  on  a  specific
hardwired  binding of  elementary  features  belonging  to  the  phobic  object  in  fearful
individuals  (i.e.,  effortless  recognition of the respective phobic object  via hardwired
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neuronal conjunctions). I suggest that these hardwired conjunctions developed due to
long-term perceptual  learning processes. We also investigate  the frequently reported
attentional bias of phobic individuals and showed that this bias is detectable in temporal
order  judgments  using  a  prior  entry  paradigm.  I  assume  that  perceptual  learning
processes might also strengthen the attentional bias, for example, by providing a more
salient bottom-up signal that draws attention involuntarily. In sum, I conclude that (1)
early information processing of threatening stimuli  is indeed enhanced in individuals
with specific phobias but that (2) differences between divers types of phobia exist (i.e.,
spider- and BII-fearful participants show enhanced information of the respective phobic
object;  though,  snake-fearful  participants  show  no  specific  information  processing
enhancement of snakes); (3) the frequently reported attentional bias of spider-fearful
individuals is also detectable in a prior entry paradigm.
VII
Outline of the present thesis
The present  thesis  aims  to  give further  insight  into  the  processing  of  threat-
relevant stimuli. More specifically, I am interested in how phobic stimuli1 (i.e., threat-
relevant stimuli which are particularly feared by someone with a specific phobia) are
processed by participants with a specific phobia (i.e., a subgroup of anxiety disorder
accompanied by an irrational fear of specific objects or situations) compared to non-
anxious  control  participants.  In  the  four  experiments  introduced  in  this  thesis,  we
applied different methods (i.e., a response priming and a prior entry paradigm) to study
the speed of information processing and the attentional biases in phobic and control
participants. We investigated three different kinds of specific phobias: spider, snake and
blood-injury-injection  (BII)  phobia.  That  approach  enables  us  on  the  one  hand  to
compare and on the other hand to differentiate between the different types of specific
phobias.
Two main reasons motivated the present research. Firstly, three major research
gaps exist  that we try to fill  in with our experiments.  To begin with,  it  is  not fully
understood on which neurophysiological mechanism enhanced information processing
is  based.  The  widespread  assumption  is  that  the  amygdala  is  crucially  involved.
However,  the  results  of  our  response  priming  study  challenge  that  assumption
(Experiment 1/Chapter 2; for a replication of the results see Experiment 2/Chapter 3).
Second, even when the underlying mechanisms of enhanced information processing are
unclear, it is widely accepted that this enhancement exists in individuals with animal
phobia. But, only few studies investigated early information processing (and attentional
bias respectively) in the group of blood-injury-injection phobics. Hence, we conducted a
response priming study to fill that gap (Experiment 3/Chapter 4). Third, it is unknown
whether the attentional bias towards phobic and threat-relevant stimuli also influence
the temporal perception of the same. Therefore, we conducted a prior entry paradigm to
test this assumption in Experiment 4 (Chapter 5). Most importantly, the applied research
methods are well understood, empirical tested by numerous studies (e.g., Schmidt &
Schmidt, 2009;  Weiß & Scharlau, 2012), and are based on theoretical considerations
1 Note that the expression threat-relevant refers to objects or situations which are assumed to be aversive
or  threatening  in  general  but  not  specifically  feared.  The term  phobic  is  used  in  case  an  objects  or
situation is specifically feared by a person. For example, spiders are phobic to spider-fearful individuals.
Neutral objects (e.g., mushrooms) are assumed to elicit no negative emotion at all.
VIII
(e.g.,  rapid-chase  theory;  Schmidt  et  al.,  2006).  Thus,  I  believe  that  our  results
contribute meaningfully to each of the current discussions in the scientific community. 
Secondly,  specific  phobias  have  serious  health  and  social  implication  for
individuals suffering from them. For example, BII-fearful individuals frequently avoid
necessary medical procedures (Kleinknecht & Lenz, 1989; Öst, 1992) which in turn can
be  fatal  in  extreme  cases  (Hamilton,  1995).  Thus,  more  effective  treatments  are
important endeavors. I suppose that basic research on specific phobias – as conducted in
the present thesis – is crucial to achieve that goal. For instance, our results show that
individuals  with  different  phobias  respond  divers  to  the  phobic  stimulus  material.
Spider-fearful  individuals  show  a  very  specific  response  pattern  towards  spiders.
However, snake-fearful individuals show a more general information enhancement to
threat-relevant stimuli  per se (i.e.,  they respond faster to snakes but also to spiders).
Accordingly, these results indicate that spider phobia should be treated very specifically
focusing on the specific fear for spiders. In contrast, snake-fearful participants show a
general hypervigilance pattern. Therefore, the treatment of snake phobia should focus
on fear in general.  In sum, the research gaps described above and the importance of
basic research for the understanding and treatment of anxiety disorders are the rationale
for the present thesis.
IX
1. General introduction
Anxiety  disorders  are  the  most  prevalent  class  of  clinical  disorders  among
German  adults  with  a  12-month  prevalence (i.e.,  frequency  of  affected  individuals
within a year) of 14.5 percent (Jacobi et al., 2004). They include specific diagnoses of
panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), post-
traumatic  stress  disorder  (PTSD),  acute  stress  disorder,  generalized  anxiety disorder
(GAD), substance-induced anxiety disorder,  anxiety disorder not  otherwise specified
(NOS),  as  well  as  specific  phobias  (e.g.,  fear  of  spiders)  (DSM-IV-TR,  American
Psychiatric Association, APA, 2000). In addition to feelings of fear or concern, people
with  anxiety  disorders  suffer  from  somatic  symptoms,  like  increased  heart  rate,
dizziness,  chest  tightness  (Barlow,  2002),  muscle  tension,  hyper-vigilance,  sleep
disturbance, and fatigue  (Wetherell, Lang, & Stein,  2006). Anxiety disorders are also
characterized by specific cognitive characteristics including feelings of risk and danger
and a sense of diminished coping abilities in anxiety-related situations (Beck, Emery, &
Greenberg, 1985). 
These  cognitive  particularities  also  affect  basic  processes  of  perception  and
information  processing;  for  instance,  ambiguous  and even neutral  visual  stimuli  are
interpreted as threat-relevant by people suffering from anxiety disorders  (Wetherell et
al., 2006). Moreover, they attend to threat-relevant stimuli more frequently compared to
non-anxious  individuals.  This  attentional  bias  (i.e.,  attention  is  automatically  and
involuntarily drawn towards threat-relevant stimuli) has been demonstrated in several
recent studies (Fox, Griggs, & Mouchlianitis, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Rinck &
Becker, 2006; for reviews see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin,
Bakermans-Kranenburg,  &  van  Ijzendoorn,  2007).  When  threat-relevant  stimuli  are
present, it generally leads to an increased distractibility and poorer task performance
(e.g.,  Devue,  Belopolsky,  &  Theeuwes,  2011).  Because  this  bias  in  information
processing is of special interest for the present thesis, it will be addressed in detail in
Section 1.5. “Attentional biases in specific phobias”. The present thesis will focus on
one major class of anxiety disorders, namely on specific phobias. 
Specific phobias - the name stems from the Greek God of war Phobos who sent
Ares into the enemy's camp to spread fear and terror - are defined as extremely intensive
and persistent reactions of fear which are caused by specific situations or objects. 
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Depending on the situation or object of fear, different forms of specific  phobias are
distinguished (e.g., spider phobia or blood-injury-injection phobia). People with phobias
try to  avoid these situations  or objects,  which might  in fact result  in the permanent
maintenance of the specific phobia: although avoidance reduces fear for the short term,
it also prevents sufficiently long exposure to the threat-relevant stimulus to unlearn the
initial fear response (Rinck & Becker, 2006).
Note that there exists a high variability in normal fear reactions towards threat-
relevant  objects  or  situations  in  people  without  specific  phobia  as  well  as  a  high
variability in the fear reactions of phobic individuals. To judge the clinical relevance of
a given fear, a set of clearly defined criteria exist which will be discussed in the next
section.
1.1. Diagnostic criteria for specific phobias
In Germany, a total of 8 percent of the citizens develop some sort of specific
phobia in the course of their life, with women being affected twice as often as men
(Wittchen, 1986). Thus, this class of psychological disorder poses a major health issue. I
propose that basic research on specific phobias helps to improve treatments of the same.
Specific  phobias  are  usually  assessed  by  one  of  the  two  most  widespread
systems;  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders (DSM-IV-TR,
American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000) - which is mostly used in the United
States  and  is  the  gold  standard  in  scientific  publications  -  and  the  International
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD 10;  Dilling,
Mombour, & Schmidt, 2000) -  which is mostly used by European psychologists and
psychiatrists.  In  the  following,  I  list  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  specific  phobias
according to the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). 
“Diagnostic criteria for specific phobia (300.29)
A) Marked  and  persistent  fear  that  is  excessive  or  unreasonable,  cued  by  the
presence or anticipation of a specific object or situation (e.g., flying, heights,
animals, receiving an injection, seeing blood).
B) Exposure  to  the  phobic  stimulus  almost  invariably  provokes  an  immediate
anxiety  response,  which  may  take  the  form  of  a  situationally  bound  or
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situationally  predisposed panic attack.  Note:  In  children,  the anxiety may be
expressed by crying, tantrums, freezing, or clinging.
C) The  person  recognizes  that  the  fear  is  excessive  or  unreasonable.  Note:  In
children, this feature may be absent.
D) The phobic situation(s)  is avoided or else is  endured with intense anxiety or
distress.
E) The  avoidance,  anxious  anticipation,  or  distress  in  the  feared  situation(s)
interferes  significantly  with  the  person's  normal  routine,  occupational  (or
academic) functioning, or social activities or relationships,  or there is marked
distress about having the phobia.
F) In individuals under age 18 years, the duration is at least 6 months. 
G) The  anxiety,  panic  attacks,  or  phobic  avoidance  associated  with  the  specific
object or situation are not better accounted for by another mental disorder, such
as obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., fear of dirt in someone with an obsession
about contamination), post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g., avoidance of stimuli
associated with a severe stressor), separation anxiety disorder (e.g., avoidance of
school),  social  phobia (e.g.,  avoidance of social  situations because of fear of
embarrassment),  panic  disorder  with  agoraphobia,  or  agoraphobia  without
history of panic disorder” (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000, p. 449-450).
Besides these general criteria, specific phobias are classified in several subtypes
due to differences in symptoms, epidemiology, onset of phobia, and prognosis: animal
type (e.g.,  spider and snake phobia), natural  environment type (e.g.,  heights, storms,
water), blood-injection-injury type, situational type (e.g., airplanes, elevators, enclosed
places), and other type (e.g., phobic avoidance of situations that may lead to choking,
vomiting, or contracting an illness; in children: avoidance of loud sounds or costumed
characters; Hamm, 2006). 
In the daily routine of mental health care and clinical research, several diagnostic
instruments  are  at  hand to diagnose specific  phobias  in  patients  or  participants.  For
example, in our experiments, we firstly used a semi-structured interview which is based
on the DSM-IV-TR classification system and provides important information about the
clinical  relevance  of  the  particular  specific  phobia  (“Diagnostisches  Interview  bei
3
psychischen Störungen” DIPS, Schneider & Margraf, 2006). Furthermore, self rating
questionnaires are conducted to measure the severity of the participant's symptoms and
are  available  for  a  wide  range  of  different  specific  phobias  (e.g.,  the  'Snake
Questionnaire' SNAQ by Klorman, Weerts, Hastings, Melamed, & Lang, 1974; or the
German  questionnaire  'Fragebogen  zur  Angst  vor  Spinnen  [Questionnaire  of  spider
fear]' FAS by Rinck et al., 2002). 
Yet, there are persons who develop a specific phobia whereat other persons in
the same situation with the similar life experiences seem to be immune to acquire that
fear. So, what causes these interindividual differences in the acquisition of fear and are
there  protective  factors  that  prevent  the  development  of  specific  phobias?  Several
behavioral and cognitive theories try to explain the origin of specific phobias and in that
course name different factors which account for individual differences. 
1.2. A history of models on fear acquisition 
In this section, I overview the most influential theories on the origin of specific
phobia. Three of the five discussed models make predictions about how threat-relevant
stimuli are processed in humans while different explanations sometimes overlap with
one another.  The different  assumptions  on enhanced information  processing will  be
discussed in section 1.4. “Enhanced information processing in specific phobias”. The
Classical Conditioning Model can be assumed to be the starting point of the scientific
examination of specific phobias. All subsequent models or theories are either extensions
or arose as a critique of the original model. Therefore, I will start the historical overview
with the Classical Conditioning Model and discuss the successive models and theories
with respect to the limitations of the original model. 
1.2.1. The classical conditioning model
Classical conditioning has its origin in animal research studies and is strongly
influenced by the work of John B. Watson in the early 20th century (e.g., Watson &
Rayner, 1920). In their famous study, Watson and Rayner (1920) aimed to investigate
the  origin  of  specific  phobias  by  conditioning  a  9-month  old  child  named  Albert.
According to the authors, Albert was an emotionally stable child, raised in an hospital
environment,  and  one  of  the  best  developed  babies  in  the  group.  In  a  baseline
4
experiment, they confronted Albert successively and for the first time “with a white rat,
a  rabbit,  a  dog, a monkey,  with masks with and without  hair,  cotton wool,  burning
newspapers, etc.” (Watson & Rayner, 1920, p. 2). Albert showed no fear of any of the
items. To test if loud sounds cause a fear reaction in Albert, the experimenter stroke a
hammer upon a steel bar. They wrote:
“One of the two experimenters caused the child to turn its head and fixate her moving hand; the
other,  stationed back of  the child,  struck the steel  bar  a  sharp  blow. The child started  violently,  his
breathing was checked and the arms were raised in a characteristic manner. On the second stimulation the
same thing occurred, and in addition the lips began to pucker and tremble. On the third stimulation the
child broke into a sudden crying fit. This is the first time an emotional situation in the laboratory has
produced any fear or even crying in Albert” (Watson & Rayner, 1920, p. 2).
When Albert  was in  the age of 12-months,  the authors placed a rat  close to
Albert and he was allowed to play with it.  In line with the findings of the baseline,
Albert experienced no fear towards the rat. In the following, the authors stroke the steel
bar with a hammer behind Albert's back. Albert responded to the sound by showing fear
and crying. After several trials, they placed the rat close to Albert without presenting the
noise. However, Albert showed fear symptoms once the rat  appeared.  Evidently,  the
baby  had  learned  the  association  between  the  white  rat  and  the  loud  noise.  In
conditioning terms,  the  noise was an  unconditioned stimulus (US) which elicited  in
Albert  an  unconditioned  response (UR)  of  fear.  The  rat  represented  a  conditioned
stimulus (CS) – a formerly neutral stimulus that became associated with the noise and,
therefore, triggered fear responses in Albert. The associated fear of Albert with the rat
represent the  conditioned response (CR). 5 days  later,  the authors confronted Albert
with other animals like rabbits, dogs and objects like fur coats and Albert also showed
fear  symptoms.  The authors concluded that  Albert's  conditioned fear  of the rat  also
generalized to other furry animal  and objects.  The experiment  demonstrate  one way
specific  phobias  might  develop.  However,  there  is  no  evidence  that  Albert  indeed
developed a specific fear of rats or furry animals or objects. 10 days after the initial
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combination  of  the rat  and the noise,  Albert  was again confronted  with the rat.  He
started to crawl away but there was no crying. 
According to Harris (1979), the study by Watson and Rayner was misinterpreted
by  many  introductory-level  textbooks  for  graduate  students  ranging  from  small
misinterpretations including Albert's name, his age, the spelling of Rayner's name, and
whether the conditioned stimulus was a rat or a rabbit to more significant interpretations
including Albert's life and alleged fear after the experiment (for example of fur pelts, a
man's  beard,  a white furry glove,  the fur coat of his mother,  or even a teddy bear).
Additionally,  happy  endings  had  been  invented  by  including  the  fact  that  Watson
'reconditioned' Albert after the experiment (Harris, 1979). 
Beside the misinterpretations, the study of Watson and Rayner (1920) should not
be  over-interpreted  in  favor  of  the  classical  conditioning  account  due  to  various
methodological reasons. First, the study included merely one single participant. Second,
as stated above, it is unclear whether Albert indeed developed a specific phobia of rats
and whether a post-experimental generalization effect occurred. Third, emotions were
not reliably assessed (cf. Sherman, 1927). Fourth, the experiment  confound classical
and instrumental conditioning. At least in three trails the loud was mad when Albert was
actively touching the rat or reaching out for the rat  (Larson, 1978;  Reese & Lipsitt,
1970). Finally, the experiment can be considered as highly unethical and replications are
not realizable today. Harris (1979) commented the study by writing in his article: “It
may be useful  for  modern  learning theorists  to  see how the Albert  study prompted
subsequent research [...], but it seems time, finally, to place the Watson and Rayner data
in the category of “interesting but uninterpretable results” (p. 158). 
Despite  the  high  face  validity  of  the  classical  conditioning  model,  clinicians
often fail to discover the specific conditioning events which caused the specific phobia
(Herbert, 1994). For instance, Öst (1992) found that 17 percent of blood or injection
phobics  did  not  recall  any  specific  cause  for  their  disorder.  Therefore,  alternative
explanation for the acquisition of fear emerged.
1.2.2. Social learning theory
To begin with, researches realized that the acquisition of fear could be modified
by family  members'  particularly  by  parents'  behavior  (e.g.,  Rachman,  1978).  These
findings  were  linked  to  Bandura's  Social  Learning Theory  and  Modeling (Bandura,
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1977; Bandura & Rosenthal, 1966). Bandura's approach indicates that learning takes
place  in  a  social  context.  Like  other  social  behavior,  fear  can  be  primarily  learned
through observation and imitation. Bandura and Rosenthal (1966) conducted a study in
which  a  participant  watched  an  experimenters'  confederate  who  pretended  being
shocked by electricity each time a buzzer sounded. After watching several episodes, the
participants themselves experienced fear whenever they heard the buzzer. Additionally,
in Cook and Mineka's (1989) study rhesus monkeys watched a monkey model behaving
fearfully to toy snakes and toy crocodiles. As a result, these monkeys acquired fear of
the respective toys. Moreover, the probability increases that children develop a specific
fear towards an object (e.g., a spider) or situation (e.g., air travel) if their parents show
fear  of  the  respective  object  or  situation.  Correspondingly,  children  with  specific
phobias frequently report that they have observed their parents reacting fearful in the
same or similar situations (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).
However, social learning can also lead to a significant reduction in fear. Bandura
and Menlove (1968) conducted a desensitization study in which dog-fearful children
watched either a movie in which a model interacted non-anxiously with a single dog or
a movie in which a variety of models  interacted non-anxiously with numerous dogs
varying  in  race.  In  both  groups,  children's  avoidance  behavior  was  significantly
reduced. Subsequent, these aspects were integrated and extended the assumptions of the
classical conditioning model (Coelho & Purkis, 2009). 
1.2.3. Preparedness
Additionally,  the  Classical  Conditioning  Model  implies  that  every  arbitrary
stimulus  may become fearsome by conditioning.  But,  phobias  are  mostly connected
with just a limited number of stimulus categories (e.g., spiders, snakes, heights, blood,
thunderstorms, and not, e.g., flowers, cf. Cook & Mineka, 1989). Therefore, the concept
of  preparedness (Garcia  & Koelling,  1967,  see also Mineka & Zinbarg,  2006) was
added to the model. In this perspective, individuals are, in varying degrees, biologically
prepared to develop a phobia when confronted with stimuli that are related to survival.
Frequently, these stimuli include spiders, but only 200 species of spiders out of 30,000
are potentially lethal to humans (Diaz, 2004). In contrast,  mushrooms which are not
regarded as fearful stimuli can indeed cause poisoning in humans (Kotwica & Czerczak,
2007). Alone in the United States, 100 species of poisonous mushrooms exist (Lincoff
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& Mitchel, 1977). Taken together, mushrooms present a greater hazard to humans than
spiders  (Coelho  &  Purkis,  2009)  and  yet  humans  do  not  demonstrate  a  fear  of
mushrooms. 
However, it should be considered that biological preparedness might be related
strictly  to stimulus  categories  that  require  actions  such as fight (i.e.,  aggressive and
combative behavior) and  flight  (i.e.,  fleeing potentially  threat-relevant  situations).  In
other words, the person's internal physiological state changes confronted with threat.
These changes prepare the person for possible 'fight or flight' reactions (Cannon, 1929).
These  actions  are  relevant  to  react  to  the  sudden appearance  of  animals.  However,
biological  preparedness  might  not  be necessarily  related  to  the actual  danger  of  the
respective stimuli but to the necessity of fight and flight reactions.
However, the classical conditioning model assumes not only that every arbitrary
stimulus can become fearsome by fear conditioning, but that this link can be learned by
every animal or person. That is, genetic influences are not considered in the original
model.  Two recent  models  acknowledge the  influence  of  heritability  and evolution,
respectively; the Non-Associative Model and the Fear Module Theory.
1.2.4. The non-associative model
The non-associative model assumes that humans will develop certain fears to a
specific  set  of  evolutionary  relevant  stimuli  without  any  associative  learning  (e.g.,
classical conditioning), social learning or vicarious information. The approach suggest
that individuals who experience some fear towards dangerous objects or situations are
favored via Darwinian natural selection compared to individuals who initially have to
acquire fear through either direct or indirect learning processes.
Menzies  and Clarke  (1993) asked the  parents  of  50 children  with  diagnosed
water phobia to name the most important factor which led to the development of their
child's  phobia.  Importantly,  only  one  parent  could  recall  an  event  of  classical
conditioning while more than 50 percent of the parents reported that their child's fear of
water had always been present. However, the main disadvantage of the non-associative
model is that it does not account for the complexity of fear acquisition by including all
relevant factors (e.g., the individual vulnerability to fear, the level of development of the
child, the previous experiences with uncontrollable events, or the initial beliefs about a
stimulus).  Furthermore,  retrospective  recall  carries  certain  problems.  According  to
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Nisbett and Wilson (1997), verbal reports are not sufficient to reveal causal processes.
That point is even more problematic given that learning and conditioning can happen
outside  of  awareness  (Öhman  &  Soares,  1994).  Furthermore,  human  memory  is
unstable; it can easily be changed, for example, based on experiences (Loftus, 2004).
This is especially true for children's memories (Brainerd & Mojardin, 1998). Finally, the
non-associative model hypothesizes a strong role of heritability in the development of
phobias (Coelho & Purkis, 2009); however, a study of twins did not support this notion
(Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1992). 
1.2.5. The fear module theory
Öhman and Mineka (2001) proposed their idea of a module for fear acquisition
which is based on the concept of evolutionary adaptiveness.  In contrast  to the Non-
associative  theory,  direct  contact  with  the  potentially  threat-relevant  stimulus  is  a
precondition  for  fear  acquisition.  But,  similar  to  the  assumptions  of  this  theory,
particular stimuli exist which are evolutionarily relevant and which also elicit fear more
easily compared to potentially dangerous but contemporary stimuli (e.g., guns) (Fox et
al.,  2007).  According  to  Öhman  and  Mineka  (2001),  danger  existed  in  the  early
mammalian environment in the form of hunting predators, falling objects, floods, and
thunderstorms. Plausible reactions to these events were escape and avoidance of the
potentially threat-relevant situations or locations. To escape potential danger, mammals
needed at least a perceptual system to identify the threat and a reflexively wired motor
system to  enable  flight.  Both  systems  had to  be  connected  in  a  way that  increases
effectiveness and avoids stereotyped behavior, so that depending on the circumstances
different  response options  like  freeze,  escape,  or  attack  can be chosen.  The authors
assume that  this  connection  is  made by a  central  motive  state,  which is  commonly
known as fear (e.g., Öhman, 1993). 
From an evolutionary perspective, these learned survival-relevant relationships
would become a factor in the process of natural selection. Based on these assumptions,
the authors developed a new concept of an evolutionary fear model with four important
characteristics. (1) The fear module is preferentially activated for defensive behavior by
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stimuli which are evolutionarily fear-relevant.2 (2) Its activation is automatic and fast.
(3) If fear is once initiated it is relative independent of cognitive control. (4) The fear
module is based on a neural circuitry which is centered on the amygdala. In contrast to
classical  conditioning  models,  the  fear  module  theory  can  explain  why  an  uneven
distribution of fear stimuli exists, that means, why people develop a specific phobia of
spiders and snakes but do not develop a specific phobia of weapons and motorcycles.
Furthermore,  the theory explains the fact that evolutionarily fear-relevant stimuli  are
easier to train in the laboratory compared to evolutionarily fear-irrelevant stimuli. 
However, the role of the amygdala had been questioned in recent studies (e.g.,
Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Phillips  et al., 2004; Piech et al.,
2010; Tsuchiya,  Moradi, Felsen, Yamazaki, & Adolphs, 2009). The discussion about
the role of the amygdala per se and particularly in enhanced information processing is of
utmost importance for the present thesis and, therefore, will be reviewed in more detail
in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) and Section 6.2. “Enhanced information processing and the
amygdala  network”.  Furthermore,  the  fear  module  theory  does  not  account  for
interindividual  differences  in  fear  acquisition.  For  example,  early  exposure  to  a
particular  stimulus  can  impede  a  subsequent  aversive  conditioning  even  if  it  is
evolutionarily fear-relevant – e.g., non-traumatic experiences with spiders or snakes can
prevent the acquisition of the respective fears (Coelho & Purkis, 2009). The latter point
is acknowledged by cognitive models of fear learning which emphasize the importance
of beliefs and expectancies. Therefore, they provide a theoretical background to explain
interindividual differences beyond the assumptions of the original classical conditioning
model in which cognitive factors did not play a role.
1.2.6. Cognitive models
Some  authors  emphasize  that  conditioning  is  a  cognitive  process  (Thorpe  &
Salkovskis, 1995). Indeed, humans learn that two events (i.e., an aversive event and a
neutral event) occur simultaneously in time and, hence, become connected and produce
the same (emotional) response. Consequently, the authors assume that expectations play
an important role (Tolman, 1949). For example, Davey (1995) argues that participants
2 Note that anxiety is mostly referred to as being an unpleasant, vague emotional state whereas fear is the
emotional reaction to a specific object or situation. If fear of a concrete object or situation is irrational and
inappropriate we refer to it as a specific phobia.
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may have certain expectations about the relationship between threat-relevant stimuli and
aversive events. Specifically, they may assume that fear-relevant stimuli are more often
followed by an aversive event (e.g., electric shocks) compared to fear-irrelevant stimuli.
Accordingly, participants would report that fear-relevant stimuli were more often paired
with aversive events even if this was not true. In one of their early experiments, Öhman
and  colleagues  (Öhman,  Eriksson,  Fredriksson,  Hugdahl,  &  Olofsson,  1974)
investigated  habituation  processes  by  presenting  participants  with  putative  aversive
pictures of snakes and spiders or putative neutral pictures of houses. The first emotional
orienting response triggered by the pictures was measured by electrodermal electrodes
(i.e., it is assumed that skin conductance can be used as a measurement of autonomic
arousal and fear, respectively). They found that participants habituated faster to neutral
fear-irrelevant pictures (in that case the orientation responses were less strong). In a
subsequent experiment, the authors applied electric shocks before the experiment and
threatened that more shocks would be given during the experiment.  In that case, the
differences  in  skin  conductance  increased  dramatically  (i.e.,  responses  to  aversive
pictures were four times as strong compared to neutral pictures). The authors concluded
from  their  results  that  spiders  and  snakes  are  biologically  prepared  stimuli  and,
therefore, easier to condition. 
Supporter of the cognitive approach would argue that the participants expected
that aversive pictures would more likely to be followed by shocks compared to neutral
pictures. Therefore, their arousal increased after the presentation of spider and snake
images.  According  to  Coelho  and  Purkis  (2009),  the  mentioned  bias  seems  to  be
stronger for  phylogenetic (i.e., evolutionarily acquired) compared to  ontogenetic (i.e.,
acquired  within a  lifespan)  fear-relevant  stimuli.  One major  point  of  critique  of the
cognitive models is that, in line with the Fear Module Theory, fear can be elicited in an
automatic fashion and mostly independent from the participant's cognition. Still, Davey
(1995) argues that the repeatedly demonstrated information processing bias of threat-
relevant stimuli (e.g., Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Piech
et al., 2010) is based mainly on expectations rather than phylogenetic predispositions.
Summing  up,  the  popular  Classical  Conditioning  Model assumes  that  the
acquisition of fear in specific phobia is mostly due to aversive events in the past leading
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to conditioned fear responses. This accounts is further expanded by the Social Learning
Theory and the concept of Preparedness. Secondly, the Non-Associative Theory states
that the development of specific phobias is possible without any classical conditioning
experiences.  In  contrast,  fear  responses  should  be  hereditary  via  Darwinian  natural
selection. Thirdly, the  Fear Module Theory proposes that the concept of evolutionary
adaptiveness  plays  the  most  important  role  in  the  acquisition  of  fear  and  the
corresponding  responses.  And  finally,  Cognitive  Models  emphasize  the  role  of
expectations  in  the  origin  of  specific  phobias  and enhanced information  processing.
Most models discussed here assume that threat-relevant stimuli are processed faster than
neutral  ones, either due to emotional,  evolutionary,  or cognitive factors. However, it
seems inadequate to discuss them separately. Davey (1995) acknowledged the fact that,
for example, expectation bias and evolutionary predisposition may coexist. More recent
models explicitly try to integrate different factors. For instance, Mineka and Zinbarg
(2006)  used  elements  of  learning  theories  as  well  as  of  the  preparedness  model  to
describe the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders. Thus, it seems that natural
selection as well as everyday life experiences can play a role in the acquisition of fear.
While phylogenetic evolution may create general predispositions, ontogenetic learning
can contribute to the individual occurrence of a specific fear. To my knowledge, no
empirical study exists which aimed to truly differentiate between the current theories of
fear  acquisition.  However,  numerous studies  give evidence  or challenge the debated
models (cf. Coelho & Purkis, 2009).
In addition  to theories  on the origin of specific  phobias,  several  theories  are
engaged in explaining the biological foundations of fear reactions, in the central as well
as the peripheral system. The next paragraphs will briefly overview the main theories
and most recent findings in the neurobiology of anxiety. 
1.3. Neurobiology of anxiety
The brain structure mostly associated with fear is the amygdala, which is one of
the subcoritcal structures of the brain and receives input from the thalamus as well as
the cortex. The amygdala  controls freezing,  blood pressure,  and stress hormones  by
projections  to  the  periaqueductal  gray,  lateral  hypothalamus,  periventricular
hypothalamus,  and the reticulopontis  caudalis  (which is  a  critical  component  of  the
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startle reflex, i.e.,  protecting the eye by eye blink;  LeDoux, 1995). Thus, according to
LeDoux (1995), the amygdala is by far the most important brain structure for human
fear responses. Later, other brain structures were described that are involved in anxiety.
Firstly, the locus coeruleus regulates arousal and attention. Secondly, the hippocampus
that encodes emotionally relevant information, and, thirdly,  the prefrontal cortex that
plays  an  important  role  in  modifying  behavior  towards  threat-relevant  stimuli
(Wetherell et al., 2006).
Gray emphasized different brain structures in emotional responses and proposed
a model which includes a behavioral inhibition system (BIS), a behavioral  approach
system (BAS), and a fight-flight system (e.g., Gray & McNaughton, 1996). In his view,
the BIS consisting of the septal area, hippocampus, and the Papez circuit suppresses
behavior and directs attention to stimuli which are new or potentially followed by non-
reward  or  punishment.  According  to  Gray,  fear  or  anxiety  is  caused  by  an  overly
reactive BIS. In contrast,  the BAS which consists  of the medial  forebrain bundle is
activated in situations when punishment is unlikely and reward likely. Finally, the fight-
flight  system,  which  is  composed  of  the  central  periaqueductal  gray,  the  medial
hypothalamus, and the amygdala,  prepares aggressive defense reactions  or escape in
potentially dangerous situations. 
Also,  different  neurotransmitters  are  involved in  fear  reactions.  I  will  briefly
describe  the  five  most  important  neurotransmitters  and  their  properties.  Firstly,  the
release of γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA) opens neuronal chloride channels which lead to
a  decreased  responsiveness  of  the  nerve  cells.  Knock-out  studies  with  mice  were
conducted to investigate the influence of the GABAA receptors on anxiety. They showed
that  dysfunctions  of  these  receptors  led to  a  reduced benzodiazepine  binding in  the
hippocampus and cerebral cortex which in turn elicited increased behavioral reactivity
to aversive stimuli in these knock-out mice (Crestani et al., 1999; cf., Nemeroff, 2003).
Secondly,  the noradrenergic system plays an important role in arousal regulation and
improves the signal-to-noise ratio for relevant events in the environment (Wetherell et
al., 2006). Thirdly, a decreased release of serotonin leads to an increased responsiveness
to punishment and fear.  However, different serotonin receptors3 seem to play different
3 Note that fourteen different serotonine receptors exist which are classified into seven categories (ranging
from 5HT1 to 5HT7; Andrade et al., 2013; Wesolowska, 2002).
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roles  in  fear  reactions:  the  presynaptic  activation  of  the  5HT1a receptor  leads  to  a
reduced fear reaction whereas the postsynaptic activation of the 5HT1a receptor as well
as the 5HT1b, 5HT1c, 5HT2a, 5HT2c and 5HT3 receptors leads to an increased fear reaction
reaction.  Also,  serotonin  indirectly  influences  the  noradrenergic  and  dopaminergic
transmitter  systems  in  which  the  latter  system  increases  motivation  and  coping
responses  in  threat-relevant  situations.  Fourthly,  glutamate  as  an  excitatory
neurotransmitter plays an important role in the acquisition of memories and conditioned
emotional responses. Finally, corticotropin-releasing hormone, which acts as a hormone
as well as a neurotransmitter, activates most of the physiological sensations experienced
in threat-relevant situations by activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. 
Furthermore, several hormones are associated with fear reactions. Specifically, it
was hypothesized that the release of epinephrine, norepinephrine, cortisol, and growth
hormone  is  increased,  and  in  men  the  release  of  testosterone  is  decreased  in  fear
reactions (e.g., Noyes & Hoehn-Saric, 1998). However, an increase or a decrease of the
respective hormones were not consistently demonstrated across studies (Wetherell et al.,
2006). Though, the underlying neurobiological principals are crucial for the medication
of anxiety disorders, but play an inferior role in the present thesis. Hereafter,  I will
mainly focus on the neurophysiological mechanisms of anxiety (i.e., in term of neuronal
structures; cf. Section 6.3.2. “The neural basis of perceptual learning”). 
 In the following sections, I focus on the aspect of specific phobias which are
most  relevant  for  the  conducted  experiments  of  the  present  thesis;  (1)  enhanced
information processing in specific phobias and (2) attentional bias in specific phobias.
Furthermore, I link these topics to the applied methods of response priming and prior
entry.
1.4. Enhanced information processing in specific phobias
From an evolutionary point of view (cf. Section 1.2.3. “Preparedness”, 1.2.5.
“The fear module theory”), it can be assumed that visual processing and rapid detection
of potentially dangerous stimuli in the environment is highly adaptive for all humans. In
addition, that ability should be further enhanced if the given stimulus (e.g., a spider) is
interpreted as threatening by one individual (e.g., by a spider phobic) even if the same
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stimulus is taken as harmless by another non-anxious individual.  Empirical evidence
indicates  that  the  processing  of  threat-relevant  objects  is  enhanced  in  the  general
population (Fox et al., 2000; Lipp & Waters, 2007; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Williams,
Moss, Bradshaw, & Mattinley, 2005; but see Tipples, Young, Quinlan, Broks, & Ellis,
2002) as well as in individuals with specific phobias, (Lipp & Waters, 2007;  Öhman,
Flykt  et  al.,  2001) and other anxiety disorders (e.g.,  social  anxiety:  Eastwood et al.,
2005; Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999). 
For instance, in the study by Öhman, Flykt and colleagues (2001), non-anxious
control  participants,  spider phobics,  and snake phobics had to search for pictures of
spiders  or  snakes  in  grid-pattern  arrays  of  flower and mushroom pictures,  and vice
versa.  Potentially  threat-relevant  pictures  of  spiders  and  snakes  were  found  more
quickly than neutral pictures by all three groups, with even faster performance in the
two phobic groups. Furthermore, search times for spider and snake targets but not for
neutral  targets  (flowers  and mushrooms)  were  largely  unaffected  by the  number  of
distractors (which normally increase response times in serial search tasks). That effect
was further  enhanced in  phobic participants.  These  results  suggest  that  detection  of
phobic pictures might be preattentive, such that pictures are not processed serially but
simultaneously across the visual field (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Even though such a
“pop out” effect was not consistently found in more recent studies (Yiend, 2010) the
evidence points to an information processing advantage for threat-relevant and phobic
stimuli.
1.4.1. The response priming paradigm
Response priming is a well-understood method (Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Klotz
& Wolff, 1995; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003; also cf.
Schmidt,  Haberkamp,  &  Schmidt,  2011)  which  enables  us  to  determine  whether
accelerated  processing of  fear-relevant  images  is  detectable  at  the  earliest  stages  of
observable behavior. Also, response priming has not been applied in this research field
before.  In response priming,  participants  have to  classify a target  stimulus  into two
response categories (e.g., animal vs non-animal), performing a speeded motor response.
The target stimulus (e.g., a spider) is preceded by a prime stimulus triggering either the
same  response  as  the  target  (consistent  prime;  e.g.,  another  spider)  or  the  opposite
response  (inconsistent  prime; e.g.,  a  flower).  If  the  prime  is  consistent,  it  speeds
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responses to the target; if it is inconsistent, it slows responses. This  response priming
effect  increases with increasing stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) between prime and
target for SOAs up to 100 ms. In that case, the priming effects increase approximately
linearly with SOA (Vorberg et al., 2003).
1.4.2. The rapid-chase theory of response priming
While  response  compatibility  paradigms  have  been  used  before  to  study
processing  advantages  for  fear-relevant  material,  response  priming  has  special
properties that have not yet been confirmed for other paradigms. Firstly, many studies
have confirmed that primes directly initiate the specific motor responses assigned to
them  (e.g.,  Leuthold  &  Kopp,  1998;  Schmidt,  2002).  Therefore,  response  priming
effects are directly related to the visuomotor processes triggered by visual stimuli, and
are  sensitive  to  differences  in  visuomotor  processing.  Secondly,  behavioral  and
electrophysiological  evidence  links  response  priming  to  visuomotor  feedforward
processing, because the earliest output of the motor system is controlled exclusively by
the prime but is independent of all properties of the target. This was established for
lateralized readiness potentials (Vath & Schmidt, 2007). More specifically, ERP-studies
showed that  the prime triggers  relative increases in EEG negativity before response
execution takes place and that these are stronger in the motor cortex contralateral to the
responding  hand  (Eimer  &  Schlaghecken,  1998;  Klotz,  Heumann,  Ansorge,  &
Neumann,  2007; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Vath & Schmidt,  2007; also cf.  Schmidt,
Haberkamp, & Schmidt, 2011). 
These studies showed that initially the prime activates the response assigned to
it,  and  then  after  the  target-onset  the  response  is  controlled  by  the  target  (i.e.,  an
inconsistent target would trigger the reaction opposite to the one elicited by the prime).
Accordingly,  if  the  prime  has  more  time  to  influence  the  motor  response,  priming
effects increase with prime-target SOA (for a mathematical model, see Vorberg et al.,
2003). These effects can also be observed in the spatial domain. Goal-directed pointing
responses are initially driven by the prime and in inconsistent cases mislead them in the
wrong direction (Schmidt et al., 2006; Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009). In line with these
results, in trials with inconsistent primes preceding the target the error rates increase
compared to consistent trials. 
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In 2006, Schmidt  and colleagues  proposed  a rapid-chase theory of  response
priming.  They  argue that  enhanced  information  processing  is  based  on  sequential
feedforward sweeps elicited by prime and target stimuli which activate the associated
motor  responses  in  strict  sequence  and  without  temporal  overlap  (cf.  Schmidt,
Haberkamp, Veltkamp et al., 2011). This theory predicts that the motor response should
first be controlled exclusively by the prime signal and only later by the actual target
signal. Because the theory assumes that the target’s feedforward sweep cannot catch up
with that  of the prime,  it  makes  the strong prediction  that  response priming effects
should be fully present in the fastest responses and should not increase any further for
longer  response  times.  Consequently,  we  analyzed  the  fastest  visuomotor  responses
(i.e., 2nd and 3rd deciles of the response time distribution) in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2)
and 3 (Chapter 4) to show that the priming effects are already fully present in the fastest
responses. These findings are consistent with such a simple feedforward model. 
Another  interesting  aspect  of  response  priming  is  its  independence  of  visual
awareness. That means even if the primes are not clearly visible - e.g., visibility can be
altered  by the  temporal  proximity  with  which  prime  and mask  are  presented  –  the
priming  effect  typically  remain  the  same  (for  double  dissociations  in  metacontrast
masking, cf. Albrecht, Klapötke, & Mattler, 2010; Mattler, 2003; Vorberg et al., 2003).
This independence, which is only of theoretical importance for the present thesis, makes
response priming a useful paradigm in the study of early visual processing.
1.5. Attentional biases in specific phobias
Attention in the sense of perceptual selectivity is adaptive and allows the agent
to achieve goals and, therefore, promote survival. Attention can be modulated in two
different  ways:  in  a  top-down  manner  (i.e.,  behavioral  goals  can  modulate  the
processing  of  sensory  input)  or  in  a  bottom-up  manner  (i.e.,  characteristics  of  the
stimulus modulate attention; Yantis, 2000). The latter way of attentional modulation can
be achieved by saliency of the item (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Theeuwes, 1992, for reviews
see Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Theeuwes, 2010). For example, a red circle embedded
in an array of green circles may automatically capture attention. Also saliency can be
modulated by the emotional significance of a stimulus. For instance, it might be highly
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reasonable that attention is automatically drawn towards a perilous animal which hides
in the woods (cf. Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). In line with these findings, several
studies  found  that  threat-relevant  stimuli  (e.g.,  spiders  or  threatening  faces)  are
preferentially  attended  compared  to  neutral  stimuli  (i.e.,  they  are  able  to  capture
attention; e.g., Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Fox et al., 2000; Mogg & Bradley,
2006;  Koster,  Crombez,  Van  Damme,  Verschuere,  &  DeHouwer,  2004; Rinck  &
Becker, 2006; for reviews see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
Several studies indicate that the attentional bias has a time course where early
attentional capture (e.g., Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, &
de Bono, 1999) by the fear-relevant stimulus is followed by deliberate avoidance (e.g.,
Pflugshaupt et al., 2005). Mogg and Bradley (2006) showed in a dot probe task that if
spider or neutral pictures were presented for 200 ms, spider-fearful individuals showed
a rapid attentional bias towards the spiders. At longer exposure times (500 ms and 2000
ms) no attentional biases for fear-relevant stimuli were found. Hence, I assume that the
attentional bias towards threat-relevant stimuli  is an early phenomenon which occurs
within approximately the first half second of exposure (see also Rinck & Becker, 2006;
for an alternative explanation of dot probe results, see Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli, 2008). 
1.5.1. The prior entry paradigm
As described in the previous chapter, evidence exits that threat-relevant stimuli
are able to capture attention. One way to measure attentional capture is to use Temporal
Order Judgments (TOJs) or Simultaneity Judgments (SJs). In these tasks, two stimuli
are presented with varying stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). To measure attentional
capture, attention in prior entry paradigms is typically either directed to one of the two
stimuli (cued trials) or not (uncued trials). In TOJs, the participants indicate which of
the two stimuli  appeared first  (or, occasionally,  second; e.g.,  Scharlau,  2004; Shore,
Spence & Klein, 2001; Yates & Nicholls, 2009). In SJs, the participants indicate if the
two  stimuli  were  presented  simultaneously  or  not  (e.g.,  Zampini,  Guest,  Shore,  &
Spence, 2005, Yates & Nicholls, 2011). The “law” of prior entry (e.g., Titchener, 1908)
assumes  that  attended  stimuli  are  perceived  earlier  than  unattended  stimuli.  For
example,  if  a  square  and  a  diamond  are  presented  simultaneously  and  an  observer
attends the square, she will perceive the square before the diamond. Prior entry effects
have been convincingly demonstrated within and between several modalities (vision:
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e.g.,  Scharlau,  2007;  Stelmach  &  Herdman,  1991;  Weiß  &  Scharlau,  2011,  2012;
audition:  Kanai,  Ikeda,  & Tayama,  2007;  tactile  modality:  Yates  & Nicholls,  2009,
2011; bimodal prior entry: e.g., Spence et al., 2001, for a recent overview see Spence &
Parise, 2010). 
The prior entry effect is technically defined as the shift in the so-called Point of
Subjective Simultaneity (PSS),  that means,  the temporal interval  at which both order
judgments  are made equally often (TOJ) or simultaneous  judgments  are given most
often (SJ). Typically, the PSS is shifted from near physical simultaneity in uncued trials
to a temporal interval at which the uncued/unattended stimulus is presented first in cued
trials. 
Consistent  with  recent  findings  of  attentional  preference  of  threat-relevant
stimuli  (cf.,  Yiend, 2010),  West,  Anderson, and Pratt  (2009) using a TOJ paradigm
without cues demonstrated that angry faces capture attention compared to neutral faces,
and that these stimuli showed visual prior entry. The prior entry paradigm is used in
Experiment 4 (Chapter 5) to demonstrate that also spider stimuli  are able to capture
attention in spider-fearful participants. 
1.6. Overview of the experiments
The goal of the present thesis is to give further insight into the early and rapid
information processing of threat-relevant and phobic stimuli, respectively. Additionally,
I  am interested  in  whether  threat-relevant  and  phobic  stimuli  are  able  to  modulate
attention. In the four experiments reported in this thesis, we applied different methods
(i.e., a response priming and a prior entry paradigm) to study the speed of information
processing  (Experiment  1-3)  and  the  attentional  bias  (Experiment  4)  in  fearful  and
control participants.
With the following experiments, I aimed to fill three main research gaps. First, it
is not fully understood on which neurophysiological mechanism enhanced information
processing is  based.  In  Experiment  1  (Chapter  2),  information  processing of  threat-
relevant,  aversive, and neutral natural images were measures in non-anxious control,
spider-, and snake-fearful participants. The results show that threat-relevant stimuli are
indeed processed faster than emotionally neutral stimuli in the experimental groups of
spider- and snake-fearful participants. We observed distinct qualitative differences in
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response  patterns  in  all  three  groups.  Therefore,  meaningful  conclusions  about  the
neurophysiological processes of threat-relevant and phobic information can be drawn. I
conclude that contrary to popular beliefs, enhanced information processing is rather due
to perceptual learning processes than changes in amygdala activation. 
In  Experiment  2  (Chapter  3),  we  hypothesized  that  if  our  assumption  of
Experiment 1 is true, spider-fearful participants should not just respond faster to spider
pictures (Target Identification task) but recognize shortly presented (masked) pictures
of spider images better than non-anxious control participants (Prime Identification task).
However, no such effect was observed. These results suggest that the categorization and
identification of a stimulus are based on different processing mechanisms. That means
stimuli can be classified during the first feedforward sweep of visuomotor processing,
whereas the identification of stimuli requires recurrent feedback from separate cortical
areas.  I  conclude  that  perceptual  learning  processes  might  enhance  information
processing of phobic stimuli. However, it does not seem to facilitate identification of
these stimuli.
 Second,  even  when  the  underlying  mechanisms  of  enhanced  information
processing are unclear, it is widely accepted that this enhancement exists in the majority
of individuals with animal phobia. But, only few studies investigated early information
processing  (and attentional  bias,  respectively)  in  the  group of  blood-injury-injection
phobics, although they differ in important stimulus characteristics from other types of
phobia  (e.g.,  fainting  when  confronted  with  the  phobic  stimulus).  Experiment  3
(Chapter 4) was conducted to measure rapid information processing of pictures of minor
injuries compared to pictures of unharmed body parts in BII-fearful participants. Here
we found, comparable to results in spider-fearful participants of Experiment 1 and 2
(Chapter  2  and 3),  an  advantage  of  phobic  stimuli  in  response  times  in  BII-fearful
individuals.
Third,  it  is  unknown whether  the attentional  bias  towards phobic and threat-
relevant stimuli also influence the temporal perception of the same.  In Experiment 4
(Chapter 5), we investigated the role of attentional capture of phobic spider stimuli in
spider-fearful participants using a prior entry paradigm. Based on the study of West and
colleagues (2009), we assumed that threat-relevant stimuli of snakes and phobic stimuli
of spiders would be able - comparably to threatening faces – to capture attention. These
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effects would be indicated by a prior entry effect in the group of non-anxious controls as
well as in the spider-fearful group. However, only the phobic stimuli of spiders in the
spider-fearful group were able to capture attention. We found no effect of merely threat-
relevant stimuli – neither in the control nor in the spider-fearful group. In the phobic
condition,  we found a  shift  of  6.87 ms.  Comparable to  the results  of the first  three
experiments, these findings show that the influence of phobic stimuli is restricted to the
group of (spider-)fearful participants (i.e., no effects were found in the group of non-
anxious control participants). 
In  sum,  we  applied  two  different  experimental  designs  and  were  able  to
demonstrate that phobic stimuli are preferentially processed compared to neutral  and
threat-relevant stimuli. Note that the two different approaches complement each other
excellently.  In response priming,  early and automatic  information processing can be
assessed (cf. analysis of the 2nd and 3rd deciles of the response times distribution, Section
2.3 and 4.3). In this design, participants responses are measured which are primarily
assumed  to  be  independent  of  awareness  (cf.  dissociations  between  masking  and
priming, see Vorberg et al.,  2003). However, in prior entry designs, participants are
asked  to  indicate  the  temporal-order  of  the  presented  stimuli.  Obviously,  these
judgments strongly dependent on the participant's awareness of the presented stimuli. I
propose that the applied experiments and methods are suitable to fill basic research gaps
in the existing literature and shed light on various aspects of information processing in
non-anxious and fearful individuals.
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2. Experiment 1 - Rapid visuomotor processing of phobic images in spider- and snake-
fearful participants
2.1. Introduction
As  described  in  Section  1.4.  “Enhanced  information  processing  in  specific
phobia”, evidence points for an information processing advantage of threat-relevant in
the general population; but an even stronger information processing benefit of phobic
stimuli in phobic individuals.  But what causes that advantage? Current studies report
that the attention of individuals with specific phobias is automatically and involuntarily
drawn towards the phobic stimuli. That effect is known as an attentional bias (Mogg &
Bradley, 2006; Rinck & Becker, 2006; for reviews, see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005;
Bar-Haim et al., 2007): as a consequence of selective attention, threatening stimuli that
are attended are processed faster than unattended ones.4 Several studies indicate that the
attentional  bias  has  a  time  course  where  early  attentional  capture  occurs  within
approximately the first half second of exposure (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Bradley et
al., 1999; Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Rinck & Becker, 2006; but see also  Gerdes et al.,
2008). 
Additionally,  the  early  attentional  bias  is  followed  by  deliberate  avoidance.
Rinck and Becker (2006) explored that time course using an eye-tracking study. Here,
the  authors  compared  gaze  durations  to  four  picture  categories  (spiders,  butterflies,
dogs,  and  cats)  of  spider-fearful  individuals  with  those  of  non-anxious  control
participants  and found that  the first  fixations  (within the first  500 ms) of the spider
phobics were more often on the spider pictures as compared to the first fixations of the
control participants. Moreover, the early attentional bias was quickly followed by an
active  avoidance:  After  two  seconds,  spider-fearful  participants  shunned  the  spider
pictures and, altogether, spent less time looking at them than did the control participants
(for further evidence of subsequent avoidance see, e.g., Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers,
& Mühlberger, 2009). According to Rinck and Becker (2006), the combination of initial
attentional  bias  and  subsequent  deliberate  avoidance  can  cause  a  permanent
4 Note that the attentional bias may also base on the participants’ expectancy about the appearance of
their phobic object/animal (Devue et al., 2011) or other characteristics of visual perception, for instance,
sudden appearance of objects (cf. Cole & Kuhn, 2009, 2010)
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maintenance of specific phobias by avoidance learning. Specifically, the attentional bias
will  enhance  the  probability  of  detecting  threatening  objects,  resulting  in  increased
anxiety.  In turn, the subsequent avoidance will reduce anxiety,  but will also prevent
sufficiently long exposures to the threatening stimuli to unlearn the initial fear response.
As  a  result,  highly  anxious  individuals  will  fail  to  experience  that  the  potentially
dangerous object is actually harmless. 
Taken  together,  there  is  strong  evidence  that  (1)  threatening  stimuli  are
processed  faster  compared  to  emotionally  neutral  stimuli  and  (2)  this  accelerated
information processing is accompanied by an early attentional bias. But what are the
neurophysiological  processes underlying  accelerated  processing? Currently,  there  are
two  different  accounts  which  try  to  explain  that  phenomenon.  First,  a  widespread
assumption is that the human amygdala plays a crucial role in rapid, automatic, and non-
conscious processing of threatening stimuli (also cf. Section 6.2. “Enhanced information
processing and the amygdala network”). According to this theory, two cortical pathways
are involved when a feared stimulus is recognized: firstly, a slow and elaborate cortical
pathway, and secondly, a subcortical route – the so-called ‘low road’ – which projects
information  directly  from the  thalamus  to  the  amygdala  via  the  pulvinar  (LeDoux,
1995). In the latter  case, it  is assumed that the thalamic input reaches the amygdala
more quickly and, therefore, might allow for rapid responses on the basis of limited
stimulus information. This model is supported by recent work from different research
teams (e.g., Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1999), even though
some researchers challenge the role of the amygdala in rapid emotional processing (for
a review, see Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). 
Alternatively  to  the  “low  road”  hypothesis,  the  involuntary  attentional  bias
towards fear-relevant stimuli  might lead to perceptual learning processes (Kourtzi  &
DiCarlo, 2006; for a review, see Gilbert, Sigman, & Crist, 2001), which in turn might
enable faster recognition and encoding of those stimuli (cf. Zeelenberg, Wagenmakers,
& Rotteveel, 2006). The perceptual learning account with respect to enhanced object
recognition  can  easily  explain  why  visuomotor  processing  of  phobic  stimuli  is
accelerated. In object recognition, elementary features (e.g., color, form) must be bound
into objects; for example, eight black pins and one black oval body may be bound into
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the silhouette of a spider. According to many authors, this process requires attentional
resources and should therefore be time-consuming (e.g., Treisman, 1996). 
Contradicting this view, VanRullen (2009) pointed out that this assumption is in
conflict with the remarkable speed of object categorization responses in natural scenes.
He therefore suggests the possibility of hardwired binding of features to which a person
is frequently exposed (i.e., perceptual learning). For example, if a person is frequently
exposed to spiders, this might induce enhancements in the functional properties of the
cortical arrays involved in spider detection and recognition. If the person also perceives
spiders as threatening, this process might be additionally strengthened by the attentional
bias. Thus, perceptual learning modulates the processing hardware concerned with that
stimulus  class,  and  so  the  processing  advantage  encompasses  the  first  feedforward
sweep  of  visual  processing  (cf.  Section  1.4.2  “The  rapid-chase  theory  of  response
priming”).
As has been repeatedly shown, the categorization of natural images by means of
speeded motor  responses is  very rapid5 (Kirchner & Thorpe,  2006; Thorpe,  Fize,  &
Marlot, 1996). Note that the two accounts described above place different demands on
the  time-course  of  the  visual  processing  during  this  categorization.  The  amygdala
account  requires  the  “low road”  to  (1)  classify  incoming  stimuli  according  to  their
emotional  relevance,  (2)  outpace  the cortical  object  recognition  route,  and (3)  exert
modulatory control on that processing route before it finishes processing the object. In
contrast, the perceptual learning account explains enhanced processing of fear-relevant
images  by  long-term  changes  in  the  processing  hierarchy.  Thus,  processing
enhancement  for  fear-relevant  images  could  conceivably  be  hardwired  into  those
processing structures involved in the first sweep of information processing through that
hierarchy  (feedforward  sweep;  Lamme  &  Roelfsema,  2000;  VanRullen  &  Thorpe,
2001). In other words, even if the categorization of natural images is already rapid, that
of fear-relevant pictures should be further enhanced. A strong prediction of perceptual
learning  model  is  that  any  processing  enhancement  should  be  fully  present  in  the
earliest  signs  of  visuomotor  processing.  Therefore,  any demonstration  of  processing
enhancements  in  the  earliest  motor  output  would  be  consistent  with  a  perceptual-
5 For  instance,  Kirchner  and  Thorpe  (2006)  demonstrated  using  a  forced-choice  saccade  task  that
participant reliably classified images as containing an animal or not by saccades in as little as 120 ms.
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learning account  and would place strict  time constraints  on the “low road” account,
possibly strict enough to challenge its physiological plausibility.
The goal of Experiment 1 was to determine whether accelerated processing of
fear-relevant  and  phobic  images  is  detectable  at  the  earliest  stages  of  observable
behavior. We used a  response priming paradigm (Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Klotz &
Wolff, 1995; Vorberg et al., 2003; also cf. Schmidt, Haberkamp, Veltkamp et al., 2011),
which has not been applied in research on specific phobias before (cf. Section 1.4.1.
“The response priming paradigm”). While response compatibility paradigms have been
used before to study processing advantages for fear-relevant material, response priming
has special properties that have not yet been demonstrated for other paradigms. Firstly,
many studies have confirmed that primes directly initiate the specific motor responses
assigned to them, an effect clearly discernible in the time-course of lateralized readiness
potentials and overt pointing movements (e.g., Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Schmidt, 2002).
Therefore,  response priming effects  are  directly  related  to  the visuomotor  processes
triggered by visual stimuli, and are sensitive to differences in visuomotor processing.
Secondly,  behavioral  and  electrophysiological  evidence  links  response  priming  to
visuomotor feedforward processing, because the earliest output of the motor system is
controlled exclusively by the prime but is independent of all properties of the target.
This was established for goal-directed pointing responses (Schmidt et al., 2006; Schmidt
& Schmidt, 2009) as well as lateralized readiness potentials (Vath & Schmidt, 2007),
just as expected from a simple feedforward system that processes prime and target in
strict sequence.6
We hypothesized  that  spider-fearful  and  snake-fearful  participants  will  show
enhanced visuomotor processing of spider or snake images, respectively, compared to
neutral images and responses of a non-anxious control group, and that response priming
effects can be used to measure this enhancement. We expected similar results for the
two types of phobia (Åhs et al., 2009; Soares & Öhman, 1993). Based on our previous
research on response priming, we predicted that enhanced processing of phobic primes
will lead to larger response priming effects, and that enhanced processing of phobic
6 Note that “response priming” is the proper name of the paradigm, named so because of the ability of the
prime to trigger a motor response. There is no assumption that effects are exclusively motoric, as opposed
to visual, semantic, or other priming processes.
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targets  will  lead  to  faster  overall  response  times.  Because  the  perceptual  learning
account  predicts  that  processing  enhancements  for  fear-relevant  stimuli  should  be
apparent even in the fastest motor responses, we are especially interested in the earliest
deciles of the response time distribution.
The present experiment was designed as follows. Three groups of participants
took part in the study; one group of spider-fearful participants with no fear of snakes,
one group of snake-fearful participants with no fear of spiders, and one non-anxious
control  group with  no  fear  of  either  spiders  or  snakes.  The  stimuli  comprised  four
categories of natural images (spiders, snakes, mushrooms, and flowers). We decided to
use  natural  images  due  to  their  high  ecological  validity.  Spider  pictures  are  fear-
relevant to  non-anxious  and  snake-fearful  participants,  but  phobic to  spider-fearful
participants.  Snake  pictures  are  fear-relevant  to  non-anxious  and  spider-fearful
participants,  but  phobic  to  snake-fearful  participants.  Mushrooms  and  flowers  are
assumed to be neutral for all three groups.
In each trial of the experiment, one prime and one target, chosen randomly from
one of the four stimulus categories, were presented in rapid sequence, and participants
performed  speeded  keypress  responses  to  classify  the  targets  into  two  response
categories.  Participants  either  had  to  discriminate  spider  and  snake  targets  from
mushroom and flower targets (“animal vs. non-animal” task) or spider and mushroom
targets from snake and flower targets (“spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task; Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1.  Stimuli and Procedure. Upper panel: Sequence of prime and target presentation. Targets
functioned as backward masks for preceding primes. In  each trial, the prime was either consistent or
inconsistent to the target  with respect  to the task-relevant motor response. Lower panel: Examples of
consistent and inconsistent trials in the two tasks. 
We  employed  a  within-subjects  design  where  the  same  participants  were
observed throughout different conditions. This design allowed us to test all our crucial
predictions  by  comparing  different  types  of  stimuli  within  any  participant  group,
instead of the more traditional clinical design where different groups are compared to
each other. As a result, statistical precision is greatly enhanced because the total error
variance between participants can be removed from the tests (Stevens, 1996). This way,
data patterns can be reliably observed in single participants, especially when a small
group of individuals is observed over many repeated trials. Our participants completed
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six sessions  with 960 trials  per  session,  summing  up to  over  5,000 data  points  per
individual.  Each  group  had  a  size  typical  for  a  psychophysical  response  priming
experiment.  We consider  that  this  approach allows us to detect  small  but consistent
differences between stimulus conditions.
2.2. Methods
Participants. Twenty-six participants,  mostly  students  from the  University  of
Kaiserslautern,  took part in the study. All of them were naïve to the purpose of the
study. Eight of them reported that they were highly afraid of spiders but not of snakes (5
women and 3 men; age range, 20-30 years) and seven reported being highly afraid of
snakes but not of spiders (5 women, 2 men; age range, 20-30 years). The remaining
eight participants reported being afraid of neither spiders nor snakes (5 women, 3 men;
age range, 17-24 years).  All participants were screened for fear of spiders or snakes
before the experiment started (Fig. 2). For this purpose, two spider questionnaires and
one snake questionnaire were applied (German version of the “Spider Questionnaire”
SPQ; Hamm, 2006;  original  version by Klorman et  al,  1974;  German questionnaire
“Fragebogen zur Angst vor Spinnen” FAS; Rinck et al., 2002; German version of the
“Snake Questionnaire” SNAQ; Hamm, 2006; original version by Klorman et al., 1974).
To  ensure  that  the  fear  was  specific  to  spiders  or  snakes,  spider-fearful
participants had to score above 75th percentile in the spider questionnaire and below
25th percentile in the snake questionnaire (and vice versa for snake-fearful participants).
One participant  fearful  of spiders scored in the 33rd percentile  of the fear-irrelevant
snake questionnaire (SNAQ) but was included because of scores above 90th percentile
in the SPQ. Two additional participants who reported being highly afraid of spiders
were excluded after the diagnostic session due to high scores in the snake questionnaire.
One additional participant who reported being highly afraid of snakes was excluded due
to high scores in the spider questionnaires. These participants are already excluded from
the number of participants mentioned above.
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Fig.  2.  Results  of  two  spider  and  one  snake  questionnaire  (German  version  of  the  “Spider
Questionnaire” SPQ; Hamm, 2006; German questionnaire “Fragebogen zur Angst vor Spinnen” FAS;
Rinck et al., 2002; German version of the “Snake Questionnaire” SNAQ; Hamm, 2006) separately for
three different groups (non-anxious controls, spider-fearful, and snake-fearful participants). Dashed lines
indicate the maximum score obtainable in the respective questionnaire.
In  addition,  all  spider-  and  snake-fearful  participants  completed  the  Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI;  Beck,  Ward,  Mendelson,  Mock, & Erbaugh,  1961) and
were  tested  for  specific  anxiety  disorders  using  a  structured  diagnostic  interview
(“Diagnostic  Interview for  Psychological  Symptoms (DIPS)”;  Schneider  & Margraf,
2006), based on the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). According to Wittchen, Kessler, Pfister,
Höfler, and Lieb (2000), a primary anxiety disorder is often followed by a secondary co-
morbid  depression  which  increases  substantially  with  time.  In  contrast  to  phobics,
depressed patients do not show an attentional bias towards negative stimuli (Eizenman
et al., 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 2005) and depression slows motor responses (McDermott
& Ebmeier, 2009; White, Myerson, & Hale, 1997). Since speeded responses are crucial
for response priming studies, it is advisable to exclude participants with a co-morbid
depression. However, none of the participants were excluded for high depression scores
on the BDI (mean = 6.67, sd = 5.98). 
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All  participants  except  one  met  at  least  four  criteria  for  specific  phobia  (cf.
Section 1.1). The criterion that was not satisfied in most cases (criterion E) states that
the  individual’s  fear,  anxiety,  or  avoidance  causes  significant  distress  or  significant
interference in the person’s day-to-day life. For this reason, we will refer to participants
in the experimental groups as “fearful” instead of “phobic”.
Participants  had  normal  or  corrected-to-normal  visual  acuity  and  received
payment  of  €  8  per  hour.  All  of  them gave  informed  consent  and  were  treated  in
accordance with the ethical guidelines of the American Psychological Association.
Apparatus.  The participants were seated in a dimly lit room in front of a color
cathode-ray monitor (1280x1024 pixels, retrace rate 85 Hz) at a viewing distance of
approximately 70 cm.
Stimuli and procedure.  Four different categories of grayscale images (spiders,
snakes, mushrooms, and flowers), each containing thirty-five different pictures (4.16° of
visual angle;  1 mm ≈ 0.008° of visual angle),  were presented against a lighter  gray
background (8.75 cd/m2). Each trial started with the appearance of the central fixation
point (cf. Fig. 1, upper panel). After a varying delay, the prime was displayed for 12 ms
either above or below the fixation point at 3.74°. Subsequently, the target was presented
at the same position at prime-target SOAs of 35, 58, 81, 105, or 128 ms and remained
on screen until the participant’s response. In each trial, the prime was either consistent
or inconsistent with the target with respect to the required motor response. Prime and
target pictures were pseudo-randomly drawn from one of the four different categories
and a data base of thirty-five pictures for each category. All stimulus combinations of
prime and target picture categories and prime-target SOA occurred equiprobably and
pseudo-randomly in a repeated-measures design.
We employed  two speeded target  categorization  tasks:  All  participants  either
discriminated  spiders  and  snakes  from  flowers  and  mushrooms  (“animal  vs.  non-
animal” task) or spiders and mushrooms from snakes and flowers (“spider/mushroom
vs. snake/flower” task;  cf. Fig. 1, lower panel). In the “animal vs. non-animal” task,
participants categorized the targets as quickly as possible by pressing the left button for
snakes and spiders and the right button for flowers and mushrooms (or vice versa). In
the “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task, participants pressed the left  button for
spiders and mushrooms and the right button for snakes and flowers (or vice versa). This
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contrast  is  essential  to  separate  real processing advantages  for phobic material  from
mere response biases. For instance, in the “animal vs. non-animal” task, a generalization
effect from spider to snake pictures might emerge because the two unpleasant image
categories are mapped to the same response. The “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower”
task  controls  for  that  effect.  Note  that  we  grouped  spider  with  mushroom pictures
because of the visual similarity of flowers and spiders, to limit effects of simple shape
priming. In any task, primes and targets were classified as “consistent” when mapped to
the same response, and “inconsistent” when mapped to opposite responses.
Each participant performed both tasks in separate sessions; the assignment of left
and right response keys was counterbalanced across participants. Participants received
immediate  auditory  feedback on correctness  of  their  response  after  each  trial.  Each
participant  performed three  1-hour sessions  performing the “animal  vs.  non-animal”
task and three 1-hour sessions performing the “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task,
with order counterbalanced across participants. Each session started with one practice
block followed by 29 blocks  of 32 trials.  Participants  were debriefed after  the final
session and received an explanation of the experiment.
At the end of the final session, participants were asked to evaluate the images
applied  in  the  study.  The  rating  involved  three  dimensions  (valence,  arousal,  and
disgust). All dimensions were rated on a six-point rating scale. Scales were coded so
that high scores reflected high arousal and disgust, respectively. Positive scores in the
valence ratings represent positive emotions towards the image, a score of zero means
that  neither positive nor negative emotions  are involved, and negative scores reflect
negative  emotions  (for  results  see  Table  1).  All  three  scores  were  submitted  as
dependent variables to multivariate analysis of variance with factors of group and image
category. In the image rating, the groups (non-anxious controls, participants afraid of
spiders, participants afraid of snakes) differed significantly regarding their evaluations.
As expected, a main effect of group (Wilk's Λ = 0.60, F(6, 156) = 7.46, p < .001) and
picture category (Λ = 0.18,  F(9, 189.98) = 21.73, p  < .001), as well as an interaction
effect of group and picture category was found (Λ = 0.21, F (18, 221.10) = 9.15, p < .
001),  reflecting  the  fact  that  fearful  participants  rated  their  phobic  images  more
negatively  on  all  three  dimensions  as  compared  to  neutral  images  or  non-fearful
participants.  Note  that  the  group  of  spider-  and  snake-fearful  participants  rated  the
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picture categories of their specific fear comparably over all three dimensions (Spider
fear: Arousal: 3.12, Disgust: 4.26, Valence: -2.55; Snake fear: Arousal: 3.45, Disgust:
4.31, Valence: -2.30). Therefore,  we conclude that the phobic images induce similar
amounts of discomfort in spider- and snake-fearful participants.
Table 1: Participants’ mean scores (with standard deviations) for image evaluation separately for
scale (valence, arousal, and disgust) for each picture category and each group. Bold letters indicate phobic
image categories. 
Data  treatment  and  statistical  methods.  Practice  blocks  were  not  analyzed.
Trials were eliminated if response times were shorter than 100 ms or longer than 1000
ms,  and if,  incidentally,  prime and target  consisted of the exact  same image.  These
criteria eliminated 1.51 % of trials in the “animal vs. non-animal” task and 1.79 % of
trials in the “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task. Repeated-measures analyzes of
variance (ANOVAs) were performed with Greenhouse-Geisser-corrected p values. We
report  F values  with  subscripts  indicating  the  respective  effect  (e.g.,  FCxS for  the
32
interaction  of  consistency and SOA).  Additionally,  we report  the  effect  size  η2 (cf.
Levine & Hullett, 2002).7
2.3. Results
The large number of conditions in this experiment requires a principled way of
analyzing the data.  We organized the results section according to a robust empirical
principle in response priming, namely,  that the strength of the target stimulus mainly
affects total response times, while the strength of the prime mainly affects the size of the
priming effect. The results section will be structured as follows. Within each of the three
groups (controls, spider-fearful, snake-fearful), we will first analyze the influence of the
targets on overall response times as a measure of response activation by the different
targets (spider, snakes, mushrooms, flowers). Second, we will examine the influence of
the  primes  on  response  priming effects as  a  measure  of  response  activation  by the
primes. Finally, we will show that the effects found in the general response times are
already  present  in  the  fastest  responses  (results  of  2nd and  3rd deciles).  (The  1st
percentile is not well suited for such an analysis because it is too dependent on the exact
outlier criteria.)
2.3.1. Influence of the targets on overall response times
In this analysis, we look at overall response time (averaged across consistent and
inconsistent  primes)  as  a  measure  of  response activation  by the  target.  Because  we
found no significant interactions of the task factor with any of the other factors, we
averaged  the  response  times  for  both  tasks  (Fig.  3,  upper  plot).  We  performed  an
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with factors of group (G; controls, spider-fearful, snake-
fearful), target category (T; spider, snake, mushroom, flower), prime-target consistency
(C; consistent, inconsistent), and SOA (S; 35, 58, 81, 105, 128 ms). However, because
consistency and SOA effects are not of theoretical interest in this particular analysis, I
do not report them here. The test on the interaction of group and target was significant,
7 Note that according to Cohen (1988) an effect size (η2) of 0.01 reflect a small, of 0.059 a medium, and
of 0.138 a large effect.
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FGxT(6, 60) = 5.45,  p = .001,  η² = 0.179, confirming our prediction that target effects
differed systematically between groups.
Additionally, we performed an ANOVA for each group. We had predicted that
participants fearful of spiders or snakes should respond faster to their respective phobic
targets than to any other target category, while no such processing preference should
occur  in  the  non-anxious  control  group.  Indeed,  in  the  control  group,  participants
responded equally fast to all types of targets (FT (3, 21) = .87, p = .428, η² = 0.010; Fig.
3). In spider-fearful individuals, however, target category strongly influenced response
times, mainly because responses were much faster when the target was a spider (FT(3,
21) = 12.71,  p = .005,  η² = 0.195). Planned paired comparisons between the phobic
targets and the remaining target categories confirmed significant differences for each
contrast (“spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task: FT(1, 7) = 16.47, p = .005; spider
vs. mushroom: FT(1, 7) = 20.21, p = .015; spider vs. flower: FT(1, 7) = 14.52, p = .007).
In fact,  response times to spider targets  were about  43 ms faster compared to other
targets.  For  participants  fearful  of  snakes,  responses  to  snake  targets  also  were
numerically faster, but not significantly so (FT (3, 18) = 2.95,  p  = .115,  η² = 0.091).
Also,  paired comparisons  did not reveal  significant  differences  between target  types
(snake vs. spider: FT(1, 6) = 0.62, p = .460; snake vs. mushroom: FT(1, 6) = 4.17, p = .
087; snake vs. flower:  FT(1, 6) = 5.87,  p = .052). Note, however, that the differences
between snake targets and flower and mushroom targets approached significance.
Faster responses to phobic targets did not result from a speed-accuracy trade-off,
as shown in Figure 3 (lower panel). In particular, spider-fearful participants responded
not only faster but also more accurately when the target was a spider, and responses to
phobic targets were also more resistant to priming effects.
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Fig. 3.  Upper panel: Response times to different target types averaged over both tasks for each
group, shown relative to the grand average response time. Lower panel: Error rates (in percentage) are
displayed separately for consistent trials (plain bars) and inconsistent trials (patterned bars). In both plots,
different gray scales indicate different target types. Here and in all remaining figures, error bars denote
standard errors of the mean with pure intersubject variance removed (Cousineau, 2005). 
2.3.2. Influence of the primes on priming effects
In this analysis, we looked at response priming effects (defined as response time
differences  between  consistent  and  inconsistent  trials)  as  a  measure  of  response
activation by the primes. For each group, we performed an ANOVA with factors of
prime  (P;  spider,  snake,  mushroom,  flower),  consistency  (C), and  SOA  (S).  We
predicted  that  participants  fearful  of  spiders  or  snakes  should  show  larger  priming
effects by their respective phobic primes than by any other prime category,  while no
such processing preference should occur in the non-anxious control group.
Response times for the different groups and prime types in the two tasks are
displayed in Figure 4. Averaged across prime type, consistent trials (where prime and
target stimuli belonged to the same response category) produced faster response times
than  inconsistent  trials  for  each  group  and  task  (“animal  vs.  non-animal”,
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“spider/mushroom  vs.  snake/flower”,  respectively;  controls:  FC(1,  7)  =  63.26,  and
95.00, both  p < .001,  η² = 0.222 and  η² = 0.366;  spider fear:  FC(1, 7) = 163.96, and
189.96, both  p < .001,  η² = 0.268 and  η² = 0.204;  snake fear:  FC(1, 6) = 92.95, and
74.02, both p < .001, η² = 0.284 and η² = 0.224). Also, priming effects increased with
prime-target SOA for all groups and tasks (controls: FCxS(4, 28) = 12.02, and 13.65, p =
.001 and  p < .001,  η² = 0.016 and  η² = 0.038;  spider fear:  FCxS(4, 28) = 25.13, and
17.67, both p < .001, η² = 0.032 and η² = 0.022; snake fear:  FCxS(4, 24) = 20.35, and
18.06, both p < .001, η² = 0.025 and η² = 0.030).
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Fig. 4. Response times and error rates in each task and group, separately for different prime types.
Response priming effects  can be observed in  error rates  as  well  as response
times. Because consistent primes activate only correct responses whereas inconsistent
primes activate only incorrect responses, errors should be observed predominantly in
inconsistent trials at long SOAs where the primes have had a lot of time to drive the
incorrect response (Vorberg et al., 2003). Figure 4 shows that priming effects in error
rates closely follow those in the response times.  In particular,  participants fearful of
spiders show large error rates when the target is preceded by a response-inconsistent
spider  prime.  No  such  effect  is  discernible  in  the  snake-fearful  participants,  in
accordance with the pattern in the response times.
In the following,  we report  the results  separately  for  each task,  for  the  four
different prime types,  and for each group, and highlight the differences between the
control and the two experimental groups.
“Animal vs. non-animal” task. An ANOVA with factors of group (G), prime (P),
consistency  (C), and SOA  (S)  yielded no significant  interactions of the group factor
with either prime type or priming effect (FGxP(6, 60) = 1.90,  p = .116,  η²  = 0.079;
FGxPxC(6, 60) = 1.72, p = .196, η² = 0.102).
“Spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task. In the previous task, spider and snake
stimuli were always mapped to the same motor response. If participants developed a
bias against  the response assigned to the phobic stimuli  (e.g.,  the spiders),  this bias
would translate to the other animal category as well (i.e., the snakes), and differences
between  phobic  and  merely  fear-relevant  stimuli  could  not  be  interpreted.  The
“spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task allows us to compare phobic and merely fear-
relevant primes in a situation where they are mapped to different responses. We predict
faster overall response times to phobic targets as compared to other target categories,
larger priming effects by phobic primes as compared to other prime categories, and no
such effects of stimulus type in the control group. An ANOVA with factors of group
(G), prime (P), consistency (C), and SOA (S)  revealed that response times to the four
different prime types varied significantly across groups, FGxP (6, 60) = 3.90, p = .006,
η² = 0.169, and that the priming effects elicited by those prime types also differed across
groups, FGxPxC(6, 60) = 5.18, p = .010, η² = 0.285.
38
As expected, non-anxious control participants showed no differences in priming
effects for the four different prime categories (FPxC(3, 21) = 2.56, p = .135, η² = 0.020)
or the two different prime response classes (spiders and mushrooms forming one class,
snakes and flowers the other;  FPxC(1, 7) = 2.05, p  = .195,  η² = 0.012). In contrast, in
spider-fearful participants  priming effects  differed significantly for the four different
prime categories (FPxC(3, 21) = 11.64, p  = .007,  η² = 0.194) as well as for the two
different prime response classes (FPxC(1, 7) = 13.42, p = .008, η² = 0.196). However, no
significant differences in priming effects were found for participants specifically fearful
of snakes (four primes:  FPxC(3, 18) = .34, p  = .599,  η² = 0.010; two prime response
classes: FPxC(1, 6) = 1.04, p = .347, η² = 0.002). 
For further understanding of that pattern, we separated response times in the two
groups by both prime and target category (Fig. 5). This analysis reveals that priming
effects  are  difficult  to  evaluate  without  taking  the  main  effects  of  target  type  into
account. Specifically, responses to phobic targets (spiders for spider-fearful, snakes for
snake-fearful  participants)  were  relatively  faster  than  those  to  neutral  targets
(mushrooms or flowers).  For instance,  when spider-fearful  participants  responded to
phobic  spider  targets,  their  responses  were  fast  even  if  these  targets  followed  an
inconsistent prime. As a result, priming effects are augmented when a phobic target is
response-consistent with the prime, because then the response to the consistent target is
speeded both by the priming effect and by the main effect of target type.  Similarly,
priming effects are  reduced or even appear to vanish when a phobic target appears in
the response-inconsistent role, because then the response is slowed by the priming effect
but still speeded by the main effect of the target. This augmentation-reduction pattern is
especially pronounced in the spider-fearful group when responding to spider targets; it
is less apparent for the snake-fearful group when responding to snake targets (cf. Fig.
4). This is of course a consequence of the larger target main effects in the spider-fearful
group.
In sum, the response pattern in the “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task is
similar  to the “animal  vs.  non-animal”  task,  indicating  that  any differences  between
phobic and merely fear-relevant images cannot be attributed to the fact that they are
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both assigned to the same response category. However, it is noteworthy that participants
responded up to 43 ms slower in the “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” than in the
“animal vs. non-animal” task. This might be due to higher demands in the former task.
Specifically, in the “animal vs. non-animal” task, the response categories are consistent
with  an  intuitive,  natural  categorization  of  the  environment,  whereas  in  the
“spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task, participants had to learn a purely arbitrary
assignment.
 
Fig.  5. Response  times  of  spider  and  snake  fearful  individuals  in  the  “spider/mushroom  vs.
snake/flower” task, separately for different prime and target types.
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2.3.3. Results of 2nd and 3rd deciles
If  the  processing  advantage  for  fear-relevant  material  is  due  to  long-term
perceptual  learning  processes,  the  advantage  could  already affect  the  first  sweep of
processing running through the visuomotor system. If so, processing advantages should
be fully present in the fastest responses (Schmidt, Haberkamp, Veltkamp et al., 2011).
This is true for the effect of phobic targets on overall response times (Fig. 6; cf. Fig. 3)
as well as for the effect of phobic primes on the magnitude of priming effects (Fig. 7).
There is no indication in our data that these effects become any larger with increasing
response time.
Fig. 6. Response times to different targets averaged over both tasks for each group, shown relative
to the grand average response time for 2nd and 3rd deciles of the response time distribution. 
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Fig. 7. Priming effects (PE) in overall response times (upper row) compared to PEs in the 2nd and
3rd deciles (lower row) for the “animal vs. non-animal” task.
2.4. Discussion
Overall, we found robust response priming effects in all groups and tasks, where
inconsistent primes led to slower response times compared to consistent ones, and these
priming effects  increased  with prime-target  SOA (complications  to  this  overall  data
pattern are discussed below). These findings are in line with previous results from the
image categorization literature (e.g., Bacon-Macé, Kirchner, Fabre-Thorpe, & Thorpe,
2007;  Kirchner  &  Thorpe,  2006)  as  well  as  response  priming  studies  with  natural
images (Schmidt & Schmidt,  2009), showing that natural images are able to rapidly
activate the motor responses assigned to them. 
The purpose of the present study was to utilize such response priming effects to
demonstrate enhanced visuomotor processing of phobic stimuli relative to merely fear-
relevant  and neutral  stimuli,  and to  investigate  whether  such processing advantages
might  conceivably be due to  enhanced feedforward processing of  visual  stimuli.  Of
special interest are systematic differences in the processing of different image categories
within each group of spider-fearful, snake-fearful, and non-anxious control participants.
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In response priming studies, such differences should show up in the overall response
times (reflecting processing aspects of the target) as well as in the magnitude of priming
effects (reflecting processing aspects of the prime).
In the non-anxious control participants, we found no systematic differences in
their responses towards the different target categories (spiders, snakes, mushrooms, or
flowers),  neither  in  the  “animal  vs.  non-animal”  nor  in  the  “spider/mushroom  vs.
snake/flower” task. Also, all primes produced strong and reliable priming effects whose
magnitudes did not differ for the different prime categories. We had been prepared to
find processing advantages for fear-relevant images in accordance with recent findings
(e.g., Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Piech et al., 2010), at least
in the “animal vs. non-animal” task. In that task, the simple categorization of animal vs.
non-animal targets is known to lead to fast categorization responses, so that mapping
spider  and snake images  to  the same response might  reveal  a  processing difference
between fear-relevant and neutral stimuli even in control participants. The absence of
such differences in our results is consistent with the fact that control participants rated
the  images  of  spiders  and snakes  as  only  slightly  negative,  arousing,  or  disgusting
(Table  1).  Similarly,  Tipples  and  colleagues  (2002)  did  not  find  any  biases  for
threatening stimuli in non-anxious individuals in a visual search task. The conflicting
findings suggest that non-anxious control participants in various studies may differ in
research-relevant  characteristics,  such  as  their  trait/state  anxiety  (see,  e.g.,  Koster,
Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, Miles & Dixon, 2004). 
Importantly,  spider-fearful  participants  showed  a  strongly  different  result
pattern. Firstly,  they responded more rapidly to spider targets as compared to snake,
mushroom,  and  flower  targets.  Secondly,  their  responses  to  spider  targets  were
exceptionally fast even in cases where these targets followed an inconsistent prime. The
fast responses to spider targets strongly affected the size of the priming effect. This can
most clearly be seen in the “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task. For instance, if the
prime was a spider, a subsequent spider target led to exceptionally large priming effects
because fast responses to the spider target became even faster by consistent priming. In
contrast, when the prime was a snake, priming effects were reduced because responses
to the spider target were still relatively fast, even though the target was inconsistent to
the  prime.  As  a  result,  priming  effects  are  augmented  if  spider  targets  appear  in
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consistent  conditions  and  are  diminished  if  they  appear  in  inconsistent  conditions.
Taking this complication into account, our results clearly show that spider targets and
spider  primes  lead  to  faster  responses  and  larger  priming  effects,  respectively,  in
participants fearful of spiders, compared to other image categories. One could argue that
the observed differences in the spider-fearful group are due to differences in low level
vision.  However,  as one reviewer pointed out the results  of the non-anxious control
group demonstrate comparable processing efficiency for all different image types.
Unexpectedly,  snake-fearful  participants  showed  a  response  pattern  different
from that in the spider-fearful group. In comparison to responses to neutral images, they
tended to respond somewhat faster not only to snake targets, but also to spider targets.
However,  neither  effect  was  significant,  so  it  has  to  be  concluded  that  information
processing was not specifically accelerated by snake pictures. In the “animal vs. non-
animal”  task,  priming  effects  were  significantly  larger  when  an  animal  prime  was
shown compared to trials when non-animal primes were presented, but again, there were
no discernible differences between snake and spider primes. Furthermore, even though
response times to animal targets were faster than those to non-animal targets, the faster
responses  occurred  indiscriminately  within  the  category  of  animal  pictures,  that  is,
snake-fearful  participants  did  not  respond  specifically  faster  to  their  phobic  picture
category. Thus, it seems that they show enhanced information processing not limited to
snake pictures, but to fear-relevant animal stimuli in general. However, some care is
needed when interpreting these group differences, since this is an accidental finding not
previously  reported  in  the  literature  and  our  experiment  is  designed  to  pick  up
differences between stimuli within groups rather than differences between groups.
The  major  reason  for  applying  two  tasks  with  different  stimulus-response
mappings was to control for generalization effects, that is, effects in response times to
snake targets  emerging  solely because  spiders  and snakes  are  matched  to  the  same
motor response. The “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task controls for such effects.
In the present results, however, response time effects in all groups can be traced back to
the  specific  image  category  presented  as  prime  or  target.  In  other  words,  no
generalization effects are apparent in the present study, so that both tasks seem suited
for measuring enhancements in response activation. The comparison of the two tasks
also tells us something about the type of information on which the response priming
44
effect is based. In the “animal vs. non-animal” task, several types of information may
conspire to prime a response: the semantic information about the animacy of primes and
targets,  the  affective  information  about  the  pleasantness  of  fear-relevant  vs.  neutral
image  categories,  and  the  stimulus-response  mapping  assigned  at  the  outset  of  the
experiment. In contrast, the “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task makes stimulus-
response assignments orthogonal to the animacy and pleasantness distinctions, leaving
only the visuomotor mapping as a source of priming information. As similar priming
effects  and  processing  enhancements  are  observed  in  both  tasks,  we  can  exclude
semantic as well as affective information as  exclusive sources of priming. Otherwise,
neutral  pictures of mushrooms and flowers would not have been able to prime fear-
relevant pictures of spiders and primes (and vice versa), which is what we found in the
“spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task (Fig. 5). On that note, we also can preclude
pure identity priming because responses are always activated by both types of stimuli
that are assigned to it.
2.4.1. Underlying mechanisms of rapid information processing
As  described  in  the  introduction,  two  different  accounts  attempt  to  explain
enhanced information processing by threatening stimuli: acceleration due to increased
amygdala activation and  long-term perceptual  learning  mechanisms.  The perceptual
learning account with respect to enhanced object recognition can easily explain why
enhanced processing of phobic stimuli is evident in the fastest responses of the response
time distribution (cf. Section 2.1). Indeed, in the present data all modulatory effects of
phobic material on response times and priming effects were fully present in the fastest
responses, that is, in the 2nd and 3rd deciles of the response time distribution, consistent
with such a simple feedforward model. 
Note that the perceptual learning account could also accommodate differential
enhancement for different phobias. For instance, because the likelihood of encountering
a snake is low for German participants compared to the likelihood of encountering a
spider,  our  snake-fearful  participants  may  have  had  less  opportunity  for  perceptual
learning than the spider-fearful participants, and less incentive for continued vigilance
in  interactions  with  their  everyday  environment.  However,  since  our  study was not
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designed  to  investigate  group  rather  than  stimulus  differences,  this  suggestion  is
somewhat speculative at this point.8
Our finding that the processing advantage of phobic stimuli already affects the
fastest  responses  places  serious  time  constraints  on  any  explanation  involving  the
amygdala,  especially considering the processing speed of the structures involved (cf.
Piech et al., 2010; Tsuchiya et al, 2009). If images can indeed be classified during the
first feedforward sweep of visuomotor processing (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009; Thorpe et
al., 1996; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001), the amygdala pathway would be required to (1)
classify  incoming  stimuli  as  emotionally  relevant,  (2)  outpace  the  cortical  object
recognition route, and (3) exert modulatory control on that processing route before it
finishes processing the object. It is questionable whether all these processes can take
place  in  the  minimal  time  available  in  the  rapid  categorization  task  that  we  used,
considering that all  amygdala modulation of the object-recognition pathway must be
finished before the fastest responses are completed.  Mormann and colleagues (2011)
analyzed response latencies from single neurons in the amygdala and found that they
responded to animal pictures within 324 ms, significantly faster than to other image
categories.  The  authors  argue  that  this  enhancement  may  reflect  the  biological
importance  of  animal  pictures,  but  stress  that  “the  observed amygdala  latencies  are
nevertheless similar to those found in other regions in the temporal lobe, and thus seem
more likely to be generated along the cortical object recognition pathway than via a
rapid subcortical route” (p. 1248). 
Note that the amygdala’s response time reported by Mormann and colleagues
(2011) is already close to the fastest keypress responses to spider targets in our study,
which average about 365 ms in the 2nd and 3rd deciles of the response time distribution.
Moreover, the time when the keypress response is completed is preceded by a phase of
motor preparation that takes about 100 ms and can be traced, for instance, in lateralized
readiness potentials (cf. Vath & Schmidt,  2007). Thus, when these timing issues are
8 Note, however, the interesting prediction that individuals fearful of spiders  as well as snakes should
show a response pattern similar to those of the spider-fearful participants and, at the same time, should
show no enhanced processing of snake pictures. This is exactly what we found in the three participants
who were  excluded from the  main analyses  because  they  scored  high  in  both  the  spider  and  snake
questionnaires. However, these findings have to be interpreted with caution due to the very small sample
size.
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considered  together,  the  amygdala  seems  just  too  slow  to  modulate  visuomotor
processing of primes or targets in an on-line fashion (see also Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).
It  may,  however,  be  crucial  for  the  emotional  response  experienced  after  or
simultaneously with the ongoing motor response.
In addition, if enhanced processing were due to an emotional response at all, one
would expect the enhancement to be predictable from the emotional evaluation of the
stimulus.  Spider-fearful  and snake-fearful  participants  in  our  study gave comparable
ratings  to  their  phobic stimuli,  respectively,  yet  strong processing enhancements  for
phobic  material  only  occurred  in  spider-fearful  participants,  while  snake-fearful
participants  showed  only  slight  enhancements  for  both  types  of  animal  stimuli.  Of
course we did not measure amygdala activation directly and have to infer it from the
self-reported fear levels; so we cannot rule out that amygdala activation might differ
across experimental groups. But even if the processing enhancement was indeed based
on a signal by the amygdala, this response would be required to occur freshly for each
stimulus presentation, without much fatigue or adaptation, over the course of several
thousand trials. All this suggests that emotional activation by the amygdala may not
play a causal role in speeding perceptual processing on-line, that is, on a trial-to-trial
basis. In the long run, however, emotional responses directed by the amygdala may play
an important role in promoting long-term perceptual learning.
In summary,  our results  show that  phobic stimuli  are  processed faster in the
visuomotor system as compared to merely fear-relevant or neutral ones, as revealed by
differences in response times and response priming effects. This processing advantage is
fully present in the fastest motor responses but may occur only in spider-fearful but not
snake-fearful individuals. These findings support the notion that long-term perceptual
learning  processes  underlie  the  automatic  and  rapid  information  processing  of
threatening images,  and conflicts  with the idea that the amygdala is involved in the
online enhancement of these processes. 
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3. Experiment 2 - Target- and prime-identification tasks in spider-fearful participants
3.1. Introduction
In Experiment 1 (Chapter 2), we demonstrated that spider-fearful participants
exhibited specific information processing styles of phobic images. Firstly, they reacted
particularly fast  to spider  targets  and,  secondly,  spider  primes  led to  larger  priming
effects  in  their  motor  responses  compared  to  snake,  mushroom,  or  flower  primes
(dependent on the respective task). The observed enhanced information processing of
fear-relevant stimuli,  reflected in faster response times, is in line with recent studies
(e.g., Fox et al., 2007; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Pflugshaupt et al., 2005). 
This  effect  can  be  explained  by  the  theoretical  assumption  that  automatic
information  processing of  threat-relevant  stimuli  is  preconscious  and inaccessible  to
intentional control (Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001). Öhman and Soares (1994) proposed that
typical symptoms of fear arise when phobic persons are confronted with phobic stimuli
even  before  they  are  aware  of  it.  In  their  study,  spider-,  snake-  and  non-fearful
participants  were  confronted  with  masked  and  unmasked  target  pictures  of  spiders,
snakes, flowers, and mushrooms. In the first experiment, pictures were presented for 30
ms  and the  target-mask  SOA was varied  between 20 ms  and 180 ms.  The authors
reported that participants were not able to indicate the picture content at target-mask
SOAs  of  30  ms.  Accordingly,  they  assumed  that  participants  were  unaware  of  the
pictures  presented  at  that  specific  mask-target  SOA.  Therefore,  they  presented  the
images with an SOA of 30 ms in a second experiment and measured skin conductance
responses (SCRs).9 They reported that subliminal as well as supraliminal (i.e., masked
as well  as unmasked)  phobic pictures  elicited increased SCRs in spider- and snake-
fearful participants. Thus, the authors concluded that indeed subliminal presentation of
phobic stimuli induces fear responses. 
Though, the study suffered from a methodological problem. The authors tested
the visibility of the pictures with different participants than those that took part in their
main experiment. However, the target-mask SOAs at which visibility is at chance level
9 Note that SCRs are used as an indication of psychological arousal. Arousal activates the sympathetic
nervous system which controls the sweat glands of the skin. These moisture changes alter the electrical
conductance of the skin which can be measured by SCRs (Martini & Bartholomew, 2003).
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varies a great deal for different persons (cf.  Marcel,  1983).  In order to test  that the
presented pictures are really subliminal one has to identify each participant's individual
threshold. Therefore, I presume that the participants in Öhman and Soares' (1994) study
were  not  completely  unaware  of  the  presented  picture  category.  Indeed,  Mayer,
Merckelbach, de Jong, and Leeuw (1999) replicated Öhman and Soares' (1994) study
and observed that their participants were able to correctly identify most of the presented
pictures  in  a  four-alternative  forced  choice  paradigm.  Hits  (e.g.,  number  of  spider
pictures identified as spiders) frequently exceeded the chance probability (25 percent).
 However, evidence exists that spider-fearful individuals indeed process threat-
relevant stimuli faster compared to other stimuli, and that this may happen even when
the participants are not aware of them (cf. Siegler, Anderson, & Han, 2011; Straube,
Mentzel, & Miltner, 2006). In Experiment 1 (Chapter 2), we provided evidence that this
processing bias might be based on long-term perceptual learning processes. In terms of
neural  plasticity,  it  can be assumed that  due perceptual  learning processing neurons
should  respond  specifically  well  towards  spiders  in  spider-fearful  individuals  (cf.
Section 6.3.2.  “The neural basis of perceptual  learning”).  From this,  we derived the
hypothesis that perceptual learning may also lead to better identification performance of
spider-fearful participants when confronted with masked spider pictures. In particular,
these participants  should be able  to detect  spiders,  even when they are masked and
presented at short picture-mask SOAs. 
 The design of the present  study is  almost  identical  to  that  of Experiment  1
(Chapter  2)  except  for  three  small  but  important  changes.  Firstly,  we  reduced  the
number of SOA levels from 5 to 2 to reduce the number of conditions, using a short
SOA of 35 ms – a situation of strong masking where we assumed that the prime would
be almost invisible – as well as a long SOA of 105 ms – a situation of weak masking
where we assumed that the prime could be easily identified. Secondly, we changed the
spatial configuration of the stimuli to be able to present a backward pink-noise (or 1/ƒ
noise)  mask  on  the  position  of  the  prime  (simultaneously  with  the  identical  target
pictures on the left and on the right). That means that the prime was presented for 24 ms
above (or below) the fixation cross, and then the two target pictures appeared (Fig. 8).
Thirdly, we introduced a Prime Identification task. In that task, participants were asked
to identify and categorize the briefly presented primes.
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Our results from Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) and the literature review on recent
studies on threat-relevant masked stimuli led us to the following hypotheses. (1) We
expected that the results in the target identification task would replicate those of the
same task in Experiment 1: spider-fearful participants should respond specifically faster
to spider targets and should show larger priming effects if the target is preceded by a
spider prime. (2) We expected that spider-fearful participants would outperform non-
anxious control participants in the identification of masked and unmasked spider primes
due to preceding perceptual learning processes.
Fig. 8. Stimuli and Procedure. Primes and targets were presented in the sequence displayed.
Primes and targets were either consistent or inconsistent with respect to the required motor response. In
half of the sessions, the target pictures were accompanied by a pink-noise mask at the position of the
prime.
3.2. Methods
Participants.  Sixteen  participants,  mostly  students  from  the  University  of
Kaiserslautern,  took part in the study.  Eight of them reported to be highly afraid of
spiders (5 women and 3 men; age range, 20-23 years) and eight reported not to be afraid
of spiders (6 women and 2 men; age range, 21-24 years). All participants were screened
for fear of spiders before the experiment started. We applied two spider questionnaires
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and one snake  questionnaire10 (German version  of  the “Spider  Questionnaire”  SPQ;
Hamm,  2006;  original  version  by  Klorman  et  al.,  1974;  German  questionnaire
“Fragebogen zur Angst vor Spinnen” FAS; Rinck et al., 2002; German version of the
“Snake Questionnaire” SNAQ; Hamm, 2006; original version by Klorman et al., 1974).
The  results  are  depicted  in  Figure  9.  Control  participants  scored  in  the  SPQ  on
percentile 25 or below relative to a normative sample. In the group of spider-fearful
participants, men scored at least on percentile 80, and women at least on percentile 85.
For the FAS only guideline  values are  available.  According to these values,  spider-
fearful participants should at least score above 14 (Rinck et al., 2002). 
Fig.  9. Results  of  two spider  and  one  snake  questionnaire  (German  version  of  the  “Spider
Questionnaire” SPQ; Hamm, 2006; German questionnaire “Fragebogen zur Angst vor Spinnen” FAS;
Rinck et al., 2002; German version of the “Snake Questionnaire” SNAQ; Hamm, 2006) separately for
three different groups (non-anxious controls, spider-fearful, and snake-fearful participants). Dashed lines
indicate the maximum score obtainable in the respective questionnaire.
In addition, spider-fearful participants were tested for specific phobias using a
structured  diagnostic  interview  (“Diagnostic  Interview  for  Psychological  Symptoms
10 Note that we additionally applied a snake questionnaire because we wanted to exclude spider-fearful
individuals with a secondary fear of snakes. 
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(DIPS)”;  Schneider  &  Margraf,  2006),  based on the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000).  All
participants  except  one  met  at  least  four  criteria  out  of  five  for  specific  phobia  of
spiders.  The  criterion  that  was  unsatisfied  in  all  cases  (criterion  E)  states  that  the
individual’s  fear,  anxiety,  or  avoidance  causes  significant  distress  or  significant
interference in the person’s day-to-day life. For this reason, we will again refer to these
participants  as spider-fearful  participants  but not as phobics.  Finally,  all  participants
completed  the  Beck Depression  Inventory  (BDI;  Beck  et  al.,  1961).  None  of  the
participants had to be excluded for high depression scores on the BDI (mean = 6.13, sd
= 5.58). 
All  participants had normal  or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and received
payment of € 6 per hour. All of them gave written informed consent and were treated in
accordance with the ethical guidelines of the American Psychological Association.
Apparatus.  The participants were seated in a dimly lit room in front of a color
cathode-ray monitor (1280x1024 pixels, retrace rate 85 Hz) at a viewing distance of
approximately 70 cm.
Stimuli and procedure.  Four different categories of grayscale images (spiders,
snakes, mushrooms, and flowers), each containing thirty-five different pictures (4.16° of
visual angle;  1 mm ≈ 0.008° of visual angle),  were presented against a lighter  gray
background (8.75 cd/m2). Each trial started with the appearance of the central fixation
point. After a varying delay, the prime was displayed for 24 ms either above or below
the fixation point at a distance of 3.74°. Subsequently, the two targets were presented to
the left and right side of the prime at prime-target SOAs of 35 or 105 ms and remained
on  screen  until  the  participant’s  response.  In  half  of  the  sessions,  targets  were
accompanied by a pink-noise mask that occurred at the same position as the prime. The
masks were generated by a Matlab program written by Yearsley (2004) and based on
inverse  Fourier  transformations.  In  each  trial,  the  prime  was  either  consistent  or
inconsistent  to  the  target  with  respect  to  the  required  response.  All  stimulus
combinations  of prime and target  picture  categories  and prime-target  SOA occurred
equiprobably and pseudo-randomly in a repeated-measures design. 
In the first 4 sessions, the participants completed the target identification tasks
(i.e., they had to classify the target as fast and as accurately as possible) and received
immediate  feedback  on correctness  of  their  responses.  In  the  next  4  sessions,  they
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completed  the  prime  identification  tasks  (i.e.,  they  had  to  indicate  the  prime  as
accurately as possible).11 As in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2), in the target identification
sessions,  participants  either  discriminated  spiders  and  snakes  from  flowers  and
mushrooms (“animal vs. non-animal” task) or spiders and mushrooms from snakes and
flowers (“spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” task). In the prime identification sessions,
participants were presented with exactly the same experimental paradigm only that now
they had to categorize the prime according to the respective categorization task. For
example, in the “animal vs. non-animal” task, they had to report if the prime picture
contained an “animal”, (i.e., a spider or a snake), or a “non-animal”, (i.e., a flower or a
mushroom). They were told that the speed of their response was irrelevant. Response
keys  were  counterbalanced  across  participants,  and  they  again  received  immediate
auditory feedback. Each session started with one practice block followed by 29 blocks
of  32  trials.  Participants  were  debriefed  after  the  final  session  and  received  an
explanation of the experiment.
At the end of the final session, participants were asked to evaluate the images of
spiders, snakes, mushrooms, and flowers applied in the study. The rating involved three
dimensions (valence,  arousal, and disgust). All dimensions were rated on a six-point
rating scale. Scales were coded so that high scores reflected high arousal and disgust,
respectively. Positive scores in the valence ratings represented positive feeling towards
the image; a score of zero meant that no positive or negative feelings were involved;
negative  scores  reflected  negative  feelings  (Table  2).  The  rating  was  conducted  to
ensure  that  phobic  pictures  did  indeed  elicit  negative  emotions  in  spider-fearful
participants.  As  expected,  non-anxious  controls  and  spider-fearful  subjects  differed
significantly  regarding  their  evaluations.  Control  participants  rated  all  pictures  of
spiders, snakes, flowers and mushrooms as minimally arousing, minimally disgusting
and of neutral valence. As expected, spider-fearful participants rated spider pictures as
strongly arousing, strongly disgusting and strongly negative compared to snake, flower
and mushroom images. This was reflected in the results of a multivariate analysis of
11 Note  that  the  only  difference  between  target  and  prime  identification  task  were  the  respective
instructions given to the participants. This is a precondition for avoiding task mismatches which would
complicate a conjoint interpretation of both tasks' findings (e.g., Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006).
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variance (MANOVA) with factors of group (G) and picture category (PC) (Wilk's Λ =
0.62, FGxPC (9, 131.57) = 3.14, p = .002).
Table 2: Participants’ mean scores (with standard deviations) for image evaluation separately for
scale (valence, arousal, and disgust) for each picture category and each group. Bold letters indicate phobic
image categories. 
Data treatment and statistical methods. Practice blocks were not analyzed. In the
target identification task, trials were eliminated if response times were shorter than 100
ms or longer than 1000 ms, and if, incidentally, prime and target were the same image.
These criteria eliminated 1.93% of trials in the “animal vs. non-animal” task and 2.76%
of trials  in  the “spider/mushroom vs.  snake/flower” task.  In the prime identification
task, trials were only eliminated if prime and target were the same image. This criterion
eliminated 0.83% of trials in the “animal vs. non-animal” task and 0.91% of trials in the
“spider/mushroom  vs.  snake/flower”  task.  Repeated-measure  analyzes  of  variance
(ANOVAs) were performed with Greenhouse-Geisser-corrected  p values.  Analyzes of
response times  are  restricted  to  trials  on which participants  made correct  responses.
Additionally, we report error rates. Error rates were arc sine transformed to make them
compatible with ANOVA requirements. We report  F values with subscripts indicating
the respective effect (e.g., FcxS for the interaction of consistency and SOA). 
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3.3. Results
The results section will be structured as follows. We will first analyze the data of
the target  identification  task  and  examine  the  influence  of  the  different  targets on
overall  response  times  as  a  measure  of  response  activation  by  the  different  targets
(spider, snakes, mushrooms, flowers) as well as the influence of the different primes on
response priming effects as a measure of response activation by the primes. Secondly,
we will analyze and compare the performance in the  prime identification task for the
two groups.
3.3.1. Target identification task
Influence of the targets on overall response times. In this ANOVA, we look at
overall  response  times  (averaged  across  consistent  and  inconsistent  primes)  as  a
measure of response activation by the four different targets (spider, snake, mushroom,
and flower). The analysis of the interaction of group (G) and target (T) was significant
(FGxT(3,42) = 3.65, p = .040; for error rates: FGxT(3,42) = 0.86, p = .440) confirming that
target  response time effects  differed  systematically  between groups.  To analyze  this
result in more detail, we performed an ANOVA for each group with factors target (T),
consistency  (C),  and  SOA  (S)  (because  consistency  and  SOA  effects  are  not  of
theoretical interest at this point, we will not report them). In the non-anxious control
group, only responses to snake targets were slower compared to other targets (FT (3,21)
= 4.59,  p = .030; for error rates:  FT(3,21)  = 2.95,  p = .078;  Fig. 10).12 Importantly,
though,  spider-fearful  participants  responded  considerably  faster  to  spider  pictures
(FT(3,21) = 9.26,  p = .008;  for error rates:  FT(3,21)  = 7.02,  p = .011). We conducted
paired comparisons of spider targets and the other target picture categories and observed
significant differences in each contrast for spider-fearful participants (spider vs. snake:
FT(1,7) = 11.87,  p = .011; spider vs. mushroom:  FT(1,7) = 7.82,  p = .027; spider vs.
flower:  FT(1,7) = 7.16,  p = .032).  Numerically,  responses on spider targets were on
average about 25 ms faster compared to responses to other targets.
12 Note that response times to targets in the group of control participants are in general about 43 ms faster
than  in  the  experimental  group  of  spider-fearful  participants.  This  effect  seems  to  be  base  on
interindiviual  differences  of  participants  in  the  two  groups  (i.e.,  non-anxious  control  participants
responded faster in general).
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Fig. 10. Relative response times to the four target picture categories for both groups averaged over
both tasks. 
Influence  of  the  primes  on  response  times.  Response  times  of  both  groups
separated by task and prime category are displayed in Figure 11. Generally, in almost
every  panel,  consistent  trials  produced  considerably  faster  response  times  than
inconsistent trials in the “animal vs. non-animal” as well as in the “spider/mushroom vs.
snake/flower” task (controls: FC(1,7) = 116.66 and 46.41, both p < .001; for error rates:
FC(1,7)  = 44.73 and 15.23,  p  < .001 and  p  = .006;  spider fear:  FC(1,7) = 88.93 and
61.44, both p < .001; for error rates: FC(1,7) = 33.95 and 64.75, p = .001 and p < .001).
Overall, these priming effects strongly increased with prime-target SOA in both groups
and tasks (controls: FCxS(1,7) = 46.20 and 29.58, p < .001 and p = .001; for error rates:
FC(1,7)  = 39.90 and 10.94,  p < .001 and  p  = .013;  spider fear:  FCxS(1,7) = 19.86 and
20.73, both p = .003; for error rates: FC(1,7) = 21.19 and 26.81, p = .002 and p = .001).
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Fig. 11. Response times in the two tasks for each group separated by primes. 
In the following, we will  report  the results  separately for each task and each
group and highlight eventual differences. 
In the “animal vs.  non-animal” task,  priming  effects  of  non-anxious  control
participants were the same for each prime picture category (FPxC(3,21) = 2.77, p = .120;
for error rates: FPxC(3,21)  = 1.08,  p = .363). Also, threat-relevant primes (spiders and
snakes)  did  not  lead  to  larger  priming  effects  than  neutral  primes  (mushrooms  and
flowers) (FPxC(1,7) = 3.34, p  = .108;  for error rates: (FPxC(1,7)  = 0.03,  p = .866). In
spider-fearful  participants,  priming  effects  were  also  of  the  same  magnitude,
independent of prime category (FPxC(3,21) = 0.59, p = .553; for error rates: FPxC(3,21) =
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0.06,  p = .915) or prime response category (i.e.,  spider/snake vs.  mushroom/flower;
FPxC(1,7) = 0.52, p = .493; for error rates: FPxC(1,7) = 0.04, p = .854). Consistently, an
ANOVA including the factor group yielded no significant interaction of that factor and
consistency.
In  the  “spider/mushroom  vs.  snake/flower”  task, non-anxious  controls  again
showed no differences between priming effects neither for the four prime categories
(FPxC(3,21) = 3.30, p  = .094; for error rates:  FPxC(3,21)  = 0.55,  p = .508) nor for the
prime response categories  (here:  spiders/mushrooms vs.  snakes/flowers)  (FPxC(1,7)  =
4.03,  p  = .085; for error rates:  FPxC(1,7)  = 1.52,  p = .561). In contrast,  the priming
effects  in  spider-fearful  participants  differed  significantly  across  prime  categories
(FPxC(3,21) = 6.38, p  = .035) as well as across prime response categories (FPxC(1,7) =
6.71, p = .036). However, the effect was not reflected in error rates (prime categories:
FPxC(3,21) = 0.90, p = .395; prime response categories: FPxC(1,7) = 0.80, p = .402). To
analyze the response time effects of the spider-fearful participants in more detail,  we
compared them for the different target picture categories (Fig. 12). The figure clearly
illustrates that the group of spider-fearful participants responded more rapidly to spider
targets in both tasks almost independent of prime-target consistency. An ANOVA with
the additional factor of participant group (G) showed that priming effects across prime
response categories were indeed of different magnitudes in the two groups (FGxPxC (1,14)
= 7.11,  p = .018). This effect did not reach significance in error rates (FGxPxC(1,14)  =
0.05, p = .828).
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Fig.  12.  Response  times  of  spider-fearful  individuals  in  the  “animal  vs.  non-animal”  and
“spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower” tasks separated by primes. Lines of consistent and inconsistent trials
are separated by targets.
Comparing the two tasks. A main effect of task (Ta) was observed within each
group (controls: FTa(1,7) = 11.56, p = .011; for error rates: FTa(1,7) = 11.52, p = .012;
spider fear: FTa (1,7) = 12.49, p  = .010; for error rates:  FTa(1,7)  = 0.33,  p = .584).
Participants responded up to 50 ms slower in the “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower”
task, most probably because cognitive demands were higher in this task. Specifically, in
the “animal vs. non-animal” task, the response categories are consistent with an intuitive
natural categorization of objects, whereas in the “spider/mushroom vs. snake/flower”
59
task,  participants  initially  had  to  learn  which  pictures  belong  to  which  response
category. 
3.3.2. Prime identification task
For statistical  analysis,  we conducted an ANOVA with factors of mask  (M),
prime  (P),  and  group  (G) and,  surprisingly,  observed  no  main  effect  of  the  mask
(FM(1,14) = 3.81, p = .071) (i.e., the number of correct responses in the masked trials did
not differ from those in the unmasked trials). We assume that this was a result of our
experimental design: As described in detail in the method section, the prime was always
followed by two flanking targets. In the masked trials, a pink-noise mask appeared on
the same position as the prime together with the targets, which should have decreased
the  prime’s  visibility.  However,  it  might  be  that  the  two  targets  already  acted  as
backward masks in the unmasked trials because of their immediate vicinity to the prime.
Hence, the visibility of the primes (and the identification performance) was decreased
not only in the masked trials but also in the “unmasked” trials in a similar manner. The
pink-noise  mask  could  not  further  add  to  the  target-induced  masking.  Thus,  in  the
following, we report the prime identification data averaged over masked and unmasked
trials. 
Additionally,  we observed  no interaction  effect  of  prime  (P) and  group  (G)
(FPxG(3,42) = 1.40, p = .264) meaning that in contrast to our expectations the groups had
the same prime identification performance. Surprisingly, when analyzing performance
separately for each group (ANOVA with factors  of prime  (P),  consistency  (C),  and
SOA (S)) we observed a main effect of prime category in the control group but not in
the spider-fearful group (controls: FP(3,21) = 20.08, p < .001;13 spider fear: FP(3,21) =
1.36, p = .288). These results are in contrast to our expectations because we assumed
that spider-fearful participants would be  better at identifying their fear-relevant spider
primes compared to  the snake,  mushroom,  and flower.  However,  they tended to be
slightly worse in doing so (correct responses to spider primes:  m = 0.64 (sd = 0.48),
snake primes:  m = 0.70 (sd = 0.46), mushroom primes:  m = 0.69 (sd = 0.46), flower
primes: m = 0.72 (sd = 0.45), Fig. 13). 
13 Correct responses of control participants to spider primes: m = 0.70 (sd = 0.46), snake primes: m = 0.77
(sd = 0.42), mushroom primes: m = 0.79 (sd = 0.40), flower primes: m = 0.75 (sd = 0.43).
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Fig. 13. Mean correct responses in the prime identification task separated by group, task, prime,
and SOA.
To  explain  the  results,  we  call  attention  to  one  characteristic  of  the  prime
identification task. In contrast to the target identification task in which participants were
asked to react as fast as possible, participants had no time pressure. As discussed in
Section 1.5. “Attentional biases in specific phobias”, spider phobics show an attentional
bias towards spiders within the first 500 ms that is followed by intentional avoidance. In
contrast  to  the  target  identification  task  where  early  and  automatic  information
processing is measured, the prime identification task is aimed at measuring the visual
awareness of the primes.  Certainly,  the involved processes and also the participants’
responses  are  comparatively  slow  and,  therefore,  allow  for  non-automatic  response
biases.  To test  this  hypothesis,  we searched our  data  for  such response  biases  and,
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indeed,  observed that  spider-fearful  participants  tended to use the response category
which included the spider primes more rarely. For example, in the “spider vs. snake”
task, spider-fearful participants declared in 54 percent of the cases that they had seen a
snake or a flower and only in 46 percent that they had seen a spider or a mushroom
(compared  to  50  percent  actual  appearances).  In  contrast,  non-anxious  control
participants used both response categories equally often (Table 3). That finding might to
a  certain  degree  explain  the  results  of  the  spider-fearful  group:  if  a  spider-fearful
participant  by  trend  avoids  the  categories  which  include  spider  pictures,  his  or  her
performance can never reach 100 percent. However, it must be noted that the response
bias in the spider-fearful group was comparably small and cannot entirely explain why
our expectations were not met. 
Table 3: Relative frequency of responses for the respective response category for non-anxious
control and spider-fearful participants.
3.4. Discussion
To investigate the role of phobia in image processing, we analyzed systematic
differences  between  response  patterns  of  the  two  groups  of  participants.  Such
differences were evident in the overall response times (reflecting processing aspects of
the target) as well as in the magnitude of priming effects in response times (reflecting
processing aspects of the prime). 
62
In almost all experimental conditions inconsistent trials led to slower response
times  compared to  consistent  ones,  and these priming effects  increased  with prime-
target  SOA.  These  findings  show  that  natural  images  can  rapidly  activate  motor
responses  assigned  to  them  and  are  in  line  with  previous  results  from  the  image
categorization literature (e.g., Bacon-Macé et al., 2007; Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006) as
well as from response priming studies with natural images (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2009). 
Surprisingly, we found that snake targets had a peculiar influence on response
times: Participants responded somewhat slower to them compared to spider, mushroom,
and  flower  targets.  However,  because  this  response  pattern  was  observed  in  both
groups,  we conclude that  it  rather  be based on physical  characteristics  of the snake
pictures than on emotional significance of snake pictures.14 Also, priming effects in the
non-anxious  control  group  were  not  systematically  different  for  the  four  prime
categories,  neither  in  the  “animal  vs.  non-animal”  nor  in  the  “spider/mushroom vs.
snake/flower” task. Instead, depending on their consistency to the targets, primes always
produced strong and reliable  priming  effects.  This  illustrates  the  way in  which  our
paradigm controls for low-level image characteristics. By comparing the two groups and
also  the  two  tasks,  we  can  identify  and  dispose  of  effects  induced  by  these
characteristics. In line with our previous findings (see Experiment 1, Chapter 2), we
observed no advantages for threat-relevant images (spiders and snakes) on information
processing  in  non-anxious  controls,  neither  on  response  times  to  spider  and  snake
targets nor in priming effects when spiders or snakes preceded the target.
In  contrast,  spider-fearful  participants  showed  a  unique  response  pattern,
comparable  to  the  results  in  Experiment  1.  They responded  more  rapidly  to  spider
targets compared to snake, mushroom and flower targets, leading to increased priming
effects in those response categories that included the spider images. This effect can most
clearly be seen in the second task (cf. Experiment 1). 
Furthermore,  we  expected  that  spider-fearful  participants  would  be  better  at
identifying  briefly  presented  spider  primes  compared  to  non-anxious  control
participants.  One  of  the  main  conclusions  of  Experiment  1  was  that  enhanced
14 This  conclusion  is  supported  by  the  image  ratings.  Control  participants  rated  the  snake  pictures
comparable to the neutral images of mushrooms and flowers.  Although the spider-fearful group rated
snakes as slightly more disgusting and arousing compared to mushrooms and flowers, these ratings were
not as high as the scores on the dimensions “arousal” and “disgust” to spider images. 
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information processing of threat-relevant stimuli might be due to life-long perceptual
learning  processes.  More  specifically,  we  concluded  that  neurons  of  spider-fearful
individuals are specialized in processing spiders (cf. Section 6.3.2. “The neural basis of
perceptual learning”). One could speculate that the same neuronal networks would not
only  allow for  faster  identification  but  would  also  help  in  detecting  spiders  in  our
environment. However,  we did not find such an effect  in  our data.  In the group of
spider-fearful participants all prime categories were identified equally well, falsifying
our hypothesis. Additionally, spider-fearful participants were less correct for all prime
categories  in  the  prime  identification  task.  However,  I  assume that  this  is  due to  a
general effect. As mentioned in the results section, spider-fearful participants were also
slower in their responses in the target identification task compared to the non-anxious
control  group. Given the fact,  that  the two groups were instructed  by two different
experimenters we can not rule out that different manners of instructions given to the
participants biased our results leading to worse performance in the experimental group.
Our main result (i.e., enhanced information categorization of phobic images, but
no improved performance in identifying phobic images) might be explained by the fact
that the type of information processing measured in the target identification task differs
from that  measured  in  the  prime  identification  task.  Although  long-term perceptual
learning processes in spider-fearful individuals might speed their visuomotor responses
to spiders, this learning does not necessarily lead to an improved performance in the
detection of spiders in the environment. In line with this assumption, a large number of
studies demonstrated a dissociation between visuomotor processes and visual awareness
(e.g., varied by different masking strength; Fehrer, & Raab, 1962; Klotz, & Neumann,
1999;  Klotz  &  Wolff,  1995;  Schmidt  &  Schmidt,  2010;  Vorberg  et  al.,  2003).
Importantly, these findings imply that categorization effects as measured by response
priming effects  are based on different mechanisms compared to the identification of
masked  primes  (Schmidt  & Vorberg,  2006).  For  example,  this  was  illustrated  by a
response priming study in which the appearance of dark and bright primes was altered
by a visual illusion (Schmidt et al., 2010). The authors showed that the priming effects
depended only on local flanker–background contrast, not on the subjective appearance
of the primes: indeed, a prime could appear (relatively) bright but could prime as if it
were  (relatively)  dark  (see  also  Schmidt,  Haberkamp,  Veltkamp  et  al.,  2011  for  a
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summary  and  discussion).  But  what  are  the  underlying  mechanisms  of  stimulus
categorization and stimulus identification?
Rapid  stimulus  categorization  is  assumed  to  rely  on  more  basic  information
processing  (e.g.,  local  contrast  of  a  stimulus)  and  is  processed  within  the  first
feedforward sweep of neuronal activation (cf. Section 1.4.2. “The rapid-chase theory of
response  priming”)  and  might  base  on  preconscious  visual  processing  (Lamme  &
Roelfsema,  2000;  also  see  Bullier,  2001).  In  contrast,  identification  of  a  stimulus
requires  visual  awareness,  needs  an  integrated  reconstruction  of  the  scene  and,
therefore,  recurrent  feedback  from  separate  cortical  areas  (Roelfsema,  2006).
Importantly, our results do not not necessarily question the assumption that perceptual
learning processes speed up processing of phobic animals. In contrast, neuronal changes
induced  by  perceptual  learning  might  enhance  information  processing  of  briefly
presented primes without facilitating the conscious percept of those stimuli. Also, from
an evolutionary point of view, it might be more plausible that spider-fearful individuals
are not better in identifying shortly masked spider pictures but partly occluded spider
pictures (similar to real-world spiders hiding in the woods; Öhman & Mineka, 2001).
That  would mean that  a  prime identification  task would not adequately address  the
question how spider-fearful individuals profit from trained neurons on detecting spiders.
On these grounds, it would be interesting to test for different potential consequences of
that specific neuronal hardware in future studies.
To sum up, an explanation of our results (i.e., enhanced information processing
of phobic images, but no improved performance in identifying phobic images) would be
that  the type  of information categorization measured in the target identification task
differs from that measured in the prime identification task. As a consequence, also the
neuronal  hardware  underlying  the  performance  in  the  two  tasks  is  most  probably
different. Therefore, although spider-fearful individuals respond faster to spiders due to
long-term perceptual  learning processes, this neural plasticity does not automatically
lead to an improved performance in the identification of spiders in the environment. 
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4. Experiment  3 -  Information processing is enhanced in blood-injury-injection fear:
Evidence from a response priming study
4.1. Introduction
As  described  in  Section  1.4.  “Enhanced  information  processing  in  specific
phobias” and 1.5.  “Attentional  biases  in  specific  phobia”,  information  processing of
phobic  stimuli  is  enhanced  in  individuals  with  animal  phobia.  Furthermore,  phobic
stimuli are able to modulate attention in phobic individuals. The large number of studies
showing these effects suggests that the repeatedly shown vigilance towards phobic or
threat-relevant stimuli, respectively, exists roughly alike in the majority of individuals
with  any  anxiety  disorder.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  few  studies  specifically
compared participants with different types of anxiety disorders. Indeed, the results for
the different groups were usually comparable. For example, Ehlers and Breuer (1995)
conducted an experiment using a modified Stroop task and observed that participants
with specific phobias as well as participants with panic attacks comparably shifted their
attention  towards  the  phobic  and  threat-relevant  stimuli,  respectively.  Öhman  and
colleagues’  (2001)  asked non-anxious  control,  spider  phobic,  and  snake  phobic
participants in a visual search task to search for pictures of spiders or snakes in grid-
pattern arrays of flower and mushroom pictures, and vice versa. They found that threat-
relevant pictures of spiders and snakes were found more quickly than neutral pictures by
all three groups, with even faster responses to phobic stimuli in the two phobic groups
(also cf. Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001; Wenzel & Holt, 1999). 
However,  in  Experiment  1  (Chapter  2),  we  observed  marked  differences
between  spider-  and  snake-fearful  participants.  In  line  with  these  findings,  Soares,
Esteves,  Lundqvist,  and Öhman (2009) reported that spider-fearful  participants  were
specifically faster in detecting spiders compared to fear-relevant but non-phobic snakes
and  neutral  targets  in  a  visual  search  task.  But  in  snake-fearful  participants,  they
observed  no  differences  in  performance  between  snakes  and  fear-relevant  but  non-
phobic spiders.
From these results,  we concluded that information processing might  differ in
different types of specific phobias. Within the class of specific phobias, there is one type
that  especially  differs  from the  other  specific  phobias;  that  is  blood-injury-injection
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(BII) phobia. In BII phobia, individuals  sense an extreme and irrational fear of blood,
injuries, or receiving an injection or an invasive medical procedure (Öst, 1992). This
phobia lends itself to investigation due to 3 reasons: (1) BII phobia has distinct features
that distinguish it from all other specific phobias (e.g., animal phobias); (2) few studies
have investigated the speed of information processing in individuals with BII phobia
compared to the large number of studies focusing on animal and social phobia; (3) these
studies  produced  mixed  results;  Thus,  it  remains  unclear  if  BII-fearful  individuals
exhibit enhanced information processing or an attentional bias similar to that in other
phobias.
First of all, up to 70% of BII phobics report a history of fainting due to a marked
drop in blood pressure, heart rate, or both when confronted with their phobic stimuli
(i.e., blood or injections; Öst, 1992). In contrast, in other specific phobias (e.g., animal
phobia)  exposure typically  triggers  sympathetic  reactions,  for  instance,  panic-related
symptoms  like  sweating,  trembling,  and  an  increased  heart  rate  and  blood-pressure
(Antony, Brown, & Barlow, 1997). Furthermore, individuals with BII phobia frequently
avoid medical procedure which might lead to serious health implications (Öst, 1992).
Therefore,  Armstrong,  Hemminger,  and  Olatunji  (2013)  argue  that  research  should
contribute to develop more effective treatments for BII-fearful individuals. According to
the authors, one promising area is that of studying vigilance in BII-fearful individuals
since  the  early  attentional  biases  contribute  to  the  increased  distress  when they are
confronted with a phobic stimulus (Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008).
Despite that the attentional bias towards threat-relevant stimuli is a core feature
of other specific phobias; the evidence for an attentional bias in BII fear is equivocal.
For example,  Sawchuk, Lohr, Lee,  and Tolin (1999) used a Stroop task to compare
semantic information processing in BII phobic and non-phobic control participants. 10
medical (e.g., “injection”), 10 disgust (e.g., “vomit”), 10 negative (e.g., “lonely”) and 10
neutral words (e.g., “spoon”) were randomly presented in black, blue, green, or red. The
authors  measured  color-naming  latencies  of  BII  phobics  and control  participants  on
medical  and  disgust  words  and  found  no  difference  between  the  two  groups.  This
indicates that no attentional bias in BII phobics towards phobic stimulus material exists.
In line with these findings, Wenzel and Holt (1999) showed in a dot probe task that
individuals  with BII phobia did not  exhibit  an attentional  bias  towards  their  phobic
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stimuli.  However,  both studies are  limited by the fact  that  they used lexical  stimuli
which might not be strong enough to elicit an attentional bias in BII-fearful participants
(Armstrong et al., 2013). 
This limitation was overcome in a series of experiments that were conducted
more recently by Buodo and colleagues.  In their  eye-tracking study,  BII-fearful  and
control participants were shown phobic, positive emotional and neutral pictures (Buodo,
Sarlo,  Codispoti,  & Palomba,  2006).  The authors  measured  free  viewing times  and
event-related potentials (ERPs). (1) the eye-tracking results revealed no clear pattern of
visual avoidance in BII-fearful participants: Even though these participants spent less
time looking at  blood pictures  when compared to  control  participants  (i.e.,  between
groups comparison), they did not spend less time looking at blood pictures compared to
the other picture categories (i.e., within group comparison). That means phobic pictures
were not specifically shunned by BII-fearful individuals. (2) the ERPs amplitudes of
BII-fearful participants revealed neither an increase indicating an attention bias towards
the  phobic  stimuli  nor  a  decrease  indicating  avoidance  of  the  phobic  stimuli.  The
authors concluded that BII-fearful individuals show no vigilance-avoidance pattern. 
In  a  follow-up study,  the  authors  measured  magnetoencephalography(MEG)-
activity in BII-fearful and non-anxious control participants in response to phobic and
non-phobic  pictures  (Buodo,  Peyk,  Junghöfer,  Palomba,  & Rockstroh,  2007).  They
found a higher activation in BII-fearful participants for the two picture categories of
phobic  and  neutral  stimuli,  but  not  specifically  for  phobic  pictures.  Again,  they
interpreted  these  findings  as  evidence  that  phobic  stimuli  are  not  preferentially
processed by BII-fearful individuals. 
However, there is also evidence that BII phobia is associated with a vigilance-
avoidance pattern. Tolin, Lohr, Lee, and Sawchuck (1999) used a viewing paradigm and
showed that BII phobics avoided viewing injection images compared to non-anxious
controls and spider phobics. Mogg and colleagues (2004) found the same effect for BII-
fearful in participants in a visual dot probe task. In addition, the authors showed that an
intentional avoidance was preceded by an initial vigilance for phobic stimuli. Finally,
two studies  by  the  group of  Buodo and colleagues  contradicted  the  group’s  earlier
results. Buodo, Sarlo, and Munafò (2010) investigated the N2pc component of ERPs -
which  is  assumed  to  reflect  processes  of  spatial  attention  -  in  BII-fearful  and non-
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anxious control participants and found an attentional bias followed by visual avoidance.
Subsequent, Sarlo, Buodo, Devigili,  Munafò, and Palomba (2011) induced cognitive-
emotional  sensitization  in  BII-fearful  participants  by repeatedly presenting  the  same
pictures  of  blood  and  mutilation,  randomly  interspersed  with  neutral  images.  They
observed an early attentional  bias,  indicated  by larger  early N100 potentials,  in  the
group of BII phobics compared to controls, followed by attentional avoidance reflected
in smaller late positive potentials. 
There is even one study that reports an attentional bias but not in line with the
vigilance-avoidance  theory.  In  an  eye-tracking  study  by  Armstrong  and  colleagues
(2013), BII-fearful participants showed a robust vigilance-avoidance pattern. However,
although, BII-fearful participants oriented their attention more often to injection images
and avoided them subsequently compared with non-anxious control participants, they
did not attend to those images more frequently compared to other emotional images.
These results  imply that BII-fearful individuals  respond more intensely to emotional
images per se, but not specifically to phobic images.
In sum, the existence of enhanced information processing and/or an attentional
bias for phobic stimuli in BII phobic individuals is equivocal. Here, we provide further
evidence for an advantage in information processing for phobic images in BII phobia by
applying  a  response  priming  paradigm  (cf.  Section  1.4.1.  “The  response  priming
paradigm”).  We  chose  to  employ  images  of  small  injuries  plus  control  images  of
unharmed body parts. These pictures of small injuries represent phobic stimuli for BII-
fearful  participants,  but  merely  threat-relevant stimuli  for  the  non-anxious  control
participants. The control pictures represent neutral stimuli for both groups. We assumed
that highly arousing pictures of severe mutilations would also evoke strong reactions in
the non-anxious control participants, so that possible differences between them and the
BII-fearful  group would be difficult  to detect.  In contrast,  minor  injuries,  which are
frequently encountered in everyday life, should elicit strong emotional reactions only in
the BII-fearful but not in control participants. 
In the present experiment,  one prime and one target  were presented in  rapid
sequence, and participants classified the targets as quickly as possible by pressing one
button for injury pictures and another button for neutral pictures. We hypothesized that
the BII-fearful  participants  will  show an information processing advantage (possibly
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caused by an early attentional bias). This will be expressed in larger priming effects by
injury primes, as compared to neutral image material (within group comparison) and to
non-anxious control participants (between group comparison) and faster responses to
injury targets (within group and between group comparison). 
Fig 14.  Stimuli  and Procedure.  Primes and targets  were  presented  in  the sequence  displayed.
Targets acted as backward masks for preceding primes. In each trial, the prime was either consistent or
inconsistent  to  the target.  Note that  the original  images  were  presented in  color  against  a  light  gray
background. 
4.2. Methods
Participants. Fifty-one  participants  recruited,  through  the  University  of
Kaiserslautern, took part in the experiment. All of them were naïve to the purpose of the
study. All participants were screened for fear of blood, injury and injections before the
experiment started (Table 4).  For this purpose, we applied two blood-injury-injection-
questionnaires  (German  version  of  the  “Multidimensional  Blood/Injury  Phobia
Inventory” MBPI; Gebhardt, Kämpfe-Hargrave, & Mitte, 2010; German version of the
“Mutilation  Questionnaire” MQ;  Hamm,  2006;  original  version  by  Klorman  et  al.,
1974). 
In addition,  BII-fearful participants  were tested for specific  anxiety disorders
using  a  structured  diagnostic  interview  (“Diagnostic  Interview  for  Psychological
Symptoms (DIPS)”;  Schneider  &  Margraf,  2006),  based on the  DSM-IV-TR (APA,
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2000).  All  participants  met  at  least  four of the six criteria  for specific  phobias.  The
criterion that was not satisfied in most cases (criterion E) states that the individual’s
fear,  anxiety,  or avoidance causes significant  distress or interference in the person’s
day-to-day life.  For this reason, we will refer to the participants in the experimental
group as “fearful” instead of “phobic”. 
BII-fearful participants had to score above the cut-off score of the MBPI of 48.
Control participants had to score below 48 in the MBPI and below percentile 25 in the
MQ. Out of the 51 participants, 42 met the inclusion criteria, whereas the data from one
BII-fearful  and 8 control  participants  had to  be excluded:  seven control  participants
scored too high in the MQ-questionnaire;  one BII-fearful and one control participant,
were excluded due to technical problems with data recording. The data of nineteen BII-
fearful participants (16 women and 3 men; mean age = 24.2 years) and twenty-three
non-anxious control participants (15 women and 8 men; mean age = 24.7 years) were
analyzed.
Table 4: Means (SDs) for group characteristics. 
Participants  had  normal  or  corrected-to-normal  visual  acuity and  received
payment of 6 € per hour. All of them gave written informed consent and were treated in
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accordance  with  the  ethical  guidelines  of  the  American  Psychological  Association.
Some  BII-fearful  participants  accepted  the  offer  to  inspect  example  images  before
deciding to participate.
Apparatus.  The participants were seated in a dimly lit room in front of a color
cathode-ray monitor (1280x1024 pixels, retrace rate 85 Hz) at a viewing distance of
approximately 70 cm.
Stimuli and Procedure. Two different categories of colored images (pictures of
injuries  and  pictures  of  unharmed  body  parts),  each  containing  forty-one  different
pictures (4.23° of visual angle; 1 mm ≈ 0.008° of visual angle), were presented against a
lighter  gray background (8.75 cd/m2).  Pictures  of injuries  and unharmed body parts
were  matched,  such  that  an  equivalent  number  of  injured  body  part  pictures  and
unharmed body part pictures (e.g.,hands, legs) were presented. Matching the pictures
makes  between  group  comparisons  more  reliable  because  neutral  and  threat-
relevant/phobic pictures do not differ in picture content. To the best of our knowledge,
this was not done in previous studies with BII-fearful participants.
Each  trial  started  with  the  appearance  of  the  central  fixation  point.  After  a
varying delay, the prime was displayed for 12 ms either above or below the fixation
point at 3.74° eccentricity. Subsequently, the target was presented at the same position
at  prime-target  SOAs  of  35,  59,  81,  or  106  ms  and  remained  on  screen  until  the
participant’s response (cf. Fig. 14). The time from fixation onset to target onset was
constant at 1000 ms. In each trial, the prime was either consistent or inconsistent with
the target with respect to the required motor response. All stimulus combinations of
prime and target picture categories and prime-target SOA occurred equiprobably and
pseudo-randomly in a repeated-measures design.
Participants categorized the targets as quickly as possible by pressing the left
button for threat-relevant pictures and the right button for pictures of unharmed body
parts  (or  vice  versa).  The  assignment  of  left  and  right  response  keys  was
counterbalanced  across  participants.  Participants  received  summary  feedback  on  the
speed and correctness of their responses after each block. Each participant performed
one 1-hour session. That session started with one practice block followed by 17 blocks
of 32 trials. Finally, participants completed an image rating (see below) and received an
explanation of the experiment. 
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Participants were asked to evaluate all test images of injured and unharmed body
parts. The rating involved three dimensions (valence,  arousal, and disgust) that were
each rated on a six-point rating scale. Scales were coded so that high scores reflected
high arousal and disgust, respectively. In the valence dimension, possible ratings ranged
from  negative  to  positive  emotion.  Five  control  and  three  fearful  participants
misunderstood instructions  and rated unharmed body parts as highly negative.  Their
valence ratings were excluded from further analysis. 
Non-anxious  controls  and  BII-fearful  participants  differed  significantly
regarding their evaluations (Table 4). A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
with factors  of  group and picture  category and the three  rating  scales  as dependent
variables confirmed a main effect of group, with BII-fearful participants rating pictures
as more negative, arousing, and disgusting compared to control participants (Wilk's Λ =
0.43, F  (3, 60) = 26.88, p  < .001), as well as a main effect of picture category, with
injury pictures rated as more negative, arousing, and disgusting as neutral pictures (Λ =
0.25, F (3, 60) =60.72, p < .001). Crucially, there was an interaction effect of group and
picture  category,  such  that  BII-fearful  participants  rated  injury  pictures  as  more
negative, arousing, and disgusting than control participants did (Λ = 0.50, F (3, 60) =
19.86, p < .001), while the two groups gave similar ratings for neutral pictures.
Data  treatment  and  statistical  methods.  Practice  blocks  were  not  analyzed.
Trials were eliminated if response times were shorter than 100 ms or longer than 1000
ms (1.92% of trials), and if, incidentally, prime and target consisted of the exact same
image  (1.25%  of  trials).  Repeated-measure  analyzes  of  variance  (ANOVAs)  were
performed with Greenhouse-Geisser-corrected p values. Analyzes of response times are
restricted to trials on which participants made correct responses. Additionally, we report
error  rates.  Error  rates  were  arc  sine  transformed  to  make  them  compatible  with
ANOVA requirements.  We report  F values  with subscripts  indicating  the respective
effect (e.g., FcxS for the interaction of consistency and SOA). 
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4.3. Results
We first analyze the influence of the primes on response times in the two groups
and link the effect to the influence of the target on overall response times. Second, we
test  whether  the  influences  of  primes  and  targets  are  also  apparent  in  the  fastest
responses (i.e, in the 2nd and 3rd deciles).
4.3.1. Influence of the primes on priming effects
Influence of the primes on response times.  Response times for the two groups
(controls and BII fear) and targets (injuries vs. unharmed body parts) are displayed in
Figure 15. We conducted an ANOVA with factors of group (G), prime (P), consistency
(C), and SOA (S). In all four panels, consistent trials (where prime and target belonged
to  the  same  response  category)  produced  faster  responses  than  inconsistent  trials
(controls:  FC(1,22) = 81.61, p < .001, for error rates:  FC(1,22) = 26.03, p < .001;  BII
fear:  FC(1,18) = 88.64, p < .001, for error rates:  FC(1,18) = 20.81, p < .001).  This
priming effect increased with increasing SOA (controls:  FCxS(3,66) = 10.48, p < .001,
for error rates: FC(3,66) = 4.55, p = .008; BII fear: FCxS(3,54) = 29.66, p < .001, for error
rates: FC(3,54) = 9.91, p < .001).
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Fig. 15. Priming effects in response times and error rates for each group, separately for the two
different prime types. 
Priming effects for the two primes differed between the two groups (FGxPxC(1,40)
= 7.92, p = .008), also by trend in error rates: FGxPxC (1,40) = 3.87, p = .056 (Fig. 15). As
expected,  injury primes elicited the largest priming effect in the BII-fearful group. We
further separated priming effects  for neutral  and threat-relevant  primes and analyzed
whether the priming effects differed between the two groups. The two groups differed
significantly for phobic/threat-relevant primes (FGxC(1,40) = 17.14, p  < .001; for error
rates:  FGxC(1,40) = 2.03, p  = .162) and showed a difference by trend for the neutral
primes (FGxC(1,40) = 4.05, p = .051; for error rates: FGxC(1,40) = 3.94, p = .054). In other
words, injury primes clearly augment the priming effect measured in response times
compared to the neutral primes. Note that the observed priming effects strongly depend
on  the influence of the target on overall  response times (Fig. 16).  We analyzed the
results within each group conducting an ANOVA with factors of group (G) and target
(T). We hypothesized that in BII-fearful participants pictures of small injuries should be
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processed more rapidly.  Correspondingly, BII-fearful participants responded faster to
phobic pictures  of  injuries than  to neutral  targets  (FT  (1,18)  = 11.75, p = .002);  on
average, these responses were about 23.26 ms faster. In the non-anxious control group,
targets had no main effect (FT  (1,22) = 1.64, p = .213). However, in this group error
rates were higher in trials where threat-relevant targets of small injuries appeared (FT
(1,18) = 5.58, p = .027). In contrast, BII-fearful participants were more accurate when
phobic targets were presented (Fig. 16, lower panel). This rules out that the advantage in
processing speed for phobic targets in that group is due to a speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
Fig. 16. Upper panel: Response times to different target types averaged for each group, shown
relative to the grand average response time. Lower panel: Error rates (in percentage) are displayed. In
both plots, different gray scales indicate different target types. 
4.3.2. Results of 2nd and 3rd deciles
The  analysis  of  the  results  in  the  2nd and  3rd deciles  enables  us  to  draw
conclusions about the underlying physiological mechanisms of information processing.
Additionally,  we  analyzed  deciles  2  to  9  to  investigate  whether  the  magnitude  of
response priming effect changes over the course of the response time distribution.  The
1st and  10th deciles  are  not  well  suited  for  such  an  analysis  because  they  are  too
dependent on possible outliers. The deciles are obtained by sorting raw response times,
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separately for each participant and condition (defined by the levels of consistency, SOA,
and either by prime or target). Note that response times shorter than 100 ms and longer
than 1000ms were not excluded. Subsequently, we calculated mean response times for
10 %-bins ranging from 0 to 100 %. 
We analyzed the response times  of the  2nd and 3rd deciles  by performing an
ANOVA with factors of group (G) and target (T). Indeed, the specific effect of phobic
targets  on  overall  response  times  was  already  observable  in  the  fastest  responses
(FGxT(1,40) = 10.10, p = .003; Fig. 17A). We conducted also an ANOVA with factors of
group (G), prime (P), consistency (C), and SOA (S) and as in the overall data, priming
effects were larger for the phobic primes in the BII-fearful group (FGxC(1,40) = 8.94, p =
.005;  Fig. 17B). This indicates that effects outlined above were already present in the
fastest responses and the processing advantage might well rely on the first sweep  of
neuronal activation running through the visuomotor system (cf. Schmidt, Haberkamp,
Veltkamp et al., 2011).
Additionally, we conducted  an ANOVA with factors of group  (G),  prime (P),
consistency (C), SOA (S) and decile (D). The analysis revealed neither an interaction of
factors consistency and decile nor of consistency, SOA, and decile (FCxD(7,280) = 0.99,
p = .345; FCxDxS(21,840) = 0.33, p = .706) nor of an interaction with these factors and the
factor group (FCxDxG(7,280) = 0.06, p  = .872;  FCxDxSxG(21,840) = 1.18, p  = .311). The
results indicate that response priming effects are already fully developed in the 2nd and
3rd deciles and do not increase or decrease in the subsequent deciles. 
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Fig. 17. (A) Response times for each group, separately for the two different prime types in the 2 nd
and 3rd deciles. (B) Response times to the two targets for the two groups, shown relative to the grand
average response time for 2nd and 3rd deciles of the response time distribution. 
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4.4. Discussion
Overall,  we found robust response priming effects  for each of the two prime
categories in the two groups of non-anxious control and BII-fearful individuals. In all
experimental conditions (except one), inconsistent trials led to slower response times
and more errors compared to consistent ones. These findings are in line with previous
results from the image categorization literature (e.g., Bacon-Macé et al., 2007; Kirchner
& Thorpe, 2006) as well as the response priming study with natural images (Schmidt &
Schmidt,  2009),  that  show that natural  image categories  are  able  to  rapidly activate
motor  responses  assigned  to  them  (for  a  review  see  Fabre-Thorpe,  2011).  More
specifically, we were interested in systematic differences between response patterns in
the  two groups.  We expected  such differences  in  the  magnitude  of  priming  effects
(reflecting processing aspects of the prime) as well  as in the overall  response times
(reflecting processing aspects of the target).
In  the  group of  control  participants,  all  primes  produced  strong and reliable
priming  effects  depending  on  their  consistency  with  the  targets.  However,  priming
effects from threat-relevant and neutral primes did not differ. Additionally, we found no
systematic  influence of threat-relevant  and neutral  targets on overall  response times.
Thus, we found no advantage for threat-relevant stimuli of small injuries in non-anxious
control participants. Also, no advantage occurred in the fastest responses (2nd and 3rd
deciles).  These  findings  are  in  line  with  the  image  ratings,  in  which  non-anxious
controls  rated  the  injury  pictures  as  only  slightly  negative,  arousing,  or  disgusting,
compared to their  ratings  of the neutral  pictures  of unharmed body parts  (Table 4).
Obviously,  the  mild  unpleasantness  of  the  images  had  no  discernible  influence  on
response times. 
In  contrast,  in  BII-fearful  participants,  phobic  primes  elicited  larger  priming
effects in the BII-fearful group compared to neutral primes and in comparison to the
control  group.  As  expected,  they  responded  faster  to  injury  targets  than  to  neutral
targets, indicating a visuomotor processing advantage for phobic images similar to that
observed in animal phobias (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2006;  Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001;
Rinck & Becker, 2006; also cf. Experiment 1, Chapter 2). Additionally, they responded
faster to injury targets compared to the control group. Most interestingly, all observed
effects  are already present in the fastest  responses (deciles 2 and 3). These findings
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support the notion that responses of the two groups were based on the first feedforward
sweep of neuronal activation proceeding through the visuomotor system. In the group of
BII-fearful participants, fastest responses are even further accelerated by phobic targets.
These  results  suggest  that  BII-fearful  participants  process  phobic  images  principally
different compared to the non-anxious group. 
We believe that this enhancement in BII-fearful participants might base on long-
term perceptual  learning processes  (cf.  Discussion  of  Experiment  1,  Section  2.4.1.).
Because  perceptual  learning  modulates  the  processing  hardware  concerned  with  a
specific  stimulus  class,  the  processing  advantage  encompasses  the  first  feedforward
sweep of visual processing. Even complex stimuli with a variety of different features
such  as  natural  images  of  injuries  can  be  processed  rapidly  and  automatically.  We
embed our findings within a feedforward theory of response priming, suggesting that
enhanced information processing is based on sequential feedforward sweeps elicited by
prime and target stimuli which activate the associated motor responses in strict sequence
and without temporal overlap (rapid-chase theory;  cf. Section 1.4.2.).  Indeed, in the
present data all modulatory effects of phobic material on response times and priming
effects were fully present in the fastest responses, that is, in the 2nd and 3rd deciles of the
response time distribution, consistent with such a simple feedforward model. 
Our findings are in contrast to those earlier studies that reported no processing
enhancement  for  BII  phobic  material  in  BII-fearful  individuals  (cf.  Sawchuk et  al.,
1999; Buodo et al., 2006, 2007; Wenzel & Holt, 1999). We assume this to be in part a
consequence  of  the  different  methodological  approaches  (i.e.,  response  priming
paradigms compared to other paradigms are highly sensitive for measuring early and
automatic visuomotor information processing), and the different selection of stimulus
material. 
We did not use highly arousing images of severe mutilations in our study but
pictures of minor injuries. By that, we ensured that the two groups of BII-fearful and
control participants were sufficiently different in their ratings of the stimulus material.
In other words, images of severe injuries or mutilated bodies that were used in earlier
studies  may have  also evoked strong reactions  in  non-anxious  controls  and thereby
abolished possible differences between them and phobic participants. Thus, we believe
that  using  pictures  of  just  small  injuries  is  crucial  when  investigating  response
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differences  between  non-anxious  control  and  fearful  participants.  In  that  context,
Lissek,  Pine,  and  Grillon  (2006)  refer  to  the  psychological  concept  of  the  strong
situation (Ickes, 1982; Mischel, 1977; Monson & Snyder, 1977) in which unambiguous
stimuli  yield  uniform reactions  and expectancies.  On the  contrary,  they refer  to  the
weak situation in  which stimuli  are  less-defined and of  lower salience.  The authors
argue  that  weak  situations  diminish  the  situational  influence  and  strengthen  the
influence of the individual participant. Therefore, using weak stimulus material might
facilitate  the differences between non-anxious and fearful groups. We are convinced
that the use of less severe stimulus material should also be considered in future studies
on phobias.
Additionally, we matched the pictures of injuries and unharmed body, such that
an equivalent number of injured and unharmed body part pictures (e.g.,  hands, legs)
were presented. Matching the pictures makes between group comparisons more reliable
because neutral and threat-relevant/phobic pictures do not differ in picture content. To
the  best  of  our  knowledge,  this  was  not  done  in  previous  studies  with  BII-fearful
participants. The stimulus material applied in this study might have contributed to the
differences in information processing observed between the non-anxious and BII-fearful
group, while other studies did not find such effects (cf. Sawchuk et al., 1999; Buodo et
al., 2006, 2007; Wenzel & Holt, 1999). 
Note  that  control  and  threat-relevant  stimuli  differed  in  their  appearance.
Because threat-relevant stimuli  were pictures of small  injuries, the proportion of the
color  red is higher in these images. As a result, responses to these pictures might be
faster  because  of  the  higher  salience.  Still,  we  decided  to  present  colored  pictures
because red blood is an important characteristic of the threat-relevant injury pictures and
probably play an important role in inducing fear in BII-fearful individuals. However, the
non-anxious group controls for a potential influence of stimulus characteristics on the
responses. In this group, response times were not different between neutral and threat-
relevant images; indicating that stimulus characteristics alone do not lead to enhanced
information processing. 
Although, we found evidence for enhanced information processing, the current
study has limitations which should be considered. A limitation of our study is the fact
that we did not use threat-relevant (but non-phobic) pictures. In the eye-tracking study
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by Armstrong and colleagues  (2013),  BII-fearful  participants  attended to pictures  of
injections  most  frequently.  Though,  the  authors  found  no  difference  between  the
percentage of the initial fixations of the BII-fearful participants on phobic and merely
threat-relevant pictures (e.g., attacking dogs). This suggests that BII-fearful participants
might be better in detecting phobic stimuli comparable to other specific phobias; but,
that this bias might also apply to other stimuli with negative valence. Thus, we can not
exclude that the reported effects are based on a general hypervigilance of BII-fearful
participants and not to a specific reaction towards the phobic stimuli.  However, note
that  for  instance  Tolin  and  colleagues  (1999)  reported  that  BII-fearful  participants
avoided pictures of injections but not threat-relevant pictures of spiders (also cf. Buodo
et al., 2010).
In summary, our results show that phobic stimuli are processed faster by BII-
fearful participants as revealed by response time differences. Our results are in line with
more recent studies (Buodo et al., 2010; Sarlo et al., 2011) which suggest a preferential
processing of phobic stimuli by BII-fearful participants. This accelerated information
processing  of  phobic  images  was  comparable  to  those  reported  in  spider-fearful
participants  classifying  phobic  vs.  threat-relevant  vs.  neutral  stimuli  as  reported  in
Experiment 1 (Chapter 2). Importantly,  this suggests that despite the distinct clinical
phenomenology of BII phobia, the basic visuomotor information processes are similar
to those in other specific phobias.
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5. Experiment  4 -  Spiders capture attention:  A prior-entry-effect  for phobia-relevant
stimuli
5.1. Introduction
Attention can be modulated in two different ways: in a top-down manner (i.e.,
through behavioral goals, that means by a specific search task; e.g., search for the red
dot) or in a bottom-up manner (i.e., through the characteristics of the stimulus; e.g., the
color of a dot; Yantis, 2000). One stimulus characteristic that modulates attention is its
saliency (e.g.,  Pashler, 1988; Theeuwes, 1992, for reviews see Corbetta & Shulman,
2002; Theeuwes, 2010). For example, a red circle embedded in an array of green circles
is  very  salient,  and,  thus,  may  automatically  capture  attention.  Saliency  might  not
depend on perceptual characteristics alone, but attention might also be modulated by the
emotional significance of a stimulus. In this context, it would be highly reasonable that
a perilous animal  that hides in the woods is  automatically attended (cf.  Mathews &
Mackintosh, 1998). Indeed, it was shown that threat-relevant stimuli (e.g., spiders or
threatening  faces)  are  more  likely  to  capture  attention  than  neutral  stimuli  (e.g.,
Eastwood et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2000; Koster et al., 2004, but see Becker, Anderson,
Mortensen, Neufeld, & Neel, 2011; also cf. Section 1.5. “Attentional biases in specific
phobias”).
One way to measure attentional  capture is to use Temporal Order Judgments
(TOJs;  cf.  Section  1.5.1  “The  prior  entry  paradigm”).  West  and  colleagues  (2009)
demonstrated by applying TOJs that angry faces capture attention compared to neutral
faces, and that these stimuli show a visual prior entry effect (also cf. Fecica & Stolz,
2008).  Note  that  likewise  some evidence  suggest  spiders  should  be  able  to  capture
attention (Mogg & Bradley,  2006; Rinck & Becker, 2006; for reviews on attentional
biases in general see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Bar-Haim et al., 2007).15 In contrast
15 For example, Mogg and Bradley (2006) demonstrated in a dot probe task that spider-fearful participants
attended to spider pictures within the first 200 ms and that their response times decreased in trials where
the  dot  was  presented  at  the  position  of  the  spider  picture.  Furthermore,  Rinck  and  Becker  (2006)
demonstrated in an eye tracking study that the very first fixation of spider-fearful participants was more
often on the spider pictures compared to the non-anxious control participants whose first fixation was
equally often on the spider or the neutral control pictures.
83
to traditional studies on prior entry in  which attention is typically manipulated, West
and colleagues (2009) did not cue the stimuli that were used but rather assumed that
threatening faces would automatically capture attention in a bottom-up manner due to
the emotional significance of the threatening face stimuli. However, these results cannot
be generalized because faces are processed differently compared to objects or animals.
More specifically, faces are processed in a holistic fashion by specific cortical regions
(the fusiform face area; cf. McKone, Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2006; Kanwisher, 2010).
Additionally, no other study I know of demonstrated a visual prior entry effect with a
different  type  of  threat-relevant  or  phobic  stimuli.  Therefore,  we  wanted  to  know
whether  the  same  effect  can  also  be  found  in  spider-fearful  participants  for  spider
pictures or whether the prior entry effect demonstrated by West and colleagues (2009) is
restricted to face stimuli. 
Comparable to the study of West and colleagues (2009), we aimed to test if the
attentional bias for spiders reported above is strong enough to elicit a visual prior entry
effect in the group of spider-fearful participants. In our study, two groups of participants
took part; one group of spider-fearful and one group of non-anxious control participants.
The stimuli comprised of three categories of natural images of animals (spiders, snakes,
and butterflies). In the present study, spiders represent  phobic stimuli for the group of
spider-fearful  participants,  but  they  are  merely  fear-relevant for  the  group  of  non-
anxious controls. Snakes represent  fear-relevant and butterflies  neutral control stimuli
for both groups. Also, there was a neutral category of natural images of non-animals
(mushrooms and flowers). 
We  decided  to  use  natural  images  in  the  current  study  due  to  their  high
ecological validity. In each trial, one animal picture and one non-animal picture were
presented with a varied SOA (0 ms, 12 ms, 24 ms, 35 ms, or 47 ms; Fig. 18). We did
not  cue  the  stimuli  but  assumed  that  spider  pictures  would  automatically  capture
attention of spider-fearful participants (cf. West et al., 2009).
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Fig. 18.  Stimuli and Procedure.  Picture 1 and picture 2 were presented at varied SOAs in the
sequence displayed. The participants’ task was to indicate which of the pictures was presented first.
The experimental setup described above allows us to investigate three questions:
(1) whether spider-fearful individuals process phobic images of spiders faster than fear-
relevant  animals (snakes) or neutral  animals  (butterflies)?  (2) Whether spider-fearful
participants process the presented pictures of spiders faster than non-anxious controls?
(3) Whether non-anxious controls process fear-relevant stimuli (spiders, snakes) faster
than neutral stimuli?
In Experiment  1  (Chapter  2),  we found enhanced information  processing for
phobic pictures in spider-fearful but not for fear-relevant pictures in non-anxious control
participants using the same stimulus material (also cf. Tipples et al., 2002). Therefore,
we  expect  that  no  visual  prior  entry  effects  for  fear-relevant  spiders  and  snakes
compared to the neutral category of butterflies will occur in the group of non-anxious
control participants. However, we expect to find a visual prior entry effect for phobic
spiders in spider-fearful participants (within-group-prior-entry effect). Furthermore, we
expect to find a prior entry effect for spiders in the spider-fearful group compared to the
non-anxious control group (between-groups-prior-entry effect).
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5.2. Methods
Participants.  Twenty-eight  participants  recruited  through  the  University  of
Kaiserslautern took part in the study. All of them were naïve to the purpose of the study.
Fourteen of them reported that they were highly afraid of spiders but not of snakes (8
women and 6 men; age range, mean = 25.75, SEM = 2.45). 14 participants reported
being afraid of neither spiders nor snakes (11 women, 3 men; age range, mean = 24.50,
SEM = 1.08). All participants were screened for fear of spiders or snakes before the
experiment started (Fig. 19). For this purpose, two spider questionnaires and one snake
questionnaire  were  applied  (German  version  of  the  “Spider  Questionnaire”  SPQ;
Hamm,  2006;  original  version  by  Klorman  et  al.,  1974;  German  questionnaire
“Fragebogen zur Angst vor Spinnen [Fear of spiders questionnaire]” FAS; Rinck et al.,
2002;  German  version  of  the  “Snake Questionnaire”  SNAQ; Hamm,  2006;  original
version by Klorman et al., 1974). 
To  ensure  that  the  two  groups  differed  substantially,  non-anxious  control
participants  had  to  score  below  the  25th percentile  in  the  SPQ  and  spider-fearful
participants had to score above the 75th percentile in the SPQ. All participants had to
score below the 50th percentile in the SNAQ to exclude persons with snake phobia from
the  study.  For  the  FAS,  only guideline  values  exits.  However,  the  two groups also
differed significantly in this questionnaire (T(14.49) = 11.68, p < .001; Fig. 19).
 Three additional participants who reported being highly afraid of spiders and
two participants who reported being afraid of neither spiders or snakes were excluded
after  the  diagnostic  session  due  to  high  scores  in  the  snake  questionnaire.  One
participant who reported being highly afraid of spiders was excluded due to low scores
in the two spider questionnaires. These participants were not included in the number of
participants stated above. 
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Fig.  19.  Results  of  two  spider  and  one  snake  questionnaire  (German  version  of  the  “Spider
Questionnaire” SPQ; Hamm, 2006; German questionnaire “Fragebogen zur Angst  vor Spinnen” FAS;
Rinck et al., 2002; German version of the “Snake Questionnaire” SNAQ; Hamm, 2006) separately for
two  different  groups  (non-anxious  controls,  spider-fearful  participants).  Dashed  lines  indicate  the
maximum score obtainable in the respective questionnaire.
In  addition,  all  spider-fearful  participants  were  tested  for  specific  anxiety
disorders  using  a  structured  diagnostic  interview  (“Diagnostic  Interview  for
Psychological Symptoms (DIPS)”; Schneider & Margraf, 2006), based on the DSM-IV-
TR (APA, 2000). All fearful participants except one met at least four criteria for specific
phobia. The criterion that was not satisfied in most cases (criterion E) states that the
individual’s  fear,  anxiety,  or  avoidance  causes  significant  distress  or  significant
interference in the person’s day-to-day life. For this reason, we will refer to participants
in the experimental groups as “fearful” instead of “phobic”. 
 All participants completed the  Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al.,
1961; mean = 4.00, SEM = 0.74). Three of the participants (two spider-fearful,  one
control)  were  excluded  for  high  depression  scores  above  10,  which  indicate  the
existence of a mild depressions (cf. Experiment 1/Chapter 2). These participants are also
already subtracted from the number of participants reported above.
Participants  had  normal  or  corrected-to-normal  visual  acuity  and  received
payment  of  €  6  per  hour.  All  of  them gave  informed  consent  and  were  treated  in
accordance with the ethical guidelines of the American Psychological Association.
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Apparatus.  The participants were seated in a dimly lit room in front of a color
cathode-ray monitor (1280x1024 pixels, retrace rate 85 Hz) at a viewing distance of
approximately 70 cm.
Stimuli  and  procedure.  Five  different  types  of  gray  scale  images  (spiders,
snakes, butterflies, mushrooms, and flowers), each containing thirty different pictures,
were presented against a lighter gray background (8.75 cd/m2).  Each trial started with
the appearance of the central fixation point (Fig. 18). After a varying delay, the first
picture was displayed for 35 ms either to the left or the right of the fixation point at
3.74°. The second one was shown for 35 ms at the opposite position of the fixation
point, i.e. to the left or right of the fixation point, respectively, at SOAs of 0 ms, 12 ms,
24 ms, 35 ms, or 47 ms. Both pictures were presented at a visual angle of 4.16° (1 mm ≈
0.008° of visual angle). In each trial, animals (spiders, snakes, or butterflies) and neutral
non-animals  (flowers and mushrooms) were presented in pairs.  That results  in three
possible  conditions:  “spider  vs.  neutral  picture”,  “snake  vs.  neutral  picture”,  and
“butterfly  vs.  neutral  picture”. In  each  block,  only  one  type  of  animal  picture  was
combined with the neutral  non-animal  pictures.  Blocks were presented in a  pseudo-
random order. In each session, 27 blocks – consisting of 32 trials – were presented. Both
non-animal  picture types  occurred in every block. In order to avoid a response bias
towards spiders, the participants’ task was to indicate whether the animal (and not the
specific animal, e.g., spider) or the non-animal picture came first.
Although  one  can  theoretically  assume  that  for  stimuli  in  the  same  sensory
modality the PSS would coincide with physical simultaneity (SOA 0) if attention is not
manipulated, several studies revealed at least small deviations of the PSS from physical
simultaneity  (e.g.,  vision:  Shore,  Spence  & Klein,  2001;  tactile  modality:  Yates  &
Nicholls, 2011). These findings are probably due to the influence of low-level feature
differences between the stimuli on temporal perception. Thus, computing a prior entry
effect  between a control  (“butterfly vs.  neutral  picture”)  and experimental  condition
(“spider vs. neutral picture”, “snake vs. neutral picture”) corrects for possible effects of
low-level  feature differences  which could lead either  to over- or underestimation of
prior entry. Participants received visual feedback on the correctness of their responses
after each block. Each participant performed two 1.5-hour sessions. The first session
started  with  the  diagnostic  screening  which  was  followed  by  a  1-hour  computer
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experiment. The second session started with a second 1-hour computer experiment and
was followed by a picture evaluation of the images presented during the experiment. 
The picture rating after the second session involved three dimensions (valence,
arousal, and disgust). All dimensions were rated on a six-point rating scale. Scales were
coded  so  that  high  scores  reflected  high  arousal  and  disgust,  respectively.  Positive
scores in the valence ratings represent positive emotions towards the image, a score of
zero means that neither positive nor negative emotions are involved, and negative scores
reflect  negative  emotions  (Table  5).  All  three  scores  were  submitted  as  dependent
variables to a multivariate analysis of variance with factors of group and picture type. In
the  image  rating,  the  groups  (non-anxious  control  and  spider-fearful  participants)
differed significantly regarding their evaluations. A main effect of group (Wilk’s λ =
0.51, F(3,128) = 41.62, p < .001) and picture type (Wilk’s λ = 0.15, F(12,338.95) =
29.99, p < .001), as well as an interaction effect of group and picture type was observed
(Wilk’s λ = 0.26, F(12,338.95) = 18.73, p < .001), reflecting the fact that spider-fearful
participants  rated  the  spider  images  more  negatively  on  all  three  dimensions  as
compared to  neutral  images  or non-anxious participants.  Participants  were debriefed
after the second session and received an explanation of the purpose of the study.
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Table 5: Participants’ mean scores (with standard deviations) for image evaluation separately for
scale (valence, arousal, and disgust) for each picture type and each group. Bold letters indicate phobic
image categories. 
Data  treatment  and  statistical  methods.  Practice  blocks  were  not  analyzed.
Univariate analyzes of variance (ANOVAs) were performed with Greenhouse-Geisser-
corrected p values. We report F values with subscripts indicating the respective effect
(e.g., FGxC for the interaction of group and picture condition). Additionally, we estimated
the slope and the shift in the psychophysical functions of each participant for the three
experimental conditions (“spider picture vs. neutral picture”, “snake picture vs. neutral
picture”,  “butterfly  picture  vs.  neutral  picture”)  by  non-linear  regression  based  on
Birnbaum’s (1968) logistic model (Suen, 1990):
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We extracted the parameters slope and shift and tested them with independent 
two-sample t-tests. Additionally, we report the effect size using Cohen's d for all 
independent two-sample t-tests (Cohen, 1988).16
5.3. Results
Firstly, we performed a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with factors of
group (G;  non-anxious controls vs. spider-fearful participants), picture condition  (PC;
“spider vs. neutral picture”, “snake vs. neutral picture”, “butterfly vs. neutral picture”),
and SOA (S; -47 ms, -35 ms, -24 ms, -12 ms, 0 ms, 12 ms, 24 ms, 35 ms, or 47 ms). The
interaction of group and picture condition was significant (FGXPC(2, 702) = 8.02, p  < .
001)  confirming  that  the  two groups  differed  in  their  rating  concerning  the  picture
condition. As expected, a main effect of SOA (FS(2, 702) = 8.02, p  < .001) occurred,
confirming that the ratings depend on the respective SOA. This is not surprising given
that SOA and picture presentation are related (i.e., negative SOAs indicate that animal
pictures  were  presented  first,  positive  SOAs  indicate  that  neutral  pictures  were
presented first; Fig. 20, 21).
We also analyzed the differences between the two groups for the two parameters
slope and shift using independent two-sample  t-tests (Fig. 20). Results show that the
two groups do not differ in the slope of their  function in any condition (“spider vs.
neutral picture”, “snake vs. neutral picture”, “butterfly vs. neutral picture”: all |t (26)| ≤
0.57,  p > .05, .14 ≤  d < .23).  Most importantly,  significant  differences between the
groups  appear  in  the  shift  of  the  fitted  curves  in  the  “spider  vs.  neutral  picture”
condition (t (26) = -2.23, p = .034,  d  = .65). No group differences in the “snake vs.
neutral  picture” condition appear (t  (26) = 0.99, p > .05,  d  = .43). As expected,  the
analysis  reveals  no group differences  in the control  condition  (“butterfly  vs.  neutral
picture”, t (26) = 0.83, p > .05, d = .31). The differences in PSS between the groups add
up to 6.87 ms in the “spider vs. neutral picture”, up to 1.89 ms in the “snake vs. neutral
picture”, and up to 1.56 ms in the “butterfly vs. neutral picture” condition.17
16 Note that effect sizes of d = .2 are considered as being small, of d = .5 as being medium, and of d = .8
as being large (Cohen, 1988).
17 Note that the calculation of the PSSs is based on the shift of Birnbaum's logistic model (1968).
91
Fig. 20. Three panels  – one for  each  animal  condition  (A:  “spider  vs.  neutral  picture”,  B:
“snake vs. neutral picture”, C: “butterfly vs. neutral picture”) – are displayed. In each panel, proportion
of ‘animal first’ responses are plotted. Results of the two groups are indicated by the two different lines.
Arrows indicate the prior entry effect in panel A.
Finally, we conducted a multivariate ANOVA to  analyze whether a difference
between the conditions in the shift and/or slope exist within each group (Fig. 21). We
found no significant difference in the control group neither for the slope nor for the shift
of the psychometric functions (shift: F(2,26) = 1.15, p = .329; slope: F(2,26) = 0.20, p =
.730). Additionally, we found no differences in the slope of the functions in the spider-
fearful group (F(2,26) = 0.16, p = .814). However, as expected, we found a significant
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difference  in  the  shift  between  the  conditions  within  the  group  of  spider-fearful
participants of approximately 7 ms (F(2,26) = 4.55,  p = .046). This finding confirms
that spiders elicit a prior entry effect in the experimental group.
Fig. 21. Responses are plotted for the two different groups (A: non-anxious controls, B: Spider
fear). Each line indicates one animal condition (“spider vs. neutral picture”, “snake vs. neutral picture”,
“butterfly vs. neutral picture”). Note that the plots here and in all remaining figures are based on the row
data.  Therefore,  the  differences  between  the  plotted  lines  can  differ  from  the  fitted  functions  of
Birnbaum's logistic model (1968). 
5.4. Discussion
The  purpose  of  the  present  study  was  to  investigate  if  the  attentional  bias
towards spiders - which recent studies (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Rinck & Becker,
2006) evidenced in individuals with spider phobia – is strong enough to trigger a prior
entry effect. Theoretically there are two possibilities in which such a prior entry effect
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could be revealed: First, between groups - that means spider-fearful participants process
spiders faster than non-anxious control participants - and secondly, within groups - that
means  spider-fearful  individuals  should  process  spiders  faster  compared  to  neutral
material of butterflies. Most importantly, we found a between-group-prior-entry effect
for spiders of 6.5 ms. Thus, the spider-fearful participants processed spider 6.5 ms faster
compared to non-anxious control participants.  The prior entry effect between the two
groups has a comparable magnitude as the prior  entry effect  elicited  by threatening
faces in the study by West and colleagues (2009). In their study, the authors reported
prior  entry  effects  from  5.88  to  7.85  ms  for  pictures  of  schematic  faces  and  one
exceptional large prior entry effects of 18.26 ms for pictures of real faces.
Furthermore, we found an approximately 7 ms within-group-prior-entry-effect in
spider-fearful participants but no prior entry effect for spiders in the non-anxious control
group.  We assume that this effect in the spider-fearful group is based on the different
emotional valence of the spider pictures compared to the neutral pictures of mushrooms
and flowers. Accordingly,  spiders were rated as highly negative by the experimental
group. 
As expected, we found no prior entry effect for threat-relevant images (spiders
and snakes) in the non-anxious control group confirm earlier findings using the same
stimulus  material.  In  this  study,  non-anxious  controls  also  showed  no  enhanced
information  processing  of  threat-relevant  pictures.  These  results  are  in  contrast  to
studies  which  demonstrated  attentional  biases  as  well  as  advantages  in  information
processing  of  threat-relevant  pictures  in  the  non-anxious  population  (cf.  Fox  et  al.,
2000; Van Damme, Gallace, Spence, Crombez, & Moseley, 2009; but see Tipples et al.,
2002). 
We assume  that  the  stimulus  material  applied  in  our  study (i.e.,  pictures  of
spiders and snakes) was insufficiently threatening for non-anxious control participants
to capture attention.  This assumption is supported by the picture ratings of the non-
anxious group. Overall, they rated the fear-relevant pictures of spiders and snakes as
neutral  on the valence scale,  only slightly arousing, and only slightly disgusting (cf.
Table 5). However, West and colleagues (2009) reported visual prior entry effects in
their  sample  of  non-anxious  participants  for  threatening  faces.  We assume that  this
might  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  authors  did  not  use  a  control  condition  in  their
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experiments (i.e.,  in their  study prior entry effects  were calculated as PSS-deviation
from zero). Thus, their prior entry effects were not corrected for possible non-emotional
influences;  for example,  differences in low-level features between the target stimuli.
However, such low-level feature differences could lead to non-zero PSS-values also in
control conditions (cf. Shore, Spence & Klein, 2001; Yates & Nicholls, 2011). Thus,
calculating a prior entry effect as PSS-deviation from zero could under- or overestimate
the real size of prior entry. Our results as well as the results by Schettino and colleagues
(2013) using threat-relevant faces failed to replicate visual prior entry effects for merely
threat-relevant stimuli in non-anxious controls participants. These findings indicate an
overestimation of the size of prior entry for threatening faces.
5.4.1. Prior entry effects for snakes?
No visual prior entry effects occurred for snakes which were fear-relevant for
the spider-fearful and the non-anxious-control group; neither between the spider-fearful
and the control group nor within one of the groups. We hypothesized that a visual prior
entry effect for snakes might occur in the spider-fearful group because we assumed that
fearful participants might be more sensitive to threat-relevant stimuli per se. However,
as  displayed  in  Table  5,  spider-fearful  individuals  rated  the  snake  pictures  as  only
slightly  negative,  arousing,  and  disgusting.  Therefore,  we  assume  that  the  threat-
relevant snake pictures were not emotionally significant for either group and, therefore,
did not capture attention.
5.4.2. A response bias explanation of the phobic prior entry effect?
A  possible  alternative  explanation  of  our  results  would  be  that  spider-fearful
participants did not actually perceive spiders earlier than control participants but that
they  showed  a  response  bias  (e.g.,  Schneider  &  Bavelier,  2003).  That  means  they
preferentially used the response “animal first” in case the animal of the respective trial
was a spider. This might seem especially possible since the animal trials where blocked
(i.e.,  in  one block only one type  of  animal  was presented  either  spiders,  snakes,  or
butterflies). An argument against this kind of response bias is that participants did not
make more temporal order errors in trials in which the spider picture was present. That
means  the  slope  was  not  different  between  conditions.  If  spider-fearful  participants
would show a strong response bias for spiders, this fact should be evident in reduced
95
temporal discrimination accuracy due to more errors (for a refutation of the response
bias argument in visual prior entry studies with attentional manipulation, see Weiß &
Scharlau, 2012, and Scharlau, 2004). 
In sum, we demonstrated for the first time that spider-fearful participants show a
visual prior entry effect for phobic spider pictures in comparison to control participants
and argue that these prior entry effects  for spiders cannot be explained by a simple
response  bias.  Furthermore,  spider-fearful  participants  but  not  non-anxious  control
participants showed faster processing of spider pictures in comparison to threat-relevant
and  neutral  pictures.  Hence,  we assume  that  the  prior  entry  effects  result  from the
attentional  bias  frequently  reported  in  studies  with  spider-fearful  individuals. We
expected that the snake pictures were not emotionally significant for either group and,
therefore, did not capture attention. Nevertheless, the effect sizes of the reported results
are rather small and a substantial increase in sample size should be considered.
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6. General discussion
Anxiety  disorders  are  common  in  the  German  population  with  a  12-month
prevalence of about 15 percent (Jacobi et al., 2004). Specific phobias form a major class
within  the  class  of  anxiety  disorders.  Due  to  the  frequent  occurrences  of  specific
phobias,  an  improved  understanding  is  necessary  to  facilitate  the  classification,
diagnosis, and treatment of these phobias. More specifically, one promising area is that
of studying vigilance in individual with specific phobia since the early attentional bias
contribute to enhanced anxiety when phobic individuals are confronted with the feared
stimulus. Additionally,  the early attentional bias is followed by intentional avoidance
which reduces anxiety.  However, this avoidance behavior shown by individuals with
specific phobias contributes in turn to the maintenance of the specific phobia because it
prevents sufficiently long exposure of fearful individuals to the threatening stimuli to
learn that the phobic stimulus is actually harmless (Rinck & Becker, 2006). 
Accordingly, I was interested to further investigate the attentional bias and the
accompanied enhancement in information processing of phobic stimuli in individuals
with specific phobias. Therefore, I address three research questions in the present thesis;
(1) Is information processing of threatening stimuli measured by speeded responses in
response priming paradigms enhanced in individuals  with specific  phobias?  (2)  Are
there any differences between the different types of phobia (e.g., spider phobia vs. snake
phobia)? (3) Does the frequently reported attentional bias of individuals with specific
phobias also appear in temporal-order judgments? In other words, the present thesis
contributes  to  our  better  understanding  of  specific  phobias  by  addressing  research
questions which are concerned with the nature of specific phobias. Accordingly,  the
present  experiments  account  for  currently  discussed  topics  in  the  research  field  of
anxiety disorders and provide valuable insights into the processing of threat-relevant
and phobic stimuli. 
In  the subsequent  paragraphs,  I  succinctly  summarize  the research questions,
method and most important findings of each experiment. I also aim to shed further light
on two important aspects of the present thesis which were only briefly mentioned in
preceding paragraphs. 
First, it is frequently reported that information processing of threat-relevant or
phobic stimuli is enhanced in the general population (Fox et al., 2000; Lipp & Waters,
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2007; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Williams et al., 2005; but see Tipples et al., 2002) as
well as in individuals with specific phobias, (Lipp & Waters, 2007; Öhman, Flykt et al.,
2001). However, the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms remain largely elusive.
Commonly,  researcher  attribute  improved  recognition  or  categorization  of  threat-
relevant stimuli to enhanced amygdala activation (e.g., Anderson & Phelps, 2001). In
the  following,  I  summarize  their  explanation  how  the  amygdala  contribute  to  the
enhanced information processing of threat-relevant or phobic stimuli  and discuss the
plausibility  of  that  account  (Section  6.2.  “Enhanced information  processing  and the
amygdala network”). In contrast, we have argued that enhanced information processing
possibly  results  from long-term perceptual  learning  rather  than  enhanced  amygdala
activation.  I  outline  how  changes  in  the  neural  hierarchy  contribute  to  enhanced
information processing efficacy (6.3. “Enhanced information processing and perceptual
learning”). 
Second, based on our research on anxiety and emotion in the past, I have arrived
at the conclusion that the emotion research field features a lot of pitfalls which can lead
to misinterpretations of the emotional significance of a given stimulus. These pitfalls
will be discussed in connection with the frequently reported attentional bias. Finally, I
close by a summary of the most important aspects of the present thesis.
6.1. The present results
In the present thesis, we demonstrated that information processing for phobic
stimuli is indeed enhanced in fearful individuals and we found discrepancies between
different  types  of  specific  phobia.  In  Experiment  1  (Chapter  2),  we  investigated
enhanced  visuomotor  processing  of  phobic  compared  to  fear-relevant  and  neutral
stimuli. Three different groups took part in the study: spider-fearful, snake-fearful, and
non-anxious control participants. We used a response priming design to measure rapid
and automatic  motor  activation  by natural  images  (spiders,  snakes,  mushrooms,  and
flowers). We found strong priming effects in all tasks and conditions; however, results
showed marked differences between groups. Most importantly, in the group of spider-
fearful  individuals,  spider  pictures  had  a  strong and  specific  influence  on  even  the
fastest motor responses: Phobic primes entailed the largest priming effects, and phobic
targets  accelerated  responses,  both effects  indicating  speeded response activation  by
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phobic images.  In snake-fearful participants,  this processing enhancement for phobic
material  was  less  pronounced  and  extended  to  both  snake  and  spider  images.  We
concluded that spider phobia leads to enhanced processing capacity for phobic images.
In Experiment 3 (Chapter 4), we investigated whether information processing is
also enhanced in individuals with blood-injury-injection (BII) phobia. Only few studies
investigate that type of specific phobia so far, even though it has distinct features that
clearly distinguish it from all other specific phobias. The present study aimed to fill that
gap and explored rapid information processing of phobic stimuli (i.e., pictures of small
injuries) in BII-fearful and non-anxious control participants by using a response priming
paradigm. BII-fearful  participants  responded  more  rapidly  to  their  phobic  stimuli
compared  to  neutral  stimuli,  whereas  non-anxious  control  participants  showed  no
difference in their response. Our results showed that enhanced visuomotor processing of
injury pictures occurs in BII-fearful individuals.  We concluded that these results  are
comparable to processing advantages of phobic stimuli in other specific phobias (e.g.,
animal phobia).
Based on the perceptual learning account (i.e., spider-fearful participants possess
cells specialized in detecting spiders compared to non-anxious control participants), we
hypothesized in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) that spider-fearful participants would exhibit
enhanced information processing of phobic pictures. Additionally, we assumed that they
would also be better at identifying briefly presented spider primes. Two different groups
took part in our study: spider-fearful and non-anxious control participants. We applied a
response priming paradigm. Our stimulus material consisted of natural images (spiders,
snakes, mushrooms, and flowers). A target identification task was applied to measure
rapid  information  processing  and  a  prime  identification  task  to  measure  prime
recognition.  In  the  target  identification  task,  we found strong priming  effects  in  all
conditions; however, in the group of spider-fearful individuals,  spider pictures had a
strong and specific influence on motor responses: Phobic primes entailed the largest
priming  effects,  and  phobic  targets  accelerated  responses.  Hence,  we  were  able  to
replicate our findings from Experiment 1. However, in the prime identification tasks,
spider-fearful participants identified all prime pictures of spiders, snakes, flowers, and
mushrooms equally well. In other words, we did not find the expected improvement in
spider recognition performance in the spider-fearful group. These results suggest that
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classification  and  identification  of  a  stimulus  are  based  on  different  processing
mechanisms. Stimuli can be classified during the first feedforward sweep of visuomotor
processing  whereas  the  identification  of  stimuli  requires  recurrent  feedback  from
separate  cortical  areas.  I  conclude  that  perceptual  learning processes  might  enhance
information  processing  of  phobic  stimuli.  However,  it  does  not  seem  to  facilitate
identification of these stimuli.
Finally, it is widely accepted that spider phobics show an early attentional bias
towards spiders. We wondered whether the internal attentional bias of spider phobics is
strong enough to trigger a prior entry impression. Therefore, we used a Temporal Order
Judgment  (TOJ)  paradigm.  The  paradigm is  based  on the  assumption  that  attended
stimuli are perceived as occurring earlier in time compared to unattended stimuli. For
example,  if  a  cued  and  an  uncued  stimulus  are  presented  at  the  same  time,  the
participant will perceive that the cued stimulus was presented first. This is known as the
Prior Entry Effect and has been convincingly demonstrated by several recent studies of
temporal  perception.  The prior  entry effect  is  technically  defined as the shift  in the
Point of Subjective Simultaneity (PSS). That means, the temporal interval at which the
attended and unattended stimulus are perceived as occurring simultaneously (Spence &
Parise, 2010; Weiß & Scharlau, 2011). In our final experiment of the present thesis,
spider-fearful and non-anxious control participants took part. In each trial, we presented
natural images of animals (spiders, snakes, and butterflies) in pairs with natural images
of neutral non-animals (flowers and mushrooms) on both sides of the fixation cross with
a varied time interval between the onset of the two stimuli. None of the pictures were
cued.  We  assumed  that  spider  pictures  are  automatically  attended  by  spider-fearful
participants compared to neutral pictures. Our participants had to judge which picture
appeared first. We found that spider pictures induced a significant difference between
the two groups. Spider-fearful participants perceived the spider pictures as occurring
earlier in time compared to non-anxious control group and in comparison to snake and
butterfly pictures. I conclude that phobic but not merely threat-relevant images show
visual prior entry.
With these four experiments, I addressed three research questions which aim to
fill important current research gaps. First, I wondered whether information processing
of threatening stimuli measured by speeded responses in response priming paradigms is
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enhanced in individuals with specific phobias? And in case information processing is
enhanced  for  phobic  images  which  neurophysiological  mechanisms  underlie  this
enhancement? Indeed, we were able to successfully demonstrate in Experiments 1, 2,
and 3 (Chapter 2, 3, and 4) that natural images elicit response priming effects (measured
in response times and error rates) and that these priming effects are modulated by the
emotional  significance  of  the  presented  images.  Most  interestingly,  the  modulated
priming effects  were already present  in the fastest  responses (i.e.,  in  the 2nd and 3rd
deciles  of the response time distribution;  cf. Sections  2.3.,  2.4.,  3.3 and 3.4). These
results allow me to draw conclusions about the way phobic, threat-relevant and neutral
images is processed considering the assumptions made by the rapid-chase theory (cf.
Section 1.4.2. “The rapid-chase theory of response priming”). The rapid-chase theory
links behavioral findings of response priming paradigms to recent findings that visual
stimuli elicit a wave of neuronal activation (i.e., the feedforward sweep) which travels
through the visuomotor system (Lamme & Rolfsema, 2000). Because the first sweep of
neuronal activation is remarkably fast, Lamme and Rolfesema (2000) propose that this
wave is  purely  feedforward  and free  of  feedback  from other  cells.  The rapid-chase
theory  states  that  both  prime  and  target  elicit  a  feedforward  sweep  of  neuronal
activation and predicts that the motor response should first be controlled exclusively by
the prime signal and only later by the target signal. Because the theory assumes that the
feedforward sweep of the target cannot catch up with that of the prime, it makes the
strong prediction that response priming effects  should be fully present in the fastest
responses and should not increase any further in slower response times. This is exactly
what we found in Experiment 1 and 3 (Chapter 2 and 4). We were not only able to find
priming effects of neutral images but we were also able to find the modulatory influence
of  phobic  images  on  priming  effects  in  2nd and  3rd deciles  of  the  response  time
distribution. Therefore, we conclude that information processing of natural images in
general and, specifically, information processing of phobic images is based on the first
feedforward sweep of neuronal activation traveling through the visuomotor system.
Second,  I  was  interested  whether  differences  between  the  different  types  of
phobia (e.g., spider phobia vs. snake phobia) occur? Contrary to our initial hypothesis,
we found marked differences  in priming effects  and overall  response times between
different  types  of  specific  phobias  –  namely  between  spider-  and  snake-fearful
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participants.  These  findings  suggest  that  the  modulatory  effect  by  emotionally
significant stimuli is driven by something beside emotion because spider- and snake-
fearful individuals rated their phobic images of spiders and snakes comparably negative
on the dimensions valence, disgust, and arousal. Furthermore, we found no indication
that  the  two  experimental  groups  differed  in  their  fear  level  of  spiders  or  snakes,
respectively. These results allow me to draw further conclusion about the way phobic
stimuli  are  processed.  In  contrast  to  the  assumption  that  enhanced  information
processing is based on enhanced amygdala activation (cf. Section 2.4.1. “Underlying
mechanisms  of  rapid  information  processing”  and  6.2.  “Enhanced  information
processing  and  the  amygdala  network”),  the  perceptual  learning  account  can
accommodate differential enhancement for different phobias. For instance, because the
likelihood  of  encountering  a  snake  is  low for  German participants  compared to  the
likelihood of encountering a spider, our snake-fearful participants may have had less
opportunity  for  perceptual  learning  than  the  spider-fearful  participants,  and  less
incentive  for  continued  vigilance  in  interactions  with  their  everyday  environment.
Additionally, if modulatory effects of phobic images are already present in the fastest
response times this would put serious time constraints on any explanation involving the
amygdala,  especially considering the processing speed of the structures involved (cf.
Piech et al., 2010; Tsuchiya et al., 2009). That means that the amygdala pathway would
be required to (1) classify incoming stimuli  as emotionally relevant,  (2) outpace the
cortical object recognition route, and (3) exert modulatory control on that processing
route  before  it  finishes  processing  the  object.  It  is  questionable  whether  all  these
processes can take place in the minimal time available in the rapid categorization task
that  we  used,  considering  that  all  amygdala  modulation  of  the  object-recognition
pathway must  be finished before the fastest  responses are completed.  Mormann and
colleagues (2011) analyzed response latencies from single neurons in the amygdala and
found that they responded to animal pictures within 324 ms. That means significantly
faster  than to  other  image categories.  The authors argue that  this  enhancement  may
reflect  the biological  importance of animals,  but stress that  “the observed amygdala
latencies are nevertheless similar to those found in other regions in the temporal lobe,
and thus seem more likely to be generated along the cortical object recognition pathway
than via a rapid subcortical route” (p. 1248). 
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Based on our results of Experiment 1 to 3, I conclude that response priming is a
useful  instrument  which  can  be  easily  adapted  for  research  in  the  field  of  clinical
psychology.  Because  response  priming  has  a  strong  theoretical  and  empirical
background,  the  findings  allow  me  to  make  well-founded  assumptions  about  the
underlying neurophysiological mechanisms involved in the processing of neutral, threat-
relevant, and phobic images. Accordingly, our results shed light on certain aspects of
information  processing  which  are  usually  not  considered  by  recent  literature.
Additionally, response priming is not restricted to further investigate early information
processing in individuals  with anxiety disorders, but might  also – for example – be
applied to research on mood disorders (like depression), substance abuse, or obsessive-
compulsive disorders. 
Third,  I  was  interested  whether  the  frequently  reported  attentional  bias  of
individuals with specific phobias also appear in temporal order judgments? To answer
this question, we conducted a prior entry study in which we carefully controlled for the
participating groups and applied conditions.  Firstly,  a control group took part in the
experiment which enabled us to control for potential influences of image characteristics
like spatial frequencies (cf. Chapter 5 and Section 6.4. “Pitfalls in emotion research”).
Secondly, we applied three conditions (“spider vs neutral picture”, “snake vs. neutral
picture”, and “butterfly vs. neutral picture”) These different conditions served as phobic,
threat-relevant, and neutral conditions and allowed us to compare potential effects that
occur within each group. Again, we found a specific influence of the phobic stimulus
material  on  the  participants'  responses  which  was  -  comparable  to  the  findings  of
Experiments 1 to 3 - restricted to phobic images and did not occur for threat-relevant,
but non-phobic images. 
In sum,  the results  of Experiment  1 to  4 show that  individuals  with specific
phobia (i.e., spider and BII phobia) process their phobic images differently compared to
non-anxious individuals and neutral images. Furthermore, merely threat-relevant images
did not speed information processing in non-anxious control participants in neither of
the four experiments. Most notably,  we found differences between different types of
phobia. I propose that these findings can be easily explained by long-term perceptual
learning processes and a specific hardwired binding of elementary features belonging to
the  phobic object  in  fearful  individuals  (i.e.,  effortless  recognition  of  the respective
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phobic  object  via  hardwired  neuronal  conjunctions).  Furthermore, I  suggest  that
perceptual learning processes might also strengthen the attentional bias, for example, by
providing a more salient bottom-up signal that draws attention involuntarily. I believe
that  our results  and the combination of response priming and prior  entry paradigms
allow me to draw well-founded conclusion about  the underlying mechanisms of the
processing of phobic images and the early attentional bias. Furthermore, in contrast to
traditional  paradigms  (e.g.,  visual  dot  probe  paradigm18 or  emotional  stroop  task19)
response priming permits us to make distinct assumptions about  how neutral,  threat-
relevant,  and  phobic  images  are  processed  in  non-anxious  and  fearful  individuals.
However, I also want to emphasize that different methods like the prior entry paradigm
we  applied  in  the  present  thesis  have  to  be  considered  to  asses  the  different
characteristics of specific phobias. Taken together, I conclude that (1) early information
processing  of  threatening  stimuli  is  indeed  enhanced  in  individuals  with  specific
phobias but that (2) differences between divers types of phobia exist and that (3) the
frequently reported attentional bias of spider-fearful individuals is also detectable in a
temporal order judgments.
As  described  above,  two  different  accounts  attempt  to  explain  enhanced
information processing by threatening stimuli:  acceleration due to increased amygdala
activation and long-term perceptual learning mechanisms. In the next two sections, I
describe (1) how changes in the amygdala activation via the subcortical  route might
influence  the  processing  of  phobic  images  (Section  6.2.)  and  (2)  how  perceptual
18 Visual  dot  probe  tasks  are  usually  applied  to  measure  the  hypervigilance-avoidance  pattern  in
individuals with anxiety disorders. Commonly, two stimuli - one neutral and one phobic - are presented
for a varying time interval on the screen before a dot is presented on the position of one of the stimuli.
Participants are asked to indicate the location of this dot as quickly as possible. It is assumed that faster
responses to the dot occur if the dot appears  on the location of the attended stimulus (e.g.,  Mogg &
Bradley, 1999; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986).
19 Emotional stroop tasks are usually applied to measure information processing of emotionally significant
words in contrast to neutral words. The presented word are written in different colors. Participants are
asked to indicate the word color and response times are recorded. It is assumed that the response times to
the color of emotionally significant words are slower compared to the response times of neutral words
(e.g., Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). 
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learning might change the functioning and structure of neurons in the visual system and
in turn accelerate the speed in which phobic stimuli are processed (Section 6.3.).
6.2. Enhanced information processing and the amygdala network
It is frequently assumed that enhanced information processing of threat-relevant
or phobic stimuli is mediated by changes in the neural activation of the amygdala. The
processing of these stimuli should happen via a subcortical route of visual information
processing  and  should  be  independent  of  attention  and  awareness  (Tamietto  &  de
Gelder, 2010). Consistent with that notion, several authors report (1) that threat-relevant
faces are processed more rapidly and pre-attentively in visual-search tasks (e.g., Öhman,
Lundqvist,  & Esteves,  2001),  (2)  that  subliminally  presented  fear-relevant  faces  are
identified earlier compared to happy faces in continuous flash suppression tasks (Yang,
Zald, & Blake, 2007), and (3) that amygdala activation increases in response to threat-
relevant faces rendered unconsciously by backward masking (e.g., Morris, Öhman, &
Dolan, 1998; Whalen et al., 1998). 
However, the  exact nature  of the interaction between amygdala activation and
enhanced information processing is typically not described. Originally, the assumption
that subliminally presented visual stimuli are processed via a subcortical route has its
roots in rodent studies which demonstrated that structures from the auditory thalamus to
the  amygdala  are  to  some extent  involved in  Pavlovian  fear  conditioning  (LeDoux,
1996). The idea of a similar subcortical route in humans is compelling since processing
via this  route is  assumed to be faster than the cortical  visual  route and, indeed,  the
processing of threat-relevant  and phobic stimuli  in humans is very fast.20 But  which
structures are said to be involved in the subcortical route of visual information and what
are their roles?
First of all, the subcortical pathway is said to consist of the superior colliculus,
the  pulvinar nuclei and the  amygdala whereas the pulvinar nuclei  form the key link
between the two other structures (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). The pulvinar complex, like
other cortical areas involved in the visual system, has expanded during evolution and
20 Note that because information processing of emotionally relevant stimuli is assumed to be subcortical,
it is suggested that information processing of affective visual stimuli should be coarse (e.g., is based on
low-spatial frequencies; cf. Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003).
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forms the largest complex of nuclei in the primate thalamus (Grieve, Acuña, & Cudeiro,
2000). It receives direct input from the retina, indirect input via the superior colliculus
and extensive input from the striate and extrastriate visual cortices. At a first glance, this
appears to make the pulvinar complex a likely candidate for a route of fast information
processing.
Indeed,  the pulvinar  complex plays  an important  role  in  attention  and visual
awareness. First, a majority of pulvinar cells inhibit responses to stimuli which are task-
irrelevant in contrast to task-relevant stimuli (Benevento & Port, 1995). Additionally,
activation  of  the  pulvinar  complex  only  increases  in  case  the  monkey  attends  to  a
stimulus  (Petersen,  Robinson,  &  Keys,  1985).  Second,  the  pulvinar  complex  is
associated with awareness; more specifically, with visual neglect and deficits in feature
binding (Zihl  & von Cramon,  1979; Karnath,  Himmelbach,  & Rorden, 2002; Ward,
Danziger, Owen, & Rafal, 2002). For example,  a fMRI study by Padmala, Lim, and
Pessoa (2010) demonstrated that  the pulvinar  nuclei  do not respond to the affective
valence of a stimulus, but to whether or not the stimulus is consciously perceived. This
directly  contradicts  the  frequently made  assumption  that  the  pulvinar  is  involved in
unconscious processing (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). Taken together, evidence exists that
the pulvinar complex plays an important role in attention and visual awareness. 
However, Pessoa and Adolphs (2010) also report a number of studies indicating
that the input from the superior colliculus does not reflect the visual response properties
of the pulvinar nuclei. For instance, a study by Bender (1983) showed that lesions in the
superior  colliculus  has little  effect  on electrophysiological  responses  of  the pulvinar
complex in contrast to lesions of the primary visual cortex (cf. de Gelder et al., 2010).
This directly challenges the notion of a visual pathway progressing from the superior
colliculus via the pulvinar nuclei to the amygdala. In contrast, it is more probable that
the pulvinar nuclei are part of a more wide-spread cortical network (Pessoa & Adolphs,
2010). Still,  the critical question, based on the findings reported above, is whether a
subcortical route also exists in humans and, specifically, in human vision? 
Monkey studies  showed that  there are  in  fact  neuronal  connections  from the
superior colliculus to the  inferior pulvinar (Grieve et al., 2000) and from the pulvinar
nuclei to the amygdala (Jones & Burton, 1976; Romanski, Giguere, Bates, & Goldman-
Rakic,  1997).  However,  the  connections  to  the  amygdala  are  only  from the  medial
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pulvinar and not from the  inferior pulvinar (Jones & Burton, 1976; Romanski et al.,
1997).  Hence,  a  direct  colliculus-pulvinar-amygdala  pathway  seems  to  be  unlikely
solely  from  an  anatomical  viewpoint  (Pessoa  &  Adolphs,  2010).  Given  that  a
subcortical  route  of  information  processing  is  implausible,  which  role  does  the
amygdala play in visual information processing of emotionally relevant stimuli at all?
According to Pessoa and Adolphs (2010), the amygdala's most prominent feature
is its connectivity to the visual cortex and higher-order visual cortical areas, but also to
the  frontal  and prefrontal  cortex  (Averbeck  & Seo,  2008;  Ghashghaei,  Hilgetag,  &
Barbas,  2007).  Due  to  its  feedback  loops  to  the  visual  cortex,  the  amygdala  most
probably  has  a  modulatory  role  in  the  processing  of  visual  input  (Vuilleumier,
Richardson, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004). Additionally,  the amygdala belongs to
the “core brain circuit” (Modha & Singh, 2010) which is a central structure in terms of
global connectivity within the brain suggesting that its major role is the aggregation and
distribution of information. Consequently, Pessoa and Adolphs (2010) propose that the
amygdala can mediate behavior through many routes (e.g., via both the visual and the
prefrontal cortex). This notion is supported by the results of a study by Lim, Padmala,
and Pessoa (2009). They demonstrated in a task combining attentional blink and fear
conditioning  that  trial-by-trial  fluctuations  in  the  amygdala  evoked  by  emotionally
relevant stimuli predict target detection. Furthermore, they found that responses of the
amygdala and the visual cortex is highly correlated.  Correspondingly,  statistical path
analysis showed that the modulatory effect of the amygdala on behavior was mediated
by the visual cortex and prefrontal cortex. Thus, the amygdala enhances processing of
emotionally  relevant  stimuli  directly  (via  the  amygdala-visual  cortex  pathway)  and
indirectly  (via  the  amydgala-prefrontal  cortex-visual  cortex  pathway)  but  not  via  a
subcortical pathway (cf. Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).
A synopsis of all these findings suggests that the subcortical  pathway via the
superior  colliculus,  pulvinar  nuclei,  and  amygdala  does  not  play  the  role  that  was
ascribed to it by many authors (e.g., by  Öhman & Mineka, 2001; by  Tamietto & de
Gelder, 2010). Indeed, these structures are important for the processing of visual stimuli
but  their functions are different than frequently proposed. A subcortical processing of
emotionally relevant stimuli via the colliculus-pulvinar-amygdala pathway as opposed
to a cortical pathway seems to be highly implausible. 
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However, there is striking evidence that emotionally relevant stimuli are indeed
preferentially processed in individuals with specific phobias. In the next chapter, I will
provide an alternative explanation for this enhancement in information processing.
6.3. Enhanced information processing and perceptual learning
In  the  following,  I  first  summarize  why researchers  believe  that  perceptual
learning can lead to changes in the neural hierarchy of the visual system and report the
most significant findings in this research field (Section 6.3.1.). Second, I describe how
these changes in the visual system might enable enhanced information processing of
phobic images (Section 6.3.2.).
6.3.1. Perceptual learning and hardwired binding
According to Gilbert  and colleagues  (2001) perceptual learning “is a lifelong
process [in which] We begin by encoding information about the basic structure of the
natural world and continue to assimilate information about specific patterns with which
we become familiar” (p. 681). More specifically,  we implicitly learn to discriminate
different stimuli when we are frequently confronted with them. Research on perceptual
learning processes and, thereby, on neural plasticity has substantially increased in the
last few decades. The changes in the neural organization also affect early visual stages
like the primary visual cortex (V1; the first cortical  area in which visual processing
takes place), V2, and V4.21 These early stages are reasonably well understood in terms
of receptive fields and neocortical circuits. Originally, it was assumed that plasticity in
sensory areas is restricted to newborns and rapidly decline as the child gets older. The
idea that neural plasticity also affect the primary visual cortex in adults is relatively new
(Gilbert et al., 2001).
Thus, researchers showed that training (i.e., perceptual learning) improves the
discrimination of the trained stimuli. For example, Fiorentini and Berardi (1980, 1981)
demonstrated that the benefits of discrimination training on complex grid patterns led to
21 Later visual stages in object recognition involve cortical areas in the ventral visual pathway, like the
inferotemporal cortex and the medial temporal lobe (MT). Neurons in V1 represent the detailed features
of  a  stimulus  whereas  neurons  in  higher  areas  of  the  visual  system  respond  to  more  complex
representations of the object (e.g., Quiroga, 2012).
108
an improved performance. Similar results were reported for discrimination training in
vernier acuity (i.e., the ability to decide if one of two lines that are presented on top of
each  other  is slightly  displaced  to  the  left  or  right;  McKee  & Westheimer,  1978),
orientation (Vogels & Orban, 1985), motion (Ball & Sekuler, 1982, 1987), and depth
perception (Fendick & Westheimer, 1983; Ramachandran & Braddick, 1973). 
However,  Fiorentini  and  Berardi  (1980,  1981)  also  demonstrated  that  the
training effects vanished in case the trained pattern was rotated by 90 degrees. The same
effect occurred when the trained stimulus was tested at an untrained position (e.g., Ball
& Sekuler,  1987; Karni & Sagi,  1991).  Gilbert  and colleagues (2001) conclude that
training  in  perceptual  discrimination  tasks  most  likely  involve  early  visual  stages
considering (1) “that stimulus features are represented with the finest resolution” (p.
682) and (2) that the training effects vanish when the small receptive fields of the early
visual stages are changed during the task.22
Gilbert  and  colleagues  (2001)  argue  that  also  complex  features  can  be
successfully trained. For example, Westheimer and colleagues (Fendick & Westheimer,
1983;  Fahle  &  Westheimer,  1988;  Westheimer  &  Truong,  1988)  showed  that  an
improvement in depth perception as a consequence of training also depended on the the
spacing of the trained elements and the surrounding context. In other words, perceptual
learning did not only encompasses the discrimination between single stimulus features
but also the context in which stimuli are presented. Furthermore, it was also shown that
perceptual  learning  lead  to  a  preference  of  neurons  in  higher  cortical  areas  for  the
trained stimuli like the inferotemporal cortex (Sakai & Miyashita, 1994) which plays a
role in object recognition (Tanaka, Saito, Fukada, & Moriya, 1991) and in the middle
temporal cortex (Zohary, Celebrini, Britten, & Newsome, 1994) which plays a role in
motion  perception  and  guidance  of  eye  movements  (Born  &  Bradley,  2005).
22 Note that in the visual system, the receptive field of a neuron is defined by the area of the retina to
which a (preferred)  stimulus must be presented  to evoke a response  (i.e.,  increases  or  decreases  the
neuron's firing rate). The whole retina is covered by a mosaic of receptive fields (Rosenzweig, Breedlove,
& Watson,  2005).  Consequently,  when a  small  stimulus  is  presented  in  the  visual  field,  only  those
neurons whose receptive fields are in the corresponding part of the retina respond to that stimulus. Hubel
and Wiesel (e.g., 1959) propose that the small receptive fields of simple feature cells in early stages of the
visual system are combined into larger receptive fields of complex feature cells in higher levels of the
visual system.
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Consequently, we can assume that not only simple object features (e.g., the orientation)
but  also  complex  shapes  like  (e.g.,  spiders)  can  be  trained  by  perceptual  learning
processes.  Thus,  these  learning  processes  might  enhance  information  processing  of
phobic stimuli.
I  conclude  that  the  processing  of  complex  stimuli  is  suspect  to  perceptual
learning  processes.  This  learning,  or  training,  leads  to  an  increasingly  automatic
processing of complex stimuli that is possible without requiring additional attentional
resources. I propose that this is exactly what happens in phobic or fearful persons. In
Experiment 1 and 2 (Chapter 2 and 3) we demonstrated that spider-fearful individuals
show enhanced information processing of the phobic stimuli in contrast to snake-fearful
participants.  I  propose  that  the  perceptual  learning  account  can  also  accommodate
differential enhancement for different phobias. For instance, because the likelihood of
encountering  a  snake is  low for  German  participants  compared to  the likelihood of
encountering  a  spider,  snake-fearful  participants  may  have  had  less  opportunity  for
perceptual learning compared to the spider-fearful participants, and less incentive for
continued vigilance in interactions with their everyday environment. However, we also
demonstrated  that  spider-  and  BII-fearful  individuals  show  enhanced  information
processing of spiders and injuries compared to the non-anxious control groups despite
that spiders and injuries are also encountered in everyday life for these participants. I
suggest that the hypervigilance pattern frequently reported in the literature (cf. Chapter
1.5. “Attentional biases in specific phobias”) plays an important role in the initiation of
perceptual learning processes. Since phobic stimuli like spiders and injuries are attended
more often by fearful compared to non-anxious individuals, perceptual learning is more
likely  for  these  stimuli.  Additionally,  the  confrontation  with  phobic  stimuli  are
accompanied  by  negative  emotions  which  might  extra  enhance  perceptual  learning
processes.  But,  which  concrete  physiological  changes  in  the  neural  structure  or  the
functioning of neurons are induced by perceptual learning?
6.3.2. The neural basis of perceptual learning
As described above, the idea that the adult primary visual cortex is subject to
neuronal plasticity is relatively new. For example, in a classical study (Wiesel & Hubel,
1965; cf. Fahle, 2003), it was demonstrated that when one eye of a kitten is sewn shut,
the  resulting  changes  in  the  cortical  hierarchy  due  to  visual  deprivation  are  only
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reversible until the adolescence of the animal. However, first evidence that neurons of
the  primary  sensory cortex  are  alterable  came  from studies  with  adult  monkeys  by
Merzenich and colleagues (Merzenich et al.,  1983, 1984). The authors demonstrated
that after the amputation of a finger the sensory cortex of the monkeys was reorganized
such that neurons formerly responding to the ablated finger started to respond to the
adjacent fingers of the hand. This plasticity of neurons was also demonstrated for V1.
For example,  studies demonstrated that,  initially,  retinal lesions silenced the affected
cortical areas. However, after a certain time period, the respective receptive fields in V1
were shifted towards unaffected regions close to the lesion (Gilbert & Wiesel, 1992;
Kaas et al., 1990).
However,  not  only  cortical  lesions  induce  neural  plasticity.  Also  perceptual
learning  processes  in  an  unscathed  brain  might  alter  the  neural  representation  of  a
stimulus in several ways. First, the representation of a trained feature or stimulus may
increase in size. For example, Nudo, Milliken, Jenkins, and Merzenich (1996) showed
that when monkeys are trained in forearm movements the cortical representation of the
forearm in the motor cortex expands (i.e., the cortical surface of motor responsive areas
becomes  larger).  Furthermore,  Recanzone,  Schreiner,  and  Merzenich  (1993)
demonstrated  that  when  owl  monkeys  were  trained  to  discriminate  between  small
differences in the frequency of tones, the auditory cortex showed an increase in the size
of the representation of the trained frequencies (also cf. Xerri, Merzenich, Peterson, &
Jenkins,  1998).  Interestingly,  the  increase  in  the size of  cortical  representation  of  a
trained stimulus does not decrease the size of non-trained representations suggesting
that as a result of training more information can be stored in a given cortical area. 
Second,  the  tuning curves  of  neurons might  be  sharpened.  The tuning curve
describes the specificity of a population of neurons to a specific stimulus feature (e.g.,
orientation).23 The neurons with the highest sensitivity for the orientation of a presented
stimulus respond most strongly in terms of spikes per second. The adjacent neurons
which are less sensitive to this orientation but sensitive to a similar orientation respond
less strongly. The resulting (typically bell-shaped) tuning curve can be sharpened via
learning. Prior to training, the cells of a given neuron population are selective for similar
23 For the recording  of population tuning curves integrating the responses  of  single  neurons see,  for
example, Martínez-Trujillo & Treue (2002).
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but different features; after training more cells of the population are most sensitive to
the feature (e.g., orientation) of the trained stimuli (Gilbert et al., 2001). As a result, the
tuning curve of the population (i.e., activation of its neurons) increases for the trained
feature  and  decreases  for  the  other  (similar)  features.  Accordingly,  Weinberger  and
colleagues  (1990)  as  well  as  Recanzone  and  colleagues  (1993)  demonstrated  that
animals  who  were  trained  to  discriminate  different  auditory  frequencies  showed  a
sharpening of population tuning curves and a shift towards the trained frequencies.
Third, Gilbert and colleagues (2001) propose that perceptual learning leads to a
shift in the locus of representation. Originally, it was assumed that simple stimuli with a
single feature are encoded in early stages of the visual system, while complex stimuli
which  require  the  combination  of  these  single  features  are  encoded  in  later  stages
(Hubel & Wiesel, 1959). Furthermore, it was proposed that the combination of several
single  features  is  time-consuming  and  demands  attentional  resources  (Treisman  &
Gelade, 1980). In contrast, Gilbert and colleagues (2001) assume that the processing of
complex, but familiar stimuli might be shifted from later to earlier stages of the sensory
system.  They  propose  that  features  of  familiar  (i.e.,  “overlearned”)  stimuli  have  a
special  significance.  Therefore,  these features can be processed in  an automatic  and
parallel fashion by neurons in early stages of the visual system. Consequently, it is easy
to find the number “5” between an array of number distractors (“2”). However, this task
becomes  harder  and  requires  attentional  resources  when  the  array  is  rotated  by  90
degrees (Wang, Cavanagh, & Green, 1994),  because numbers  are only familiar  in a
vertical orientation. 
Complementary,  VanRullen  (2009)  impose  the  idea  of  hardwired  binding of
features. Originally,  it  was  assumed  that  object  recognition  depends  on  on-demand
binding during which the separately coded features of a presented stimulus are bound
into one object. This process is assumed to require attentional resources (cf. Treisman &
Gelade, 1980). On the other hand, one important goal of learning is to decrease the level
of attention which is needed to accomplish a certain task (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977;
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  In contrast to the on-demand binding account, hardwired
binding of features does not require attentional resources because elementary features
can be bound by higher  level  neurons into hardwired combinations. Supporting this
hypothesis, several studies were able to show that the categorization of natural images
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(i.e., stimuli that are encountered in everyday life) by means of speeded motor responses
is indeed very rapid (Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006; Thorpe et al., 1996).24 As described in
Section 1.4.2. “The rapid-chase theory of response priming”, these findings suggest that
the processing of natural images is most likely based on the first feedforward sweep
traveling through the visual system (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Schmidt & Schmidt,
2009; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001). Indeed, it was shown that the temporal distribution
of the first spikes can already code for most of the stimulus-relevant information (spike-
timing-dependent  plasticity;  Guyonneau,  VanRullen,  &  Thorpe,  2005;  Masquelier,
Guyonneau,  &  Thorpe,  2009).  The  rapid-chase  theory  by  Schmidt  and  colleagues
(2006) provides a framework for rapid visual information processing based on the first
feedforward sweep. The theory proposes that the motor response measured in response
priming paradigms should first be controlled exclusively by the prime signal and only
later  by  the  actual  target  signal.  Because  one  assumption  of  the  theory  is  that  the
feedforward sweep elicited by the target cannot catch up with that of the prime signal, it
makes the strong prediction that response priming effects should be fully present in the
fastest responses and should not increase any further for longer response times. This is
exactly what we found in Experiment 1 and 3 (cf. Chapter 2 and 4).
I  conclude  that  the  neural  plasticity  of  the  visual  system (but  also  of  other
sensory cortical areas) is not restricted to early post-natal stages, but can also occur in
adult learning. These physiological changes can be induced via training (i.e., perceptual
learning)  and  are  accompanied  by  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  neuronal
representation of a stimulus - in the firing rates of sensitive neurons, in the locus of
stimulus  representation  and/or  in  the temporal  distribution  of  the  first  spikes.
Additionally, perceptual learning might lead to hardwired binding which means that the
features  of  familiar  objects  are  automatically  bound  together  and,  therefore,  no
attentional  resources  are  necessary  for  their  categorization.  Spider-  and  BII-fearful
individuals  attend  frequently  to  the  respective  phobic  stimuli.  I  suggest  that  these
stimuli  are  well  trained  by  the  fearful  individuals  which  might  lead  to  a  higher
sensitivity of neurons towards phobic stimuli, to a larger representation of these stimuli,
to  changes  in  the  temporal  distributions  of  the  first  spikes  in  the  first  feedforward
24 For  instance,  Kirchner  and  Thorpe  (2006)  demonstrated  using  a  forced-choice  saccade  task  that
participant reliably classified images as containing an animal or not by saccades in as little as 120 ms.
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sweep, or a combination  of these described changes.  As discussed in Section 2.4.1.
“Underlying  mechanisms  of  rapid  information  processing”,  the  perceptual  learning
approach  can  well  account  for  our  results  in  Experiment  1,  2,  and  3,  whereas  the
assumption  that  the  modulation  of  response  priming  effects  is  due  to  enhanced
amygdala activation is challenged by the time constrains of our results.
6.4. Pitfalls in emotion research
In Experiment  4,  we demonstrated that  a  prior entry effect  occurs for spider
pictures  in  spider-fearful  participants.  The  effect,  though,  is  small  (Effect  sizes  of
Cohen's d, cf. Section 5.3. and 5.4.) even in participants with a specific fear of spiders.25
Nevertheless, attentional biases are frequently reported the current literature. I believe
that a variety of mechanisms – beside emotionality of the stimulus material – can lead to
attentional biases and that these effects may be misattributed to the emotionality of the
stimuli.  These  mechanisms  comprise  bottom-up  as  well  as  top-down  processes  of
attention. I will discuss some of them and their possible influence on the present results.
6.4.1. Stimulus characteristics
The starting point of conducting the prior entry study reported in the present
thesis  (Experiment 4, Chapter 5) were the studies by West and colleagues (2009) and
Fecica and Stolz (2008).26 In the two studies, the researchers used threat-relevant and
neutral face stimuli and reported a prior entry effect for threat-relevant stimuli in non-
anxious participants. Accordingly, West and colleague (2009) concluded that their study
“provides  direct  evidence  of  the  extent  to  which  motivationally  significant  stimuli
capture attention over other concurrently displayed items in the visual array” (p. 1032).
Yet, I believe that their effects may be explained at least in part in terms of confounds in
low-level vision (e.g., orientation, color) in the stimulus material used in their study.
25 This impression was further supported by a personal conversation on ECVP 2012 with Dr Michael
Pilling who applied roughly the same paradigm as we used in Experiment 4 (Chapter 5). Pilling and his
colleagues  were  not  able  to  demonstrate  a  prior  entry effect  using  a  sample of  non-anxious control
participants. This suggests that attentional biases for threat-relevant pictures in non-anxious participants
are rarely detectable. 
26 Note that these are the only two studies I know of which used the method of temporal order judgments
to demonstrate that threat-relevant stimuli capture attention.
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Furthermore, I believe that the paradigm they applied was not adequate to control for
these effects.
First of all, the authors used schematic faces in four of their six experiments and
assumed  that  these  stimuli  are  motivationally  significant.  However,  several  recent
studies  (cf.  Coelho,  Cloete  & Wallis,  2010;  Becker  et  al.,  2011;  Horstmann,  2007;
Horstmann  & Bauland,  2006;  Stein  & Sterzer,  2012)  cast  doubt  on  the  validity  of
schematic  faces  in  emotion  research.  Researchers  started  to  use  schematic  faces  in
response to the criticism that the frequently found  face in the crowd effect  (i.e.,  the
effect that faces with threatening expressions are more rapidly detected in contrast to
faces with neutral expressions) are due to low-level differences in the images of real
faces  rather  than  biological  preparedness  (Coelho  et  al.,  2010).  Consequently,
researchers  assumed  that  the  schematic  versions  of  emotional  faces  control  for  this
effect. 
Unfortunately, the use of schematic faces leads to other confounds. For example,
Coelho  and  colleagues  (2010)  conducted  a  series  of  visual  search  experiments  and
demonstrated that an advantage in search times for angry schematic compared to happy
schematic  faces  indeed exists.  However,  they also showed that  stimuli  with oblique
oriented  lines  and  with  curved  mouth-like  elements  elicit  a  comparable  effect.
According  to  the  authors,  these  results  “suggest  that  low-level  features  probably
underlie  the  face-in-the-crowd  effect  described  for  schematic  face  images,  thereby
undermining evidence for a search advantage for specific facial expressions” (Coelho et
al., 2010, p. 1). Moreover, Becker and colleagues (2011) conducted seven experiments
using  schematic  faces  that  carefully  controlled  for  confounds  of  low-level
characteristics. They found no advantage in detecting angry faces, but in contrast, found
an advantage in detecting happy faces. Several other recent studies challenge the use of
schematic images in emotion research and conclude that the demonstrated effects are
most likely based on low-level characteristics of the schematic faces (Horstmann, 2007;
Horstmann & Bauland, 2006; Stein & Sterzer, 2012). 
These  findings  show  that  researchers  should  carefully  control  their  stimulus
material concerning the influence of confounding variables. One way to control for the
influence of low-level characteristics is the implementation of a non-anxious control
group similar to what we did in Experiments 1 to 4. Our present experiments are based
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on the assumption that the control and experimental groups differ in respect to their
emotionality. In other words, in case we find an effect in the experimental group, but
not in the control group, we can rule out differences in low-level vision; in case we find
a  comparable  effect  in  the  two  groups,  influences  of  low-level  vision  must  be
considered.  However,  a  control  group  cannot  be  implemented  in  every  paradigm.
Therefore,  suitable  control  stimuli  should  be  considered.  For  instance,  West  and
colleagues  (2009) could have considered using neutral  control  stimuli  in their  study
(e.g.,  like  the  control  stimuli  in  Coelho  et  al.,  2010)  and  pair  them  with  neutral
schematic face stimuli.
6.4.2. Expectancy
A top-down mechanism which may influence the attentional bias is expectancy.
Devue and colleagues (2011) used an additional-singleton task. In this task, participants
searched for a circle and responded to the orientation of a line within that circle. In their
first experiment, the authors additionally presented a spider or butterfly distractor on the
screen. They found that the performance deteriorated in spider-fearful participants each
time one of the distractors appeared, independent of its type. In the second experiment,
Devue and colleagues  (2011) presented the distractors  in blocks (i.e.,  in  each block
either  spider  or  butterfly  detectors  were  presented).  The  authors  found  that  in  that
condition performance solely was impaired in blocks containing spider distractors, but
not in blocks where butterfly distractors were presented. The authors concluded that
performance is only affected in cases in which spider-fearful participants expect spiders
to appear and wrote, “Our results show that people that fear spiders inspect potential
spider-containing locations in a compulsory fashion even though directing attention to
this location is completely irrelevant for the task” (Devue et al., 2011, p. 1; also see
Bermpohl et al., 2006). 
I  assume that  expectancy does  not  play a  major  role  in  Experiments  1  to  3
(Chapter  2  to  4)  of  the  present  thesis  because  neutral,  threat-relevant,  and  phobic
pictures  were randomly presented and not presented in blocks. That  means that,  for
example, spiders appeared frequently and unpredictably across each session. However,
expectancy  might  have  influenced  the  results  of  Experiment  4  (Chapter  5).  In  that
experiment, animals were presented in blocks (i.e., in each block either spiders, snakes
or butterflies appeared). Therefore, it would be interesting to compare our results to a
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paradigm  in  which  the  animal  pictures  are  not  presented  in  blocks,  but  randomly
presented trial by trial. In case expectancy increases attentional capture, I would assume
to find smaller prior entry effects in this experiment. 
6.4.3. Sample characteristics
Differences in sample characteristics might also lead to contradictory results. For
instance, several studies report effects in information processing and/or attentional bias
of threat-relevant stimulus material  in non-anxious control groups (e.g.,  Anderson &
Phelps, 2001; Öhman, Flykt et al., 2001; Piech et al., 2010). However, we were not able
to  find  these  effects  in  any of  our  experiments  (also  cf.  Tipples  et  al.,  2002).  The
conflicting findings suggest that non-anxious control participants in various studies may
differ in research-relevant characteristics, for example in their trait/state anxiety (see,
e.g., Koster et al., 2005; Mogg et al., 2004). 
Furthermore,  depression  questionnaires  should  be  applied  in  every  study
measuring rapid information processing and/or attentional biases. In a study by White
and colleagues (1997), the authors demonstrated that depression slows response times
(also cf. McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009). In studies where fast responses are crucially
important,  depression  questionnaires  should  also  be  used  for  non-anxious  control
participants. Likewise, studies showed that robust attentional biases exist in individuals
with anxiety disorders. However, Mogg and Bradley (2005) summarized in their review
article  that  attentional  biases  are  less  stable  in  participants  with  clinical  depression.
Generally, depression is more frequently reported in individuals with anxiety disorders
(Wittchen et al., 2000). However, it can also occur in participants in the non-anxious
control  group.  I  conclude  that  depression  questionnaires  should  be  used  in  studies
measuring  fast  information  processing  and/or  attentional  biases  even  if  the  sample
consist of non-anxious individuals. 
6.5. Summary
In the present thesis, I was able to demonstrate that information processing of
visual phobic stimuli is enhanced, and, additionally, that this processing differ between
different types of specific phobia (i.e., spider phobia and BII phobia vs. snake phobia).
The empirically and theoretically well-founded method of response priming allows me
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to draw funded assumption how these stimuli are processed. Based on our findings, we
conclude that processing of images in general is most probably based on the first sweep
of  neuronal  activation  (i.e.,  the  first  feedforward  sweep)  which  travels  through  the
visuomotor  system.  Most  interestingly,  the  already  rapid  information  processing  of
natural images is further enhanced for phobic images in the respective fearful group. We
assume that this further enhancement can be easily explained by long-term perceptual
learning processes and in terms of hardwired binding (i.e., effortless recognition of the
phobic objects via hardwired neuronal conjunctions). These findings are in contrast to
the  frequently  reported  assumption  that  the  amygdala  plays  a  major  role  in  the
processing of phobic and threat-relevant stimulus material. Based on our results of the
first 3 experiments, I conclude that response priming is an excellent method which is
able to reveal the underlying mechanisms of rapid information processing of natural
images in general and of phobic images specifically. Also, it can be easily adapted for
research  in  the  field  of  clinical  psychology.  Additionally,  we  were  also  able  to
demonstrate  that  the  frequently  reported  early  attentional  bias  in  individuals  with
specific  phobia  is  strong enough to  trigger  a  prior  entry effect  of  spider  images  in
spider-fearful individuals. I propose that these findings can also be explained by long-
term perceptual learning processes in the way that perceptual learning might strengthen
the attentional bias by providing a more salient bottom-up signal for phobic images.
Closing, I conclude that (1) early information processing of threatening stimuli
is indeed enhanced in individuals with specific phobias but that (2) differences between
divers  types  of  phobia  exist  and that  (3)  the  frequently reported  attentional  bias  of
spider-fearful  individuals  is  also  detectable  in  a  prior  entry  paradigm measured  by
temporal order judgments.
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